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APPLYING EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND THE FICAS MODEL: 
A CASE STUDY OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND CURRENCY 
TRADING 
RAJBHALA• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Equilibrium Theory In Brief 
Is international banking law in a state of chaos? Or, is the law moving to-
ward a stable dynamic equilibrium? I address these issues in the present article 
by applying a theory of equilibrium developed in my article Equilibrium The-
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ory, the FICAS Model and International Banking Law.1 
In the Equilibrium Theory article, I focus on two questions. First, what 
does "equilibrium'~ mean inthe i~temational banking context? Second, what 
are the determinants of a stable dynamic equilibrium? I answer the first ques-
tion by arguing that a legal regime is likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium 
if banks would have no legitimate reasons to present significant opposition to 
that regime. Banks' challenges may destabilize the regime because the 
authority responsible for creating the regime, the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision (or Basle Supervisors Committee ("BSC")), is de facto comQelled 
to change the regime.2 
I answer the second question by identifying five independent determinants 
of stability, collectively referred to as the FICAS variables: the Frequency of 
adjustments to rules in a regime; the Intricacy of the rules; the Cogency of the 
rules; the Authority of the rules; and the Scope of the rules. The FICAS model 
I develop hypothesizes five relationships: (1) the more frequent the adjust-
ments to rules in a regime, the more likely banks will oppose the regime; (2) 
the more intricate the rules, the more likely banks will oppose the re~ime; (3) 
the less cogent the rules, the more likely banks will OQpose the regime; (4) the 
less authoritative the rules, the more likely banks will oppose the regime; and 
(5) the narrower the scope of application of the rules, the more likely banks 
will oppose the regime. 
Finally, in the Equilibrium Theory article, I argue the FICAS model sug-
gests an "ideal type" of regime in international banking law. In other words, 
the model prescribes a type of regime unlikely to give banks reason for oppo-
sition and, therefore, is likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium. This ideal 
type is a self-regulatory regime. In such a regime, banks-not the BSC-are 
principally responsible for drafting rules and propo.sals for the regime. 
An analysis of the FICAS variables reveals the reasons why self-regulation 
is an ideal type. In a self-regulatory regime, banks are free to set an adjust-
ment frequency and intricacy level with which they ;are comfortable. As ra-
tional actors, banks adopt rules and proposals they find cogent. The authority 
of banks to devise rules and proposals is "delegated" by the BSC and domes-
tic bank regulators, and banks attempt to widen the scope of application of the 
regime to ensure a level, competitive playing field. 
Thus, the issue to which I now wish to address may be rephrased as fol-
lows: to what extent, if any, does international banking law resemble the ideal 
type self-regulatory regime as prescribed by the FICAS model? 
I. 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Equilibrium Theory]. 
2. The BSC was established in 1975 and formally known as the "Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices." See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Introductory Note, 30 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 967 n.l (1991). It is usually referred to by its informal name, "Basle 
Committee." !d. 
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B. Why Study This Regime? 
·This issue can be explored via a general equilibrium analysis, i.e., by ask-
ing whether equilibrium exists at a given moment in all legal regimes in inter-
national banking. Such regimes include capital adequacy, foreign bank regu-
lation, information sharing and disclosure among bank regulators, and 
regulation of on- and off- balance sheet banking transactions. Alternatively, 
the issue can be addressed by a partial equilibrium analysis, that is, an inquiry 
into the stability of a single legal regime over time. 
For tWo reasons, I pursue the latter course.3 First, a general equilibrium· 
analysis of international banking law may not be well-suited to a law review 
article given the space constraints in this mode of discourse. The problem is 
exacerbated because I wish to engage in a time-series analysis. That is, rather 
than looking at equilibrium in a given moment, I want to consider it over a pe-
riod of time-an inherently more meaningful inquiry. 
The second and more significant reason is the presence of an outstanding 
candidate for partial equilibrium analysis: the capital adequacy regime for for- · 
eign exchange transactions. The BSC developed its capital adequacy regime 
between 1988-96 by publishing eight documents:4 
3. Therefore, no inference about the stability of other international bankin·g law regimes 
can be drawn from my conclusions in Parts II and III of this article. 
4. All documents listed below are on file with the author and may be obtained from the 
Bank for International Settlements, Postfach, CH 4002, Baste, Switzerland. 
. Because the BSC lacks rule-making authority, it is technically precise to use the term 
"guidelines" instead of "rules" when speaking of the capital adequacy regime. However, be-
cause in practice the 1988 Accord has been implemented throughout the G-1 0 countries, and 
many non-G-10 countries, the guidelines have become rules. Accordingly, the term "rules" is 
used throughout the text and Capital Adequacy Regime Appendix. 
The BSC's economic and financial studies are sent to persons on its mailing list. How-. 
ever, one of the frustrations associated with research in international banking law is the diffi-
culty in obtaining the BSC's legal documents. Few such documents appear on LEXIS or in In-
ternational Legal Materials, and if they are so published it is only after a great delay. Typically, 
the best way to obtain a document is through personal contacts. The BSC ought to follow the 
example of the World Trade Organization and ensure the results of its legal work are widely 
disseminated and easily accessible. One step would be to include the BSC's legal documents on 
the mailing list, and expand the addressees to cover legal data bases and law libraries. This step 
would be consistent with the BSC's self-interest of promoting itself as a pre-eminent interna-
tional banking law forum. 
Of course, the BSC has rules and proposals for the capital adequacy treatment of many 
transactions in addition to foreign exchange. See, e.g., Frederick M. Struble & Norah Barger, 
International Capital Standards for Banking Institutions, in I REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS 
4-19 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner, eds., 2d ed. 1995) (summarizing the 1988 Baste Capital 
Accord credit risk requirements); Joseph Jude Norton, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK 
SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 193-212 (1995) (also summarizing the credit risk capital require-
ments contained in the 1988 Accord); I GLOBAL RISK BASED CAPITAL REGULATIONS (Charles 
A. Stone & Anne Zissu eds., 1994) (treating selected topics concerning the BSC's capital ade-
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(1) The 1988 Basle Accord 5 a report establishing capital adequacy re-
quirements to cover potential losses resulting from credit risks associated. with 
on- and off-.balance sheet transactions;~ 
(2) The 1993 Market Risk Proposa/ 7 a "consultative proposal" to amend 
the 1988 Accord by requiring an express capital charge to cover potential 
losses resulting from market risks arising from trading activities.8 
(3) The 1993 Netting Proposal 9 a "consultative proposal" to amend the 
1988 Accord to recognize the credit-risk .reduction effects of certain netting 
techniques. 10 
(4) The 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposa/ 11 a "consultative proposal" to 
amend the 1988 Accord to measure interest rate risk arising from trading ac-
quacy regime); RAJ BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK-BASED CAPITAL 43-102 (1989) (discussing 
the Basle Accord rules to safeguard against the risk of loss arising from credit risks associated 
with a variety of on- and off-balance sheet banking transactions). 
5. The formal title of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord is International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 980 (1991), re-
printed in 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 5403 (July 29, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Basle,Capital 
Accord]. · · 
6. "Credit risk" is the risk of counterparty failure, i.e., the risk a bank's counterparty will 
default on its obligations to the bank. See 1988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 5, at~~ 8, 31. 
7. The formal title of the 1993 Market Risk Proposal is The Supervisory Treatment of 
Market Risks (Apr. 1993) [hereinafter 1993Market Risk Proposal]. The 1993 Market Risk Pro-
posal is prefaced by The Prudential Supervision of Netting, Market Risks and Interest Rate Risk 
(Apr. 1993) [hereinafter The Prudential Supervision of Netting]. 
8. "Market risk" is the "risk of losses in on- and off- balance-sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices." That is, it is the risk of loss in the value of a financial asset be-
cause of absolute·or relative price changes in exchange rates, interest rates, .or·equity values. 
See 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 1, glossary at 45. Thus, the term "market risk" 
encompasses the narrower term "foreign exchange risk," which is the risk exchange rate 
movements will affect adversely the financial position of a ·bank. See 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment, infra note 16, at l. In currency trading, market risk arises because of interest rate 
as well as exchange rate fluctuations associated with the currencies traded. . 
Market risk is relevant to interest-rate related instruments and equities in a bank's 
trading book, as well as to foreign exchange instruments. See 1996 Market Risk Amendment, 
infra note 16, at l. The term "trading book" includes a bank's proprietary positions in financial 
instruments it holds for short-term resale in anticipation of gains from differences between pur-
chase and sale prices .. See infra note 82 for a more complete definition. 
9. The formal title of the 1993 Netting Proposal is The Supervisory Recognition of Netting 
for Capital Adequacy Purposes (Apr. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Netting Proposal]. 
10. "Netting" refers to any technique used to calculate a net (as distinct from gross) posi-
tion by offsetting positions associated with a.series oftransactions. See 1988 Basle Capital Ac-
cord, supra note 5, Annex 3. For example, a bank may be obligated to deliver a given currency 
on a particular date. Through a bilateral netting technique known as "netting by novation," this 
obligation is amalgamated with all other obligations for the same currency and value date, 
thereby substituting a single net amount for the previous gross obligations. /d. at Annex 3 n.6 .. 
11. The formal title of the 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposal is Measurement of Banks' Ex-
posure to Interest Rate Risk (Apr. 1993) [hereinafter. 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposa{j. 
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tivities. 12 
(5)The 1994 Netting Amendment 13 an amendment to the 1988 Accord to 
recognize the credit-risk reducing effects of certain netting techniques. 
(6) The 1995 Netting Amendment 14 a second amendment to the 1988 Ac-
cord to recognize the credit-risk reducing effects of certain netting techniques. 
(7) The 1995 Market Risk Proposal 15 another "consultative proposal," 
which supersedes the 1993 Market Risk Proposal, to amerid the 1988 Accord 
by requiring an express capital charge for market risk. 
(8) The 1996 Market Risk Amendment 16 an amendment to the 1988 Basle 
Accord to. cover capital rules on market risk, which confirms the proposed 
12. /d. "Interest rate risk" is "the risk that changes in market interest rates might ad-
versely affect an institution's financial condition." /d. at 33. A classic example of an adverse 
effect is a mismatch between the value of assets and liabilities recorded on a bank's balance 
sheet. As the 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposal states: 
[B]anks are exposed to interest rate risk whenever the interest sensitivity of their assets 
does not match the sensitivity of their liabilities or off-balance-sheet positions. For a 
bank whose liabilities reprice faster than its assets, a rise in interest rates can reduce net 
interest income by increasing the institution's cost of funds relative to its yield on assets, 
and vice versa. Changes in interest rates may affect not only an institution's current 
earnings but also its future earnings and the economic value of its capital, reflecting 
changes in the value of the institution's financial instruments. For the bank with liabili-
ties carrying interest rates which change faster than those. on its assets, its net present 
value will decline if interest rates rise. 
/d. at 4-5. 
· 13. The formal title of the 1994 Netting Amendment is The Capital Adequacy Treatment of 
the Credit Risk Associated with Certain Off-Balance Sheet Items (July 1994) [hereinafter 1994 
Netting Amendment]. The 1994 Netting Amendment is prefaced by a July 15, 1994 Press 
Statement [hereinafter July 15, 1994 Press Statement]. 
14. The formal title ofthe 1995 Netting Amendment is Baste Capital Accord: Treatment of 
Potential Exposure for Off-Balance Sheet Items (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Netting Amend-
ment]. 
15. The formal title of the 1995 Market Risk proposal is Planned Supplement to the Capital 
Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Market Risk Proposal]. The 
1995 Market Risk Proposal is prefaced by a press release dated April 13, 1995 [hereinafter April 
1995 Press Release] and a summary document entitled Proposal to Issue a Supplement to the 
Baste Capital Accord to Cover Market Risks [hereinafter 1995 Proposal to Issue a Supplement]. 
The 1995 Proposal is followed by a commentary entitled An Internal Model-Based Approach to 
Market Risk Capital Requirements (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter Internal Model Based Approach]. 
16. The formal title of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment is Amendment to the Capital Ac-
cord to Incorporate Market Risks (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter 1996Market Risk Amendment]. The 
1996 Market Risk Amendment is prefaced by a Dec. 12, 1995 Press Statement [hereinafter De-
cember 1995 Press Statement], a Dec. 12, 1995 Communique [hereinafter December 1995 
Communique], and a summary document entitled Overview of the Amendment to the Capital 
Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter Overview]. The 1996 Amendment 
is followed by a paper entitled Supervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting" in Con-
junction with the Internal Models Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements (Jan. 1996) 
[hereinafter Supervisory Framework For the Use of "Backtesting"]. 
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amendment in the 1995 Market Risk Proposal. 
This enumeration suggests one reason why the capital adequacy regime for 
foreign exchange transactions is an excellent case to which to apply equilib-
rium theory. The rapid pace of issuance ofthese documents and their extraor-
dinary complexity reinforces the perception among even seasoned scholars and 
practitioners that international banking law is plagued by upheaval and tur-
moil. 
Indeed, the eight documents have attracted significant attention from 
banks. Banks have provided comments to the BSC (or their relevant domestic 
bank regulators) to pressure the BSC to modify its existing or proposed rules. 
For example, in 1993 three major banking groups, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, the British Bankers' Association, and the Institute of 
International Finance, published lengthy critiques of the BSC's consultative 
papers. 17 These critiques effectively forced the BSC to publish a revised con-
sultative paper in 1995, which in tum was the subject of another round of 
comments from banks. 18 The BSC again responded to criticisms by issuing 
the 1996 Market Risk Amendment. 
The second basis for asserting this regime is that it is an excellent candi-
date for partial equilibrium analysis. Capital adequacy is the heart of interna-
tional banking law. The existing and proposed rules in the BSC's capital ade-
quacy regime are key weapons in the regulatory arsenal against future 
17. See Letter from Joseph Bauman, Chairman, International Swaps and Derivatives Asso-
ciation, Inc., to Baste Committee on Banking Supervision re: Consultative Proposal by the Ba-
ste Committee: Capital Adequacy for Market Risk (Dec. 28, 1993) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Letter from Joseph Bauman]; British Bankers' Association, The Supervisory Treat-
ment of Market Risks- Comments on the Baste Consultative Paper, Oct. 1993 (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk]; Institute of International Finance, 
Report of the Working Group on Capital Adequcy-A Response to the Baste Committee on 
Banking Supervision 1993 Consultative Papers, Oct. 1993 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Capital Adequacy]; Institute of International Finance, An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach 
to Derivitives Activities, May 1993 (on file with author) [hereinafter An Integrated Bank Regu-
latory Approach]. The three groups represent a very substantial number of banks active in the 
foreign exchange market. 
18. See, e.g., Letter from David H. Sidwell, Managing Director and Controller, J.P. Morgan 
to William W. Wiles, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. re: Baste 
Committee Proposal on the Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks (Aug. 2, 1995) (with at-
tachments) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Sidwell]; Letter from Gay H. Evans, 
Chairman, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, to Baste Committee on Banking 
Supervision re: Planned Supplement to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (July 
31, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Evans]. In addition, the Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Comm's offered comments on the 
1995 Market Risk Proposal. See Technical Comm., Int'l Org. of Sec. Commissioners, 
"Implications for Securities Regulators of the Increased Use of Value at Risk Models by Secu-
rities Firms" (July 1995) (on file with author). 
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international bank collapses.19 The amount of capital maintained by banks is a 
critical· indicator of their financial health and the overall safety and soundness 
of the international banking system. Additionally, any capital adequacy re-
gime devised by the BSC represents an ambitious effort to harmonize banking 
law across borders and thereby level the competitive playing field among 
banks from different countries.20 
In turn, the capital adequacy regime shapes events in the world's largest 
financial market, the over-the-counter ("OTC") foreign exchange market. 
This market boasts daily trading of over one trillion dollars worth of foreign 
currencies.21 To put this amount into perspective, observe that the total value 
of all goods and services traded globally in 1995 was $6 trillion dollars.22 
Thus, roughly every week the annual value of world trade.is turned over in the 
foreign exchange market. In fact, referring to a single foreign exchange 
"market" is somewhat misleading. There is a global bazaar that never closes 
in which there is a market for every freely convertible currency. In this cur-
19. See, Ethan B. Kapstein, Shockproof, 74 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 (1996) (arguing capital 
adequacy requirements have saved financial markets from potentially disastrous consequences 
of the Mexican peso crisis and the Barings collapse). I am somewhat skeptical of Kapstein's 
optimistic assessment. See David Mutch, 20 Years of Hard Work Ease Impact of Financial Fi-
ascos, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 1, 1996, at 8 (noting my skepticism). 
20. See, 1988 Baste Capital Accord, supra note 5, ~ 3 (stating the Accord should be applied 
consistently to banks in different countries "with a view to diminishing an existing source of 
competitive inequality among international banks"); Hal S. Scott & Shinsaku Iwahara, In 
Search of a Level Playing Field, 46 GROUP OF THIRTY OCCAJSIONAL PAPERS (1994) (exploring 
the consistency of implementation of the Accord in the U.S. and Japan, and questioning the ex-
tent to which the Accord levels the competitive playing field); Raj Bhala & Ethan Kapstein, The 
1988 Baste Capital Accord and Financial Competition, 90 HARV. Bus. REv. 158 (Jan.-Feb. 
1990) (discussing the numerous opportunities for bank regulators to exercise discretion when 
implementing the Accord). 
21. Bank for International Settlements Press Communique, Central Bank Survey of Foreign 
Exchange Market Activity in Apri/1995: Preliminary Global Findings (Oct. 24, 1995). After 
adjusting for double counting, the Bank for International Settlements estimates the average daily 
turnover of spot, forward, and swap contracts is $1.230 trillion. This figure excludes currency 
options. See also Big: The Foreign Exchange Market, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1995, at 63 
(discussing the estimates). 
The Bahk for International Settlements' previous survey of trading volumes in the for-
eign exchange market yielded similar results, though a comparison of the two sets of results in-
dicates the market has continued to grow in size at an impressive rate. See MONETARY AND 
ECONOMIC DEPARTMENT, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK SURVEY 
OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ACTIVITY IN APRIL 1992 1, 5, and Table I at 6 (March 1993) 
(noting gross average daily turnover of approximately $1 trillion, including trading in all OTC 
instruments, namely, spots, forwards, and derivatives (options and currency swaps) as well as 
exchange-traded derivatives (options and futures), but excluding cross-currency interest rate 
swaps) [hereinafter CENTRAL BANK SURVEY]. 
22. See Frances Williams, WTO Predicts Robust Trade Growth, Despite Slowdown, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at 14. 
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rency bazaar, there is a broad assortment of transactions, from simple spots 
and forwards to OTC derivative contracts such as options and swaps.23 
Given this enormous size and diversity, it is not surprising the BSC and 
domestic bank regulators are concerned about the currency bazaar.24 They in-
fluence it in part by the amount and nature of the capital charges they impose 
on banks active in the bazaar. First, the requisite capital charges can affect the 
overall liquidity in currency markets: the greater the capital requirements, the 
more expensive it is to trade in the markets, hence the less desirable (ceteris 
paribus) it is to trade, and the less liquid the markets become. Second, capital 
charges can strongly and perhaps adversely affect the ability of banks to com-
pete with one another and non-bank players in the bazaar, particularly if differ-
ent requirements are imposed by different regulators.25 Finally, like any regu-
lation, capital adequacy requirements can be a barrier to new bank entry into 
the bazaar.26 
23. See the Transactions Appendix to this article. While there is some debate about the 
meaning of the term "derivatives," it is commonly understood to encompass "financial instru-
ments which derive their value from the performance of assets, interest or currency exchange 
rates, or indexes." Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular 277, Risk Man-
agement of Financial Derivatives 4 (Oct. 1993) reprinted in Safety and Soundness Issues Re-
lated to Bank Derivatives Activities-Part /, Hearing before the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 688 (Oct. 28, 1993). Accordingly, there is no 
need to actually buy the underlying asset, interest rate or currency instrument, or index. See 
also Claude Brown, How to Recognize a Derivative, 14 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 28 (May 1995); Jo-
seph S. Rizzello, The Development and Evolution of Derivative Products, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
DERIVATIVES & SYNTHETICS 2-3 (Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman, eds., 1994); GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 3, 24 (GAO/GGD-94- 133, May 1994). For 
instance, currency options and currency swaps are examples of derivatives in that their value 
depends in part on an exchange rate for an underlying pair of currencies. In addition, forwards 
are sometimes classified as derivatives. See Office ofthe Comptroller of the Currency, Banking 
Circular 277, supra, at 4; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, supra, at 
26-27. 
24. For instance, recently leading central banks have warned about failure to settle large 
foreign exchange liabilities. See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Bank for In-
ternational Settlements, Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions (Mar. 1996); Philip 
Gawith, Banks Warned Over Foreign Exchange Risks, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at 1 and 
George Graham, BIS Outlines Forex Settlement Risk Strategy, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at 5. 
For a discussion of foreign exchange settlement issues and wire transfer law, see Raj Bhala, The 
Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J. 347 (1993). 
25. See generally Scott & Iwahara, supra note 20, at 49-54 (discussing the original versus 
current exposure method for calculating the credit risk equivalent amount of foreign exchange 
contracts). 
26. Regulation can, of course, be a barrier to entry in the foreign exchange (or any other) 
market. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 154-55 
(15th ed. 1995) (discussing different forms oflegal restrictions); Raj Bhala, Self-Regulation in 
Global Electronic Markets through Reinvigorated Trade Usages, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 863, 912-13 
n. 138 (1995) (stating legally recognized "usages of trade can raise costs of entry into the for-
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In sum, a second reason for focusing on the BSC's capital treatment of the 
currency bazaar is that this regime represents one of the most significant inter-
sections between rules and a market in international banking. However, each 
part of this intersection tends to attract independent attention. There are 
countless handbooks describing foreign exchange instruments and "how to 
trade" currencies.27 Several excellent guides to international bank capital ade-
quacy rules exist.28 Little attention is given to the intersection itself How do 
eign exchange market because potential new entrants must Jearn those usages"); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 312 (4th ed. 1992) (defining a barrier to entry as "a 
condition that makes the long-run costs of a new entrant into a market higher than the long-run 
costs of the existing firms in the market," and citing "regulatory limitation on entry" as "a 
good example"); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 38 (1988) (noting 
"statutory and other legal restrictions on entry" as a barrier to entry). At the same time, the 
number of participants in the foreign exchange market is quite large. One estimate puts the fig-
ure at about 200,000 active traders. See ANDREW KRIEGER, THE MONEY BAZAAR 21 (1992). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests roughly 2,000 banks around the world trade foreign exchange in 
the ordinary course of business. Thus, while capital adequacy requirements could pose a sub-
stantial barrier to entry, the degree of competition already in the market should not be underes-
timated. 
27. See, e.g., CORNELIUS LuCA, TRADING IN THE GLOBAL CURRENCY MARKETS (1995); 
DAVID F. DEROSA, CURRENCY DERIVATIVES (1995); Eileen Baecher, Swaps and the Deriva-
tives Markets, in HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES, supra note 23, at 113-43; JOHN F. MARSHALL & 
KENNETH R. KAPNER, THE SWAPS MARKET 55-119 (2d ed. 1993); COOPERS & LYBRAND, 
CURRENCY SWAPS (1992); JACK D. SCHWAGER, THE NEW MARKET WIZARDS 17-68, RUDI 
WEISWEILLER, HOW THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET WORKS 9-38, 109-185 (1990); JACK D. 
SCHWAGER, MARKET WIZARDS 3-190 (1989); GARY L. GASTINEAU, THE OPTIONS MANUAL 
255-59 (3d ed. 1988); and TORBEN JUUL ANDERSEN, CURRENCY AND INTEREST-RATE HEDGING 
(1987). 
28. See, e.g., Matthew Elderfield, Basle Publishes Final Market Risk Capital Standards 11 
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 125 (1996) (explaining the BSC's 1996 market 
risk rules); Barbara C. Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting and Derivatives, 2 STANFORD J. L., 
Bus. & FIN. 167 (1995) (tracing the evolution of capital adequacy requirements for derivatives 
transactions); Walter I. Conroy, Note, Risk-Based Capital Adequacy Guidelines: A Sound 
Regulatory Policy or A Symptom of Regulatory Inadequacy?, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 2395 (1995) 
(considering whether capital adequacy rules guarantee bank soundness); NORTON, supra note 4 
(analyzing the formation and content of capital adequacy requirements); Hal S. Scott, The Com-
petiiive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 885 (1995) (discussing 
the competitive effects of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord); ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 103-28 (1994) (discussing the origins and competitive effects of the 
1988 Bas1e Capital Accord); STONE & ZISSU, supra note 4 (discussing various financial issues 
associated with the 1988 Basle Capital Accord); Struble & Barger, supra note 4 (providing an 
expositional treatment of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord and its implementation irt the U.S.); 
MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS 48-61 
(treating the implementation of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord in the European Union); Matthew 
Elderfield, Developments in EC and International Capital Adequacy Regulations, 2 J. FIN. REG. 
& COMPLIANCE 314 (1994) (explaining the BSC's 1993 proposed market risk rules); Scott & 
Iwahara, supra note 20. For additional sources on the 1988 Basle Capital Accord, see infra note 
475. 
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the BSC's existing and proposed rules work in the currency bazaar?. What are 
their effects? Would the BSC's rule-making activities be better performed by 
banks? A partial equilibrium analysis using the FICAS model from my first 
article provides insights into these questions. 
C. Argument 
Applying the equilibrium theory to the BSC's capital adequacy regime for 
foreign exchange transactions raises doubts about the stability of this regime 
and underscores the importance of self-regulation by banks. In Part II below, I 
argue the regime as it existed unti/1995 which was not tending toward a stable 
dynamic equilibrium. There were several reasons for banks to oppose-and 
indeed they did oppose-the BSC's capital rules for credit risk, specifically, 
the netting amendments, and its proposed rules for market risk. 
In Part III, I suggest that since 1995, the regime appears to be headed for a 
stable dynamic equilibrium. The post-1995 regime increasingly resembles the 
self-regulatory ideal type. This resemblance is particularly noteworthy with 
respect to the frequency, intricacy, and scope variables of the FICAS model. 
However, pressing concerns about the cogency and authority of the ·regime 
remain. If and when they are addressed, the· resemblance between the ideal 
type and post-1995 regime will be sufficiently close to conclude the latter is a 
stable dynamic equilibrium. 
The policy repercussions of Parts II and III are clear. If legal stability. is 
desired, then banks should play the leading role in devising capital adequacy 
rules. The BSC ought to condone banks trading currencies subject to their 
own internally-generated capital requirements. The BSC should not be a rule 
creator, but rather a non-intrusive referee administering the players' rules. 
In Part IV, I offer concluding remarks. Two appendices provide essential 
background material for this article.29 A Currency Trading Appendix explains 
the major OTC foreign exchange transactions, namely, spots, forwards, op-
tions, and swaps. A Capital Adequacy Regime Appendix reviews the BSC's 
existing and proposed rules for these transactions. 
II. INSTABILITY: THE 1988 ACCORD, 1993 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, 1994 
NETTING AMENDMENT AND 1995 NETTING AMENDMENT 
To create law in disregard of the context in which international commerce op-
erates is to deplete the self-sufficiency of the merchant regime; it is to create a 
legal system in a vacuum at the expense of the practical necessities of busi-
ness. 
29. Hereinafter, familiarity with the material in these Appendices is assumed. 
1996] APPLYING EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND THE FICAS MODEL 135 
LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 
97 (1983). 
[W]e are forced to conclude that central bankers are failing to give the lead 
they should over the guardianship of the financial system .... With regulation 
having assumed a high profile, their reputation is suffering more than they care 
to admit. 
MARJORIE DEANE & ROBERT PRINGLE, THE CENTRAL BANKS 148 ( 1994). 
Applying the FICAS model to the capital adequacy regime for foreign ex-
change spots, forwards, options, and swaps demonstrate that the regime did not 
tend toward a: stable dynamic equilibrium between 1988-95. During this pe-
riod, the regime was hardly a self-regulatory one. The evidence in favor of 
this result is summarized in Table 1. This Table indicates that banks had many 
legitimate reasons to object to the 1988 Accord and 1993 Market Risk Pro-
posal. Indeed, banks did manifest publicly their objections to these docu-
ments. The Table also shows banks had a legitimate basis for objecting to the 
1994 and 1995 Netting Amendments. Overall, bank objections to the 1988 
Accord, 1993 Market Risk Proposal, and 1994 and 1995 Netting Amendments 
ca5t doubt upon the stability of the regime. 
In contrast, Part III applies the FICAS model to the 1995 Market Risk Pro-
posal and 1996 Market Risk Amendment and argues the capital adequacy re-
gime for foreign exchange transactions may be· moving toward a stable dy-
namic equilibrium as a result of this Proposal and Amendment. Through these 
documents, the BSC allows for constrained self-regulation. 
A. Frequency: More Upheaval Than Necessary? 
1. The Blistering Pace OfBSC Issuances 
The frequency of adjustment to the capital adequacy regime for foreign 
exchange transactions between 1988-95 is a basis for bank opposition to the 
regime. Eight times in eight years the BSC issued rules or proposals. As indi-
cated above,30 in 1988, it published an initial set of rules on credit risk. In 
1993, the BSC proposed changes to those rules to deal with netting, and then 
finalized new netting rules in 1994 and 1995. In 1993, the BSC issued a mar-
ket risk proposal. In 1993, it also issued an interest rate risk proposal. In 
1995, it issued a superseding market risk proposal, and subsequently finalized 
this proposal in 1996. 
30. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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FICAS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND RESULTS 
STABILITY OF BSC'S CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGIME 
FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTION 
Frt~~utncy of A4Justmtna Does Not Favor Stabillty Because: 
Inverse relationship between frequency and stabiHty-high While possibly DOl SO frequent as to be OVe!Whclming, the 
adjustment frequency is lilcely to undermine stability. ad'ustment orocess mav have caused unnecessary upheaval. 
Intricacy ofru/ts Does Not Favor Stabillty Because: 
Inverse relationship between 1993 Market Risk Proposal regarding calculation of eapilal charge 
intricacy and stabili~plcr, more flexible rules are lilcely to 
·for debt derivatives is complex and, in some respects, seems 
enhance stability. arbilnllY~ 
Cogtncy ofrults Does Not Favor Stabillty Because: 
Direct relationship between cogency and stability-pcr.;uasivo, (I) By emphasizing product types, the 1993 Market Risk 
well-grounded rules are lilcely to conttibute to stability. Proposal did not take a holistic view of risks and 'could have 
mised systemic market risk by discouraging cross-product 
hedging. 
(2) 1993 Market Risk Proposal does not encoumge the usc of 
occ:umte and sophi~cated risk management techniques 
devised by banks. 
(3) The 3 percent add on fuctor for calculating the capilal charge 
for foreign exchange risk under the 1993 Market Risk · 
Proposal is arbilnllY 
(4) The 1994 Netting Amendment might not cover spots, has no 
set timetable for implemeutatiou, and places too many 
burdens on banks which, in turu, may discoumge banks from 
developing occ:umte and sophisticated risk management 
techniques. 
(5) The fonnula in thC 199S Netting Amendment for recognizing 
the credit risk reduction effects of netting on potential future 
exposure appears arbilnllY. 
Authorlly of rules Does Not Favor Stabillty Because: 
Direct relationship between authority and stability-binding (I) 1988 Accord may not create binding obligations as a matter 
obligations are likely to enhance stability. of public intcroationallaw. 
Scopt of rules Does Not Favor Stabillty Because: 
Direct relationship between scope and stabili~mprehcnsive (I) 1988 Accord does not account for market or interest rate 
applicability of rules is lilcely to foster stability. risks 
(2) 1993 Market Risk Proposal could be implemented in 
different 0-10 countries. 
(3) Clipilal adequacy regime applies to commercial banks from 
non-0-1 0 countries only to the extent those countries choose 
to adhere to the regime. 
(4) Capilal adeQuacy regime applies only to commercial, not 
investment banks. 
' 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OBT AJNED FROM APPLYING THE FICAS MODEL TO THE 1988 
ACCORD, 1993 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL, AND 1994 NETTING AMENDMENT 
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,No doubt many banks must have been overwhelmed l?y this blistering pace 
of developments. They had to digest quickly the substance of the new rules 
and proposals. To do so, the banks had to consider the effect of these rules and 
proposals on their capital levels and major transactional areas on a global ba-
sis. Accordingly, they incurred adjustment costs, namely, the time and money 
associated with legal and financial analyses. 
·Moreover, two· features related to the frequency of adjustment gave banks 
a legitimate reason to oppose the regime. First, the process by which the BSC 
proposed to adjust rules in the capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange 
transactions was inefficient. Second, the BSC seemed to lack a coherent strat-
egy in the timing of its adjustmepts to the regime. These features suggest the 
BSC's modus operandi contributes to the instability. of its regime, as banks 
may wonder whether the BSC is a source of avoidable upheaval. 
2. An Inefficient Process7 . 
·The adjus_tment process was-and still is-a sequential one involving the 
BSC, domestic bank regulators, and banks. Either the BSC as a whole, or 
more likely a subset of its members, develops an idea regarding capital ade-
quacy ... The BSC' discusses, negotiates, and eventually publishes a rule or pro-
posal. Some bank regulators might promulgate a proposed implementing 
regulation. Banks comment oil the BSC issuance and any proposed imple-
menting regulation, and the BSC and domestic regulators pay attention to such 
comments, possibly incorporating the comments into the final version of a rule 
or regulation.31 
It is reasonable for banks to view this sequential process as inefficient. 
Currency trading is a fast-paced, . high-technology business in which banks 
need clear answers yesterday. The multi-step process, while resulting in plenty 
of rules and proposals between 1988-95, is cumbersome. The adjustrrient 
process places the most significant player-banks in a reactive posture. Why 
sho.uld they have to wait and then. comment upon new proposals from Basle? 
Wliy are they not direct participants in the BSC's deliberations, which are 
conducted .in camera, but rather represented indirectly through bank regulators 
that have their own distinct interests? What value added exists in each step of 
the sequential interaction that could not be added at once with direct bank rep-
resentation? Banks reasonaoly could argue that if the BSC "asked the banks 
to sit at the bargaining table," then the BSC would "get it right the first time" 
and avoid unnecessary iterations in the movement toward a stable dynamic 
equilibrium. 
Such an argument is fueled by the contrast between the banks' reactive 
31. See Bhala, Equilibrium Theory, supra note I (manuscript pts. 11.8.2 and III.E. I, on file 
with author). 
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posture and the reality of currency trading. Professors Eskridge and Frickey 
point out that "an important feature of law as equilibrium [is that] the deeper 
changes in law ... occur when the relative social, economic, and political 
power of affected groups changes."32 In recent years, growing attention has 
been given to the shift in the relative balance of power among institutions 
away from central banks and toward market players. 33 One author likens 
"currency traders [who] sweep away economic empires that have lost their 
power to resist" to "the vandals who conquered decadent Rome. " 34 Another 
author (who is a currency trader) says bluntly that "[t]he market is always 
right, and over time no one player can ever hope to dominate it. " 35 Still an-
other source intimates domestic regulators and the BSC cannot keep up with 
marketplace reality: "the markets have moved on, even as regulators hammer 
out the rules."36 A good example is that by the time the BSC had released its 
1993 Market Risk Proposal, banks were developing their own risk manage-
ment techniques, like J.P. Morgan's value at risk methodology discussed be-
low in Part III. 
One inference from these anecdotes is that banks are frustrated by, perhaps 
even chafe at, their reactive posture. They may view the BSC and its domestic 
bank regulator members as Lilliputians who ought to realize they are at the 
mercy of a far larger force. The modem-day Lilliputians irritate banks by fir-
ing round after round of rules or proposals, thereby driving up banks' adjust-
ment costs, while suspicious of or oblivious to the giants' ability to exercise 
self-restraint. 
3. A Piecemeal Approach? 
This inference is reinforced by a second facet of the adjustment process. 
The BSC adjusts the capital adequacy regime in a piecemeal fashion. It has 
not sought with a single stroke a broad regime encompassing all risks associ-
ated with foreign exchange transactions. It started with credit risk in 1988, 
moved to market risk, interest rate risk, and netting in 1993, ·dealt again with 
netting in 1994 and 1995, returned to market risk in 1995, and then again han-
dled market risk in 1996. Not surprisingly, after the BSC issued its 1993 Mar-
ket Risk Proposal, banks urged the BSC to consider a comprehensive, multi-
dimensional framework that covered all risks with one aggregate ratio. 
32. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REv. 27, 55 (1994). 
33. See, e.g., GREGORY J. MILLMAN, THE VANDALS' CROWN x-xiii, 24-26, 59-61, 121·28, 
189-93 (1995); STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME, 340-95 (1995); MARJORIE DEANE 
& ROBERT PRINGLE, THE CENTRAL BANKS 148-71 (1994); ANDREW KRIEGER, THE MONEY 
BAZAAR 21-22, 89, 210-11 (1992). 
34. MILLMAN, supra note 33, at xii. 
35. KRIEGER, supra note 33, at 92-93. 
36. DEANE & PRINGLE, supra note 33, at 170. 
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[B]ecause the relationship between capital requirements for credit, market, 
forex and·interest rate risks is not obvious in the Consultative Papers [i.e., the 
1993 Market Risk Proposal], the [198~] Accord's clear benchmark of 8 per-
cent risk-based capital, will be lost. [T]he [Institute of International Finance 
Working] Group views the Jack of one aggregate capital ratio as a significant 
weakness .... One method would present an aggregate capital ratio that ex-
presses a bank's total capital as~ percentage of its minimum required regula-
tory capital. The other method would create a more explicit link between 
capital requirements for credit risk and market risk.37 
139 
For example, an aggregate capital adequacy ratio method· could entail two 
steps': the calculation of separate capital requirements fo~ credit, market, and 
other risks, followed by a comparison of the capital required for all risks with 
the capital available to meet regulatory requirements.38 The aggregate ratio 
"would show overall capital sufficiency" to meet all of the separ11te capital re-
quirements, "thereby eliminating potential confusion stemming from uneven 
distributions ofcapital requirements among the different risk factors." 39 An 
alternative method-explicitly linking credit and market risk requirements-
might involve a three-step process: measuring the amount of market risk, 
multiplying this amount by a factor (such as eight percent) t~at reflects the 
credit risk capital ratio, and adding the result to credit risk weigJ:lted assets.40 
The goal of both methods would be to ensure that a bank meeting the ratio has 
sufficient capital to cover both credit and market risks .. 
Perhaps political pressures among the BSC members disable the BSC from 
pursuing either alternative. In other words, the BSC's piecemeal adjustments 
may be a pragmatic accommodation to the impossibility of developing a global 
capital adequacy strategy. The consequence, howeve~, is uncertainty for 
banks, as they pointed out after the BSC issued the 1993 Market Risk Pro-
posal. · 
The capital requirements [proposed in the 1993 Market Risk Proposal] are 
. clearly intended to be additive to the current CR [credit risk] requirements. 
However, the relationship between the original [1988 Accord] CR capital re-
quirements and the new MR [market risk] requirements remains unclear in the 
Consultative Papers. The proposed capital framework is structured so that 
some items currently covered under the CR rules (which· require explicit capi-
tal cover for items based on their on-balance-sheet value) will instead be cov-
ered under the MR rules .... [T]he introduction of a more complex capital 
framework undermines the certainty and,simplicity of the 8 percent CR r3:tio.41 
Put bluntly, banks wonder when the BSC might publish its next proposed ad-
37. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, INC., Capital Adequacy, supra note 17; at iii. 
38. !d. at 10-11. 
39. /d. at II. 
40. /d. at 11-12. 
41. /d. at 8-9 (emphasis added). 
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justment, what its nature and scope will be, and whether there will be any end 
to new proposals. 
In sum, the frequency of adjustments to the capital adequacy regime for 
foreign exchange transactions between 1988-1995, and the associated adjust-
ment costs, are sufficiently high to engender bank opposition. The reactive 
posture of banks in the adjustment process, coupled with the BSC's erratic 
movements, raise further troubling questions about adjustments to the regime. 
Banks may legitimately question whether more upheaval than necessary has 
occurred. 
B. Intricacy: Calculating Required Capital For Debt Derivatives Under The 
1993 Market Risk Proposal 
In its 1993 Market Risk Proposal, the BSC addresses two issues affecting 
capital adequacy requirements for foreign exchange transactions. First, how 
should a bank calculate the amount of capital it must maintain both to support 
its portfolio of debt derivatives (e.g., forwards and currency swaps) and to 
cover possible losses arising from foreign exchange risk associated with cer-
tain transactions (namely, spots and currency options)? Second, how should a 
bank satisfy the requisite capital charge?42 
The BSC's answer to the second inquiry is relatively straightforward. The 
BSC proposes a new "tier III" category of qualifying capital instruments. 
Specifically, a bank could use subordinated debt to meet its market risk capital 
charge as long as this debt could absorb losses. The BSC proposes tests to 
determine whether a particular subordinated debt instrument would qualify.43 
However, as discussed below, the BSC prohibits the use of tier III capital to 
cover losses caused by foreign exchange risk.44 
The BSC's answer to the first issue, the methodology for calculating 'the 
capital charge, is virtually impenetrable. If the BSC wants banks to digest an 
intricate methodology, then it should provide ample and clear explanations 
about that methodology. It does not do so in the 1993 Market Risk Proposal. 
Worse yet, the dearth of careful rationales makes the BSC's work seem not 
just complex, but also arbitrary. Thus, the 1993 Market Risk Proposal raises a 
number of troubling issues identified by banks.45 Because it is so intricate, the 
Proposal could not possibly contribute to the stability of the capital adequacy 
regime for foreign exchange transactions. When the Proposal was issued, The 
Economist pronounced it stillborn, saying capital rules were "in danger of be-
42. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, INC., Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at 8-9. 
43. !d. at 10-11. 
44. !d. at 11. See infra notes 158-164 and accompanying text. 
45. See Elderfield, supra note 28. See Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17; The Su-
pervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17; Capital Adequacy, supra note 17. 
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coming too bitty (and therefore too burdensome)."46 Nonetheless, the Pro-
posal is being implemented by the G-1 0 countries, albeit in reincarnated form 
through the 1996 Market Risk Amendment discussed below.47 
1. Defining Debt Derivatives 
The best way to convey the intricate and arbitrary nature of the 1993 Mar-
ket Risk Proposal is to explain it.48 The BSC sets as a target capital level the 
amount needed to "cover adequately a high proportion of the losses that would 
have been experienced in any two-week holding period in a range of repre-
sentative portfolios over the last five years. " 49 The capital requirement would 
apply to the current market value of debt securities in which the bank had a 
proprietary position, and to the foreign exchange risk associated with the 
bank's transactions.50 The BSC proposes different calculation methodologies 
for debt securities and foreign exchange risk. 
A threshold ambiguity is delineating the precise scope of these categories. 
"Debt securities" include "debt derivatives," and the latter term applies to 
currency forwards and currency swaps. 51 Whether "debt derivatives" also en-
compass currency options is debatable. On the one hand, options are not ex-
pressly listed in the definition of "debt derivatives."52 On the other hand, the 
BSC's definition is open-ended, stating that "[i]t is proposed to include in the 
46. A Simple Proposal, ECONOMIST, Dec. lith-17th 1993, at 20:20. 
47. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. 
48. The explMation is based on 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 17-20, and the 
bank commentaries cited supra note 17. The BSC provided a thoroughly confusing sample cal-
culation. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra, note 7, Annex 4 at 50-51. 
49. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7; at 5. 
50. ld. at 6. However, some foreign currency positions would be reported at book value. 
"Proprietary positions" are those "taken on with the intention of benefiting in the short term 
from actual or expected differences between their buying and selling prices or of hedging other 
elements of the trading book, or which are held for short-term resale, or in order to execute a 
trade with a customer." /d. 
The BSC also proposed capital charges for equity instruments (including equity deriva-
tives). !d. at 1-32. Thus, the 1993 Market Risk Proposal applies to all positions in a bank's 
"trading book" (i.e., all financial instruments incurred for trading purposes). The distinction 
between a trading and non-trading book is significant because the Proposal applied only to the 
former category. The 1988 Accord applied to a bank's non-trading book and, to some extent, its 
trading book. Banks complained that the distinction was not clear from the Proposal because 
the scope of the trading book category was not delineated with care. See The Supervisory 
Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 5; Elderfield, supra note 28, at 315; infra note 82. 
51. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 21. The 1993 Proposal uses the term 
"cross-currency swaps" by which it appears to encompass both fixed-for-floating and fixed-for-
fixed swaps. 
52. The definition states debt derivatives "would include forward rate agreements (FRAs), 
futures and options on debt instruments, interest rate and cross-currency swaps and forward for-
eign exchange positions." /d. (emphasis added). 
142 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:125 
measurement system those debt derivatives and off-balance sheet instruments 
which react to changes in interest rates and thus affect the reporting institu-
tion's exposure to market risk." 53 An option could be affected by the interest 
rate associated with the currency pair underlying the option. 54 
Apparently, the BSC means to exclude spots, though it does not articulate 
this intent. The BSC does not list expressly spots as a "debt derivative," and it 
is inappropriate to think of them as such because their value is not derived 
from an underlying financial asset.55 In addition, the BSC may mean to ex-
clude spots because the usual two-day maturity of spots is too short to neces-
sitate a capital charge for market risk, and because spots are covered by the 
capital charge for foreign exchange risk discussed below. 56 
2. The Eight Steps 
The 1993 Market Risk Proposal does not expound upon how a bank 
should calculate the market risk associated with its portfolio of debt deriva-
tives. 57 However, a careful review of the Proposal suggests the BSC wants 
banks to apply the following eight-step methodology: (1) convert debt deriva-
tives into underlying notional long or short positions; (2) slot long and short 
positions by maturity; (3) weight the long and short positions by a factor that 
captures price sensitivity of these positions to interest rate changes; ( 4) 
"vertically" offset the weighted long and short positions; (5) adjust the vertical 
offsets by a "vertical disallowance" factor; (6) "horizontally" offset the 
weighted long and short positions; (7) adjust the horizontal offsets by a 
"horizontal disallowance" factor; and (8) obtain the total amount of residual 
net long and short positions. 58 . 
The end goal of these steps is to arrive at a figure representing a bank's 
market risk exposure. That figure equals the amount of capital the bank would 
need to safeguard itself against market risk. In other words, in contrast to the 
53. !d. 
54. See The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at II. 
55. See supra note 23 at 4. 
56. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
57. In the Proposal, the BSC takes a "building block" approach to the.market risk associ-
ated with debt securities; it distinguishes "specific risk" (the risk of loss caused by an adverse 
price movement of a security or a derivative product linked to it due principally to factors re-
lated to the issuer of the security) and "general market risk" (the risk of loss caused by an ad-
verse market movement unrelated to any specific security). /993 Market Risk Proposal, supra 
note 7, Annex I at 44, 46; Elderfield, supra note 28, at 315-16. But, the BSC acknowledges 
specific risk is not relevant to debt derivatives because they are not issued by a private entity. 
(Rather, the BSC proposed to break them down into notional holdings of central government 
securities.) Therefore, only general market risk has to be calculated. 1993 Market Risk Pro-
posal, supra note 7, at 25-26. Accordingly, the term "market risk" used in the context of the 
eight-step methodology discussed below technically refers to general market risk. 
58. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 17-20. 
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1988 Basle Capital Accord, which requires a bank to cover eight percent of its 
credit-risk weighted assets, the 1993 Proposal obligates a bank to cover com-
pletely, "dollar for dollar," its market risk exposure.59 Unfortunately, even 
seasoned international banking scholars and practitioners are sure to find each 
step in the 1993 Proposal hopelessly abstruse. 
In the first step, a bank converts each debt derivative into a long or short 
position in a relevant underlying instrument. This position, which the bank re-
cords at market value, is the basis for calculating the capital charge against 
market risk. The bank reports all long and short positions on a currency-by-
currency basis, and at every subsequent step separate reporting ladders are 
used for each currency. 
Exactly how should a bank convert currency forwards and swaps into long 
and short positions? The BSC provides an illustration of a three.:.month inter-
est rate futures contract purchased in June. The contract is treated as a combi-
nation of a long and short position in a notional government security, namely, 
a long position in a government security with a maturity of five months and a 
short position in a government security with a maturity of two months. 60 
Similarly, an interest rate swap is treated as two notional positions in govern-
ment securities with relevant maturities.61 
But, the BSC provides no explanation of how this "two-legged treatment" 
works in the foreign exchange context. Indeed, it admits readily that some of 
the central banks represented at the BSC believe this treatment is "a needless 
complexity."62 To keep the bank guessing, the BSC refers to the "relevant 
underlying" and the "principal amount of the underlying or notional underly-
ing" without indicating precisely what the underlying "thing" is that the BSC 
has in mind.63 The most logical inference to draw is that the "thing" is the 
currency or currencies that are the subject of the forward or swap contract.64 
But, the BSC casts some doubt on this interpretation because it says forwards 
and swaps should be treated "as notional positions in the relevant instru-
ments .... " instead of using the word "currencies."65 One clue as to the 
BSC's intention appears in its 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposal. That Proposal 
gives an example of a five-month forward contract to sell dollars for Deutsche 
marks. The contract is slotted as a short position in the three-to-six month 
band of the dollar ladder, and a long position in the three-to-six month band of 
the Deutsche mark ladder.66 Does this example mean the "purchased" cur-
59. Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at 11. 
60. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 22. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. 
63. /d. at 21-22. 
64. An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at v. 
65. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 24. 
66. 1993lnterest Rate Risk Proposal, supra note 11, at 23. 
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rency always is slotted as a short position, and the "payment'' currency as a 
long position? Unfortunately, the BSC does not provide an example in the 
1993 Market Risk Proposal for a currency swap to resolve such questions. 
Assuming currency options fall within the scope of the term "debt deriva-
tive," a bank must also convert these instruments into long and short positions. 
The 1993 Market Risk Proposal is no more helpful with respect to currency 
options than with respect to currency forwards and swaps. In fact, the BSC 
admits its proposals for options are "less definitive than for most other ele-
ments of the framework. " 67 It recommends a bank report its option positions 
on a "delta-weighted basis" and, therefore, '!as a position equal to the m~ket 
value of the underlying multiplied by the delta. " 68 To be sure, deltas are fa-
miliar to banks. A delta is "the expected change of an option's price as a pro-:: 
portion of a small change in the price of the underlying instrument. " 69 For ex~ 
ample, a delta of 0.5 means that for every $2.00 change in the price of the 
underlying asset, the value of the option changes by $1.00.7° Unfortunately, . 
the BSC does not elaborate further on its recommendation, and the treatment·. 
of currency options in the remaining steps remains unclear. 
Assuming a bank successfully figures out how to convert its currency-
based debt derivatives into long and short positions in relevant underlying no-
tional principals, it proceeds to the second step. In this step, the bank slots all 
· long and short positions into a maturity ladder consisting of thirteen maturity 
bands. The BSC does not explain why or how it devised these bands-their 
origin is entirely obscure. -A long or short position in (!. fixed-rate instrument is 
slotted on the basis of its residual term to maturity. Presumaply, a currency . 
forward would be slotted in this manner. Likewise, a bank slots both legs ofa. 
fixed-for-fixed currency on the basis of residual term to maturity. As for a 
fixed-for-floating currency swap, the, bank slots the fixed-rate leg on the .basis. 
of the residual term to maturity of the swap, and categorizes the floating rate 
leg on the basis of the next reset date. 
In step three, the BSC establishes numerical weights for a bank to apply to . 
the bank's long and short positions in each currency. The weights "reflect the 
price sensitivity of those positions to changes in interest rates. " 71 The BSC 
provides weights for each maturity band. But, with almost no explanation, the .. 
BSC. states the value of the weights are based on (1) the price sensitivity in an 
eight-percent interest rate environment of an eight-percent coupon bond with .a 
67. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 23. 
68. ld. at 23. 
69. ld. Annex I, at. 43. . 
70. /d. A delta is analogous to the concept of elasticity that is applied in markets for goods 
or services. /d. Deltas give rise to the use of a hedging strategy known as "delta hedging." A 
trader can hedge the risk exposure of an option by buying or selling the underlying asset in pro-
portion to the delta. !d. 
71. ld. at 17. 
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maturity equal to the mid-point of the maturity band in question to changes in 
interest rates (a concept known as "modified duration") and (2) "an assumed 
change in yield which is designed to cover about two standard deviations of 
one month's yield volatility in most major markets." 72 What is the underlying 
logic? Why were eight percent figures used?73 Why two standard deviations 
of one month's volatility? What are "major" markets? . 
The BSC calls step four "vertical offsetting." A bank counterbalanc~s its 
weighted long and short positions within each of the thirteen maturity bands 
against on·e another. The result is a single long or short position in each band. 
The BSC recognizes long and short positions in' the same maturity band are not 
strictly comparable. For instance, some identical positions might have slightly 
different maturities, while others might have the same maturity. but represent 
different instruments. Because of imperfect comparability, a bank might be 
exposed to basis risk, which is "the risk that the relationship between the 
prices of two similar, but not identical, instruments will change-?'74 Conse-
quently, the BSC asserts it "does not believe it would be consistent with its 
prudential objective to permit full offsetting of longs and shorts ... :"75 The 
BSC calls for a compensating adjustment-the vertical disallowance, which is 
step five in the calculation of requisite capital for the m~ket risk associated 
with debt derivatives like currency forwards and currency swaps. 
Without explanation, in step five the BSC proposes a ten-percent vertical 
disallowance factor. A bank applies this factor to the smaller of the offsetting 
positions (whether they are long or short) in each maturity band.76 For exam-
ple, assume in a particular maturity band the sum of the weighted long posi-
tions is $200 million and the sum of the weighted short positions is $150 mil-
lion. The vertical disallowance is ten percent of $150 million, or $1 ~ million. 
As a result of vertical offsetting and the vertical disallowance, there are two 
figures associated with each maturity band: . a net weighted long or short posi- · 
tion, which in the above example is $50 million (the difference between the 
$200 million weighted long positions and $150 million weighted short posi-
tions), and a vertical disallowance, which is $15 million in that example. The' 
vertical disallowance factor could be extremely significant--:in some cases, 
possibly as high as 85 percent of the entire capital charge.77 · 
The BSC predicates step six on the observed phenomenon that interest 
rates associated with debt securities of different maturities often move in tan-
72. /d. 
73. The BSC indicated that with the pennission of its domestic bank regulator, a bank with 
the necessary capability could construct its own alternative that used an actual coupon rate and 
residual maturity. See 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 20. 
74. /d. at Annex 1; at 43. 
75. Id. at 18. 
76. /d. 
77. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 10. 
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dem in the same direction.78 For instance, as long-term interest rates rise, so 
too may short- and medium-term rates, albeit perhaps by different magnitudes. 
The BSC concludes it is appropriate for a bank to offset the bank's net 
weighted long or short positions for each maturity band with those positions 
for all other maturity bands. The BSC calls this process "horizontal" offset-
ting. Thus, whereas vertical offsetting nets positions within a single maturity 
band, horizontal offsetting requires netting positions across different bands. 
The BSC proposes two rounds of partial horizontal offsets. The first round 
relies on grouping the thirteen maturity bands into three maturity zones-zero 
to one year, one to four years, and over four years. A bank places its net 
weighted positions associated with each maturity band in the appropriate zone. 
Then, the bank offsets each net weighted position in a zone against the other 
positions in that zone (i.e., intra-zone offsetting) to yield a single position for 
each of the three zones. In the second round of horizontal offsets, the bank 
offsets the three net weighted positions for each zone against one another (i.e., 
inter-zone offsetting) to yield a single net weighted position for all zones. 
Why go through these two rounds? Perhaps the reason lies in the BSC's 
statement that " [ o ]bserved correlation~ suggest that the likelihood of divergent 
movements is lower for nearer segments of the yield curve and higher for more 
distant segments. '~ 79 Unfortunately, the BSC does not elaborate, and banks are 
left to ponder the matter without further assistance. 
Though it does not say why, the BSC indicates it will not permit horizontal 
offsets without some adjustment, and such adjustment constitutes step seven. 
The BSC asserts that in each of the two horizontal offset rounds "the offsetting 
of opposite positions would be subject to a disallowance (expressed, in the 
same way as the vertical disallowance, as a fraction of the smaller of the off-
setting positions), based on observed correlations of interest rate move-
ments."80 Accordingly, step seven involves adjusting horizontal offsets by 
"horizontal disallowance" factors. In Annex 3 to the Market Risk Proposal, 
the BSC lists the horizontal disallowance factors. It offers little insight into the 
derivation of these factors, even though they "would yield significantly higher 
capital requirements than justified [under alternative, more accurate method-
ologies] by limiting the scope for matching long and short positions within a 
zone."81 . 
Step seven yields a single net weighted long or short position for a bank's 
book of debt derivatives. In addition, step seven results in a horizontal disal-
lowance for each of the three maturity zones. The final step-step eight-
produces the overall capital requirement against market risk arising from debt 
78. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 19. 
79. !d. 
80. !d. 
81. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 10. 
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derivatives. A bank adds the horizontal· disallowance factors for each of the 
three maturity zones to the vertical disallowances for each of the thirteen ma-
turity bands. It then adds the grand disallowance figure to the .single net 
weighted long or short position· resulting from step seven. The . total is. the 
market risk capital charge for the portfolio of debt derivatives. Thus, this 
charge is the sum of (1) the net long or short position of a bank's trading 
book,82 (2) a proportion of matched positions in each time band (the vertical 
disallowance), and (3) a proportion of the matched positions across. different 
time bands (the horizontal disallowance).83 
The BSC proposes a significant qualification to.the above-outlined meth~ 
odology for currency-based debt derivatives like forwards and swaps. The 
scope of the qualification is unclear. The BSC states "capital charges [are· to] 
be calculated for each currency separately with no offsetting positions between 
positions of opposite sign. " 84 Does this qualification apply to both horizontal 
and vertical offsets? Does it mean a bank would not have to make. vertical and 
horizontal adjustments? 
Further, the qualification suggests long and short positions in different cur-
rencies cannot be offset.85 For example, a bank cannot offset a 100 million 
yen long position against a 50 million short deutsche mark position: Similarly, 
even matched positions (like that in the example of Hongkong Shanghai 
Bank's fixed-for-floating swaps set forth in the ·Currency Trading Appendix) 
cannot offset one another.86 But, does the BSC also mean to· suggest a bank 
cannot offset long and short positions within a single currency? 
The BSC admi~s the qualification-whatever its precise scope and na-
ture-is "rather harsh. " 87 The qualification assumes "a worst-case scenario in 
82. In brief, a "trading book" is comprised of a bank's proprietary trading positions in 
financial instruments [including off-balance sheet transactions such as derivative prod-
ucts] which are taken on with the intention of benefiting in the short term from actual or 
expected differences between their buying and,selling prices or of hedging other ele-
ments of the trading book, or which are held for short-term resale, or in order to execute 
a trade with a customer. · 
1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 6. In its 1996 Market Risk Amendment; the BSC 
discusses the scope.of the term "trading book" and how to determine whether a financial in-
strument is included therein for purposes of the market risk capital requirements. ·See .1996 
Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 1-2. 
83. See 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note ~5, at 11; 1993 Market Risk Proposal, su-
pra note 7, at 19. 
84. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 19. 
85. ld. at 24. 
86. !d. Under certain circumstances, positions in the same category of instruments and 
same currency could be regarded ·as matched and offset one another. 1993 Market Risk Pro-
posal, supra note 7, at 24. 
87. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
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the movements of interest rates in different currencies. " 88 The BSC attempts 
to defend the qualification by saying "the purpose of the proposals is to pro-
vide protection against movements in interest rates over relatively short peri-
ods and while some correlation across currencies is observable circumstances 
quite frequently occur in which interest rates in different countries move in 
opposite directions. " 89 Surely for banks, this defense is so general as to be un-
persuasive. 
3. Stifling Product Innovation 
The eight-step methodology outlined above is clear only in one respect: it 
illustrates why the 1993 Market Risk Proposal is intricate and, in some re-
spects, arbitrary. These defects have an untoward second-order consequence 
noted by banks. The Proposal is likely to stifle product innovation. One ad-
vantage of a simple capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions 
is flexibility. The more intricate the rules of the regime, the more difficult it 
may become to adapt the regime to new situations without changing the rules. 
In tum, rule changes entail a time-consuming and costly process. The inflexi-
bility of the Proposal renders it difficult to adapt to new international banking 
product innovations.90 
In particular, under the 1993 Proposal market risk was measured on a 
product-by-product basis. Accordingly, the market risk associated with cur-
rency forwards, options, and swaps must be measured separately, and thereaf-
ter the capital charge for each transaction must be calculated and aggregated. 
One difficulty with this methodology is that a product might contain different 
types of risk. For instance, a fixed-for-floating currency swap involves market 
and interest rate risks. An even more fundamental difficulty is that product 
types change. 
It will be difficult to adapt the 1993 Proposal to new products. The prod-
uct type orientation causes capital to be assessed against products, which com-
bine several risk types. As product innovation occurs, this will result in a 
built-in inflexibility to the capital requirements, since each new product type 
will require a new policy from the Basle Committee and local regulators, even 
if the new product constitutes a simple rearrangement of existing risk factors. 
With the rapid pace of new product development and innovation in the finan-
cial services industry, this could soon create a serious monitoring and en-
forcement problem for regulators.91 
The inflexibility of the 1993 Proposal has a potentially adverse effect on 
product innovation in currency trading. To be sure, the decision to introduce a 
88. !d. 
89. /d. at 20. 
90. Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 2. 
91. /d. at 8. 
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new product depends on a thorough cost-benefit analysis, and capital treatment 
is only one factor to be considered in that analysis. Occasionally, a bank's 
product marketers may be so aggressive as to introduce a new product and 
"pay the price" of non-compliance with capital rules at a later date. Yet, at the 
margin the inflexibility of the 1993 Proposal could deter some banks from of-
fering a new product because of concerns about the treatment of the product 
under the Proposal. An additional deterrent could be the waiting period in-
volved in obtaining a decision from the BSC about the proper treatment. Fi-
nally, some banks might withhold a product after obtaining an unfavorable de-
cision from the BSC. 
C. Cogency 
1. Product Types And The 1993 Market Risk Proposal 
a. A Holistic View 
The 1993 Market Risk Proposal lacks cogency in part because it does not 
take a holistic approach to the risks banks incur from foreign exchange trans-
actions. The eight-step methodology is myopic because it focuses on transac., 
tion types: a bank must isolate each type of foreign exchange transaction, 
identify a capital charge to deal with each type, and obtain an aggregate capital 
charge by summing the separate capital charges. The myopia may result in 
excessive capitalization. Indeed, using this approach some banks might have 
to double their existing capitallevels.92 
Three defects in the BSC's proposed methodology account for the possi-
bility of excessive capitalization. First, the BSC neglects the fact that potential 
changes in foreign exchange and interest rates should be examined in tan-
dem.93 For example, the value of a currency forward or option depends on 
both underlying exchange and interest rates. Hence, it is important to tran-
scend product types and simultaneously examine both risk factors. 
Second, banks know well the 1993 Market Risk Proposal does not account 
for portfolio effects. Some market risks associated with currency forward and 
swap obligations in a portfolio offset risks from other obligations; in part be-
cause of diversification of these obligations. To account for this phenomenon, 
it is not sufficient to examine the portion of the portfolio associated with one 
part of an entire banking organization. Rather, it is necessary to take a global 
institutional approach to a bank's portfolio. 
[T]he Consultative Papers [i.e., the 1993 Proposal] are ambiguous concerning 
consolidation of risks and capital requirements within conglomerates. Con-
92. The Sum, Not the Parts, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1993, at 85 .. 
93. Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 4. 
ISO SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Voi.41:12S 
solidation more accurately reflects the true risk exposure borne by each bank 
and its affiliates because mismatch-induced losses in one affiliate within a 
properly hedged holding company will create gains in its affiliated counter-
party. Therefore, when viewed from the larger group perspective, individual 
losses and gains within the group offset each other. 
Failure to recognize the interplay between these intragroup transactions would 
result in an overestimate. of the aggregate risks undertaken by the group as a 
whole. Banking or financial groups tend to evaluate their risks and calculate 
internal capital on a global, consolidated basis .... 
A capital adequacy framework that ignores these legal and market realities by 
focusing on individual banks within a larger group would overestimate risk. It 
would also create excessively large capital requirements .... 94 
Thus, in response to the 1993 Proposal banks lobbied for a holistic ap-
proach. They sought to aggregate risks associated with an entire portfolio, and 
thereafter calculate the capital charge for the market risk associated with that 
portfolio. 95 
Third, the BSC subjects debt derivatives to a credit risk charge in accor-
dance with the 1988 Basle Capital Accord as well as a market risk charge un-
der the 1993 Proposal.96 In response to the Proposal, banks rightly pointed out 
the possible inverse relationship between credit and market risk exposure: 
The ~asle Committee pr~wides only a limited discussion of the interaction of 
counterparty risk requirements and the proposed market risk regime .... [A] 
fundamental concern is that market risk and credit risk for off balance sheet in-
struments [which include spots, forwards, options, and swaps] are under the 
Basle proposals considered additive. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated 
that for each instrument a market movement that results in a mark to market 
loss cannot also produce an increase in credit exposure. For example, with re-
spect to a forward foreign exchange transaction two future scenarios are possi-
ble; the deal may move against the bank, causing a market risk loss, or in fa-
vour of the bank, increasing exposure in the event of a counterparty default. It 
is not possible for both risks to arise simultaneously and as a result it is clear 
that additive market and counterparty risk capital requirements are not a fair 
assessment of the risk assumed by the bank. The position is certainly more 
complex when the trading book as a whole is considered, but it is still the case 
that a simple additive approach will tend to overstate the risk that arises.97 
94. Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at 17-18. 
95. Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 2, 6-7 (saying the 1993 Proposal "will 
overstate the true economic level of capital requirements because it does not incorporate diversi-
fication and risk-offsetting opportunities"). See also, A Simple Proposal, supra note 46, at 20. 
96. Elderfield, Developments in EC and International Capital Adequacy Regulations, supra 
note 28, at 317. 
97. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 6. ("Marking to market" 
refers to a periodic, such as end-of-day, valuation of each asset position based on current market 
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More generally, the BSC fails to appreciate the integral relationship be-
tween credit and market risk from a bank's perspective. A bank analyzes the 
ability of its counterparty to meet its obligations, in part by simulating changes 
in market prices and examining their effect on the counterparty.98 Such analy-
sis, coupled with a possible inverse relationship between credit and market risk 
exposures, indicate that subjecting foreign exchange transactions to full capital 
charges for both market and credit risk results in excessive capitalization. 
b. Risk Management Incentives 
In response to the 1993 Market Risk Proposal, banks logically posited "the 
appropriate amount of capital should equal the amount of market risk for each 
firm's trading portfolio, which is the measure of its potential loss in economic 
value. " 99 With respect to currency forwards and swaps, banks argued the 
starting point should be a calculation of the market value of each forward or 
swap, i.e., the present value of expected future cash flows from each transac-
tion. In turn, the present value depends on two factors: the terms and condi-
tions specified in each forward or swap contract, and the underlying foreign 
exchange and interest rates relevant to the transaction. Whereas contractual 
provisions are fixed and determinable, the exchange and interest rates may be 
volatile and, therefore, the source of market risk. . 
Accordingly, banks told the BSC the correct conceptual approach to mar-
ket risk is to view it as the potential change in the present value of a bank's 
portfolio of all of its currency forwards and swaps.100-· This change could be 
calculated in one of two ways: determine the sensitivity ofthe value of the 
portfolio to an estimated potential· change in the relevant underlying exchange 
or interest rates; or simulate the effects of various potential changes. 101 In ei-
ther case, the goal is to reduce the capital charge "to reflect the fact that some 
risks cancel each other out." 102 . 
The banks' approach offered in rebuttal to the 1993 Market Risk Proposal 
creates an incentive for them to operate in a prudent manner. If the BSC al-
lows a bank to maintain less capital against foreign exchange transactions by 
counterbalancing risks associated with these transactions, then the. bank has an 
incentive to improve its risk management systems. Therefore, the bank is 
likely . to build and adjust its portfolio of currency forwards and swaps to 
maximize offsets among market and interest rate risks. 
prices.) 
98. An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at 3. 
99. Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 8. 
100. !d. at 3. 
101. For the details of the sensitivity analysis, see id. at 3, 5-6. 
102. A Simple Proposal, supra note 46, at 22. 
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c. Increasing Systemic Market Risk 
Because of the emphasis on product types in the eight-step methodology 
for measuring the market risk capital charge, the 1993 Market Risk Proposal 
creates a perverse risk management incentive that might increase the systemic 
level of market risk. This result, which would be inconsistent with the goal of 
the Proposal, is possible because the Proposal distorts economic incentives to 
hedge market and interest rate risks. 103 
Consider the fixed-for-floating currency swap example set forth in 'the 
Currency Trading Appendix. 104 Suppose Hongkong Shanghai Bank enters 
into the swap with Sumitomo Bank, but cannot find a counterparty with which 
to enter into a matching swap. Orie strategy for Hongkong Shanghai Bank is 
to hedge the market and interest rate risks arising from the swap with Sumi-
tomo by buying or selling foreign exchange futures contracts and Treasury se-
curities.105 
The 1993 Market Risk Proposal ignores this strategy and insists on a 
matched pair of cross-currency interest rate swaps. 106 As a result, the BSC ef-
fectively discourages the practice of hedging currency swaps with other finan-
cial instruments-at least from the perspective of reducing capital require-
ments. This effect arises because of steps four and five in the calculation 
methodology identified above, 107 the calculation of vertical offsets and vertical 
disallowances for different product types. The larger the number of long or 
short positions in debt derivatives, the larger the vertical disallowance and, 
therefore, the smaller the amount of allowed vertical offsets. The result is a 
capital charge on a position that would be inconsistent with, and significantly 
larger than, the risk of the position. 
[The] use [of vertical disallowances] is in effect a simple charge on volume 
and presents a distorted picture of the risk arising from the trading book. A 
closely matched trading book with little market risk can still give rise to a sig-
nificant capital ch'arge due to the disproportionate effect of the vertical disal-
lowance. This is inappropriate. Instead; any vertical disallowance factor 
should be set as an accurate reflection of the basis risk that it is intended to 
cover. We [the British Bankers' Association] therefore feel that the disallow-
ance factors : .. should be significantly reduced. 108 " 
I 03. Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 2. 
104. See infra notes 459-66 and accompanying text. 
105. See MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 18; See also Letter from Joseph Bauman, 
supra note 17, at 7 (noting that the "matched pair approach" would discourage such hedging 
swaps). 
106. See 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that "fully matched posi-
tions would be excluded from the reporting ·framework altogether" but that "[n]o offsetting 
would be allowed between positions in different currencies."). 
107. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
108. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 9. 
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For example, suppose Hongkong Shanghai Bank hedges its risks through 
the futures or Treasury markets. The vertical disallowance increases to reflect 
the additional futures or Treasury positions. The end result, ironically, is an 
increased capital charge to account for market risk, eyen though the Bank uses 
futures or Treasuries to reduce such risk. This result occurs because the verti-
cal disallowance is used to preclude a certain amount of vertical offsets of long 
and short positions and, therefore, to increase the number of such positions 
subject. to a capital charge. In sum, the 1993 Market Risk Proposal creates the 
. incentive for Hongkong Shanghai Bank to leave its swap with Sumitomo un-
hedged, . 
This perverse risk management incentive might increase the level of mar-
ket risk taken on by banks. Banks might reconsider whether they should en-
gage in cross-product hedging (i.e., hedge a risk associated with one financial 
instrument by using a different instrument) because of the attendant capital 
charges associated with the strategy. To the extent banks leave positions un-
hedged, market risk in the intemati~rial banking system might increase. 
2. · · Alternative Methodologies Under the 1993 Market Risk Proposal 
a. Insisting On Equivalent Results 
Step three of the calculation meth~dology inth~ BSG's 1993 Market Risk 
Proposal requires a bank to weight its currency forwards and currency swaps 
according to a factor designed to reflect the. price sensitivity of these positions 
to changes in interest rates . .As noted above, the factors proposed by the BSC 
are based on three assumptions: an eight-percent interest rate environment, an 
eight-percent coupon, and a change in yield designed to cover about two stan-
dard deviations of one month's yield volatility in most major. markets. 109 
Banks pointed out these assumptions render the BSC's methodology crude and 
inaccurate. In effect, the BSC's proposed methodology is complicated to use. 
. ' 
However, it is not complex enough to yield an accurate measurement of mar-
ket risk."0 . • · · 
The banks had good reason to question the cogency of the methodology. 
Realizing that measuring their exposure to market risk is a necessary but chal-
lenging task, many banks have spent millions of dollars on sophisticated com-
puter systems to keep track of this exposure.'" Nonetheless, the BSC de-
l 109; See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text; 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 
7, at 17. Volatility is "a measure of the variability of the price of an asset, usually defined as 
the annualized standard deviation of the natural log of asset prices." An Integrated Bank Regu-
latory Approach, supra note 17, at v. 
110. See A Simple Proposal, supra note 46, at 20; The Sum, Not the Parts, supra note 92, at 
85. 
Ill. The Sum, Not the Parts, supra note 92, at 85;· The Supervisory Treatment of Market 
Risk, supra note 17, at l. For an overview of the conceptual underpinnings of some of these 
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mands a bank prove its alternative method "produces results which are con-
sistently equivalent with the [BSC's] standard method," i.e., that the bank's 
method yields a capital charge equivalent to that set forth in the 1993 Pro-
posal.112 
[I]t is important that the Baste Committee's proposals take account of these 
parallel developments [the extensive progress made by international banks in 
developing accurate risk management techniques], in order to encourage wide-
spread adoption of best industry practices . . . . In this latter respect, it is es-
sential that the Baste proposals are structured in such a manner as to encourage 
the use of more accurate and sophisticated risk management techniques~ Thus, 
while it is most welcome that the Baste Committee makes provision through-
out its proposals for various "alternative" risk assessment methodologies (i.e., 
the duration approach to general market risk for debt securities and the simu-
lation approach for foreign exchange risk), it is deeply disappointing that the 
Committee insists these must nevertheless produce equivalent results to what 
are acknowledged to be more basic, less accurate, approaches. 113 
In essence, without explanation much less evidence the BSC deems sys-
tems devised by banks to be no more reliable than the BSC's proposed meas-
urement. 
b. Raising Transaction Costs 
The consequence of the BSC's summary conclusion on alternative meth-
odologies for measuring market risk is severe. Banks are forced to measure 
their exposure to market risk by using the BSC's methodology as well as their 
own techniques. 114 Duplicative measurements raise transaction costs: it is 
necessary to "train personnel, revise risk management procedures, implement 
the duration methodology for debt instruments, ensure appropriate offsets, 
adopt the historical simulation approach [and] break down derivatives instru-
ments." 115 These costs, plus any added capital requirements, are not offset by 
corresponding benefits. As the Institute oflnternational Finance states, 
[m]ost international banks will have to bear the expense of installing and 
maintaining two separate or parallel risk measurement and management sys-
tems: one that conforms to the regulatory model and one that reflects man-
agement's assessment of what is needed to monitor and control risks. This 
duplication is an inefficient use of technical and analytical capabilities as well 
systems, see Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 3-6. 
112. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 20; Elderfield, Developments in EC and 
International Capital Adequacy Regulations, supra note 28, at 319. 
113. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at I. See also id. at 8. 
114. The Sum, Not the Parts, supra note 92, at 85. 
115. Elderfield, Developments in EC and International Capital Adequacy Regulations, supra 
note 17, at 319. See also Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that the 1993 
Proposal "will be very costly for firms to implement, due to its fundamental inconsistency with 
existing systems which trading groups already have in place to manage market risk"). 
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as financial resources. 116 
Similarly, the British Bankers' Association points out · 
[t]he [1993] Proposal will be costly for firms to implement. Firms that manage 
trading portfolios use computer systems that measure risk in economic terms 
to facilitate the management of their market risk. The matched pair approach 
would force these firms to build additional computer algorithms, whose- only 
purpose would be to optimize the matching up of contract pairs in order to 
minimize capital requirements. Moreover, the calculation of the required 
[vertical and horizontal] disallowances, which the Basle Committee proposes 
as crude proxies for term structure and basis risk, would also require the crea-
tion of additional computer software. Regrettably, the cost of creating these 
capital requirement management systems would have no redeeming value in 
terms of controlling actual market risk. 117 
155 
Not surprisingly, the British Bankers' Association finds the 1993 Market 
Risk Proposal to be "frankly, puzzling." 118 The Association rightly argues 
"[t]here would not appear to be any justification on prudential grounds for 
mandating equality of capital standards" as between the BSC's imprecise and 
banks' accurate methodologies. 119 
c. Risk Management Incentives Again 
By duplicating work and reducing banks to the level of the BSC with re-
spect to the measurement of market risk, the BSC overlooks an important 
point. It "fail[s] to create sufficient regulatory incentives for banks to operate 
more sophisticated risk measurement systems than those necessary to meet the 
regulatory minimum." 12o 
This "consistently equivalent" requirement is, in light of the acknowledged 
advantages of the alternative method, unjustified and objectionable. It reflects 
a general reluctance throughout the Baste paper to recognise the advantages of 
more accurate risk management techniques and methodologies. It also implies 
that institutions would have to conduct the standard calculation as well in or-
der to demonstrate equivalence, which would be extremely onerous. Instead, 
the Basle Committee should be seeking to encourage the wider adoption of in-
dustry best practices, as more accurate risk management facilitates the task of 
prudential supervision. In fact, by requiring equivalence, the Basle proposals 
instead undermine incentives to use more accurate and sophisticated methods 
of calculating risks. 121 
116. Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at iii. See also /d. at 23. 
117. Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 8. 
118. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 1; The Sum, Not the Parts, 
supra note 92, at 85. 
119. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 1. 
120. Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at iii. See also 5-6, 23-24. 
121. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 10 (emphasis added). 
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Put simply, the BSC exalts regulatory compliance over internal risk man-
agement, yet "[b ]y demanding equivalent capital charges in all areas, there is 
less incentive to develop more sophisticated risk management systems." 122 
The ironic result is "[t]o the extent that some banks might forego the cost of 
operating duplicate systems by using only the less accurate regulatory risk 
measurement model, financial system safety and soundness could be compro-
mised .... " 123 
Further, the BSC ignores strong incentives banks have to devise their own 
precise measurement systems. When the BSC proposes a standard calculation 
methodology, it engages in a regulatory exercise that is likely to impose a 
compliance burden on banks. In contrast, when a bank devises a methodology 
for itself, its own survival and interest in profitability are at stake. If the bank 
wrongly underestimates its market risk exposure, then it may fail in the event 
of adverse foreign exchange or interest rate movements. If it wrongly overes-
timates this exposure, then it may forego profitable foreign exchange transac-
tions. This incentive structure implies banks would find the 1993 Market Risk 
Proposal more cogent if the BSC recognizes banks' market risk measurement 
systems. Indeed, the BSC could offer preferential capital treatment for banks 
with superior internal risk management systems. In sum, the BSC ought to 
have considered allowing "banks with superior risk management systems [to] 
be exempted from application of the less precise regulatory model to calculate 
capital adequacy requirements." 124 
3. Foreign Exchange Risk And The 1993 Market Risk Proposal 
a. Overlap 
In addition to establishing capital requirements for market risk associated 
with debt derivatives, the 1993 Market Risk Proposal devises a capital re-
quirement to cover losses on currency positions due to foreign exchange risk. 
The latter capital requirement encompasses a bank's spot, forward, and option 
positions. 
With respect to currency spots and swaps, there is no overlap between the 
market risk requirement for debt derivatives and the foreign exchange re-
quirement. Spots are subject only to a capital charge under the foreign ex-
change calculation. Swaps are subject only to a capital charge under the mar-
ket risk calculation. However, with respect to currency forwards and options, 
the 1993 Proposal ignores the problem of overlapping requirements. Forwards 
and options are subject to capital charges under both the debt derivative and 
122. Elderfield, Developments in EC and International Capital Adequacy Regulations, supra 
note 28, at 319. 
123. Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at 24. See also, id. at iii. 
124. /d. at 6; See also, id. at 24. 
1996] APPLYING EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND THE FICAS MODEL 157 
foreign exchange risk proposals. 125 
Separate calculations and capital charges for currency forwards and op-
tions are unnecessary. The BSC refers to the problem of volatile exchange 
risks, but does not define what it means by "foreign exchange risk." 126 Pre-
sumably, it has in mind changes in the value of a bank's currency positions as 
a result of exchange rate fluctuations. But, surely a movement in exchange 
rates is (or ought to be) encompassed by market risk and, therefore, by the 
capital requirement for debt derivatives. After all, the purpose of maintaining 
capital against market risk is to safeguard against "the risk of a general market 
movement arising from, for example, a change in interest rates or official pol-
icy."127 In sum, exchange rate risk is logically a species of market risk, hence 
the calculations and capital charges for currency forwards and options are re-
dundant. 
b. Measuring The Net Option Position 
Redundancy is not the only reason the proposed capital requirement for 
foreign exchange rate risk lacks cogency. The calculation methodology con-
tains arbitrary features which discourage implementation of, and improve-
ments to, internal risk management by banks. There are three steps in this 
methodology: (I) measuring the exposure of a bank's open currency position 
in each currency; (2) measuring the risks inherent in the bank's mix of long 
and short positions in different currencies; and, (3) determining the appropriate 
capital charge. 128 
The goal of the first two steps is to produce a single figure representing a 
bank's net open currency positions. In the third step, the bank applies a pre-set 
percentage capital requirement to this figure. Unfortunately, the BSC omits 
transparent rationales to support these steps. Consequently, the methodology 
seems arbitrary. 
The first step requires a bank to sum its net spot, net forward, and net op-
tion positions in individual or particular currencies. Its net spot position in a 
particular currency is the spot market value of asset less liability items (i.e., the 
amount of a currency it expects to receive minus the amount of that currency it 
is obligated to pay, valued at the relevant spot market rate). 129 Its net forward 
position in a particular currency is the difference between amounts to be re-
ceived less amounts to be paid, where these amounts are valued at the relevant 
125. Of course, the overlap regarding currency options assumes these instruments fall within 
the ambit of the capital requirement for debt derivatives. 
126. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 33. 
127. Id. at Annex I at 44. Plainly, the examples the BSC provides are not meant to be ex-
haustive. 
128. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 7 and 33. 
129. /d. at 33. For example, if the currency at issue was yen and the capital charge calcula-
tion was in dollars, then the relevant spot market rate would be the yen-dollar rate. 
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spot market rate. 130 Its net option position is the net delta equivalent of its total 
option positions. The first step yields a single net position for each currency 
that included all of spot, forward, and option transactions. 
However, measuring the net option position is troublesome. The BSC at-
tempts to differentiate between two types of banks. On the one hand, there are 
"major option players" that actively trade options. On the other han<;l, there 
are banks that use options to hedge foreign exchange risk but do not trade a 
portfolio of options. This distinction is imprecise. 
What is a "major" option player? What if a bank both actively trade~ op-
tions and uses options for hedging purposes? Because the BSC does not ad-
dress these issues, they are left to domestic bank regulators for resolution. But, 
if regulators are responsible for putting banks into one of the two categories, 
then what safeguard (other than good faith) exists against strategic behavior? 
Capricious enforcement? Idiosyncratic or inconsistent implementation? For 
example, a regulator could categorize one or more of the banks subject to its 
supervision in a manner that minimizes capital charges for options transac-
tions. In tum, the playing field for trading currency options transactions might 
be unlevel. 
The fuzzy distinction is not the only problem with respect to options. For 
both trading and hedging banks, key details of the proposed methodology for 
measuring a net option position have no apparent justification. Consider the 
way the 1993 Market Risk Proposal treats major option players. The BSC un-
derstands correctly that 
[t]he main complication is that the price of an option does not move in a one-
for-one relationship with the spot rate of the deliverable currency, since an op-
tion's value is a complex function of the spot rate of the underlying currency, 
its volatility, interest rate differentials, the strike price and the option's re-
maining term. 131 ' 
The BSC says "the net delta value will be used as the measure of exposure for 
major option players, the deltas being calculated according to an exchange 
model ·or i~temal pricing model approved by the supervisor [i.e., domestic 
regulator of the bank in question]." 1_32 
For instance, an optioJ;l worth $1.00 with a delta of 0.5 has a delta equiva-
130. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 33. The BSC contended it was inappro-
priate to use the relevant forward rate because that rate reflected interest rate differentials, and 
such differentials "would nonnally be taken into account .in measuring a bank's interest rate 
exposure." !d. at 3, 35. It is unclear whether the BSC meant that the general market risk and 
foreign exchange risk calculations were not redundant. 
The BSC allowed for the possibility that some international banks might measure their 
forward positions according to present value (i.e., discount forward positions to net present 
value) instead of spot market rates. /d. at 35. 
131. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 35. 
132. /d. at 36. 
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lent of $2.00. However, as the BSC itself admits, several variables, most nota-
bly volatility, are not captured in a delta. 133 That is, "options can pose risks 
other than delta risk which are not captured by the delta-weighted methodol-
ogy." 134 The 1993 Proposal does not encourage banks to devise and utilize 
accurate techniques that capture such risks. 
[T]he MR [market risk] framework's silence concerning gamma or volatility 
risks is a significant oversight because it creates an inaccurate picture of the 
risks undertaken by banks active in the options area. This [Institute of Inter-
national Finance] Report strongly recommends regulatory recognition of inter-
nal simulation methods which incorporate gamma or volatility analysis. Banks 
that operate such sophisticated systems should not be required simultaneously 
to operate the less accurate regulatory system. This would simplifY the pro-
posed capital adequacy framework by eliminating widespread application of 
an inaccurate and complex method for calculating capital adequacy. It would 
also provide banks with incentives to create sophisticated risk measurement 
and management systems, if they are not obligated to install a second, less ac-
curate risk measurement system which would be used only for regulatory 
compliance purposes. 135 
Further, the delta value of an option is likely to fluctuate. Because "the 
delta measures the change in the value of a financial asset as the underlying 
price changes ... the delta value changes with a shift in the underlying mar-
ket." 136 The fluctuations can be dramatic in the event of large market moves, 
which the BSC contemplates in the 1993 Proposal. 137 Not surprisingly, in re-
sponse to the 1993 Proposal, banks registered strong opposition to the use of 
deltas as a risk weight.I38 
For banks using options as hedging devices, the BSC prescribes two rules. 
The first rule applies when a bank hedges a long spot or forward position with 
a long put (i.e., the bank bought an option to sell the underlying currency),139 
133. Id. Hence, delta hedging is effective only for small changes in spot rates. 
134. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 19. 
135. Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, 15-16 (emphasis added). 
136. /d. at iv-v. 
137. /d. at v. 
138. Id. at iv. 
139. For example, suppose the Bank of Tokyo obtains a one million dollar long spot or for-
ward position in dollars at a rate of 105 yen per dollar. The yen-denominated value of this posi-
tion is 105 million yen. The Bank of Tokyo is concerned the dollar might depreciate against the 
yen, thus making its position less valuable in its home currency-yen. Yen is the currency in 
which its financial statements and capital ratios are reported to its regulatory authorities. 
The Bank of Tokyo's strategy is to buy a put option on one million dollars. The put 
option gives it the right, but not the obligation, to sell the dollars at an exercise price. Assume 
the exercise price is l 00 yen per dollar. 
Assume also that dollars depreciate relative to yen, and the new spot rate is 95 yen per 
dollar. The yen-denominated value of the Bank of Tokyo's long spot or forward position falls 
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or a short spot or forward position with a long call (i.e., the bank bought an 
option to buy the underlying currency).140 The capital charge for both the op-
tion and position being hedged is eight percent of the position hedged, less the 
amount by which the option is in the money. 141 Why eight percent? Why de-
duct the amount by which the option is in the money? The BSC provides no 
explanation. 142 The second rule applies where a long call or long put option is 
to 95 million yen-a loss of 10 million yen (105 million yen minus 95 million yen). Therefore, 
the Bank of Tokyo elects to exercise the option, selling one million dollars and receiving 100 
million yen. · 
As a result of this hedge, the Bank of Tokyo incurs a loss of only five million yen (I 05 
million yen minus 100 million yen). This loss excludes the cost of the option premium and, of 
course, varies with the assumed numbers used. 
140. For example, suppose the Bank of Tokyo takes a one million dollar short spot or for-
ward position in dollars at a rate of 105 yen per dollar. The yen-denominated value of this posi-
tion is 105 million yen, which is important because yen is the currency in which its financial 
statements and capital ratios are reported to its regulatory authorities. 
The Bank of Tokyo is concerned the dollar might appreciate against the yen, thus 
making it costly for it to cover its short position and fulfill its delivery obligation to its counter-
party on the short transaction. For instance, if the dollar-yen rate moves to 115 yen per dollar, 
then the Bank of Tokyo must pay 115 million yen to get one million dollars. In contrast, at the 
105 yen per dollar rate it would pay 105 million yen. 
Accordingly, the Bank of Tokyo's buys·a call option on one million dollars. The call 
option gives it the right, but not the obligation, to buy the dollars at an exercise price. Assume 
the exercise price is 110 yen per dollar. 
Assume also that dollars appreciate relative to yen, and the new rate is 115 yen per 
dollar. To cover its short position, the Bank of Tokyo 'exercises the option, spen.ding 110 mil-
lion yen for one million dollars. 
This hedging strategy saves five million yen (115 million yen minus 110 million yen), 
excluding the cost of the option premium. Of course, this result varies depending on the as-
sumed numbers used. 
141. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 35. An option is "in the money". if it is 
profitab 1e to exercise the option. 
142. For example, suppose Deutsche Bank has a long forward position of$100 million. It is 
concerned the dollar will depreciate against the mark. It hedges its position with a put option 
that entitles it to sell dollars for marks at a strike price of 1.45 marks per dollar. If the dollar 
depreciates on the spot market, then the decline in the value of Deutsche Bank's long forward 
position will be offset (at least in part) by its gain from exercising the option. 
Suppose the spot rate is 1.40 marks per dollar, then the option is in the money, and 
Deutsche Bank will exercise. If the dollar appreciates to over 1.45 marks per dollar, then the 
option will be out of the money. In turn, the capital charge will be eight percent of the dollar 
forward position. 
To determine the requisite capital charge (in marks), Deutsche Bank calculates the po-
sition being hedged at the spot rate, which is 140 million marks ($100 million multiplied by 1.40 
marks per dollar), and multiplies this figure by eight percent. The result is 11.2 million ,marks. 
Then, if the option is in the money, Deutsche Bank must deduct from this result the amount by 
which the option is in the money. 
For example, at the 1.40 marks/dollar spot rate, Deutsche Bank calculates the' difference 
between the number of marks obtained by exercising the option and the spot market value of the 
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held outright (i.e., not as a hedge). In this case, the capital charge is the lesser 
of eight percent of the market value of the underlying currency and the market 
value of the option. Again, the BSC gives no rationale for the eight percent 
charge. 143 These omissions create a strong impression the proposed methodol-
ogy is arbitrary. 
c. Constraints On The Simulation Method 
The second step in calculating the capital charge for foreign exchange rate 
risk .is designed to account for foreign exchange risks associated with long and 
short positions in various currencies. A bank converts its net positions in each 
currency it calculated in step one into a single net open position encompassing 
all net positions in the different currencies. The lack of cogency in this step 
lies in the conversion method. The BSC gives a bank a choice between the 
BSC's "shorthand method" and a "simulation method" devised by the 
bank.144 
Under the shorthand method, the bank converts at the relevant spot rates 
its net long and short positions in each currency into the currency in which it 
denominates its financial statements and maintains its capital (i.e., the bank's 
"reporting currency"). Then, it aggregates these net long positions and short 
positions into a single net long or short position in the reporting currency. Fi-
nally, the capital charge is eight percent of the larger of the long or short posi-
tions. 
The BSC does not explain why the larger position is the basis for the 
capital charge. Presumably, the BSC wants to be conservative. Moreover, the 
shorthand method assumes ~ capital requirement of eight percent "would en-
sure an adequate level of protection against losses for most portfolios .... " 145 
Yet, the BSC offers no supporting evidence for this assumption. 
The ostensible purpose of the simulation method is to provide a bank with 
a flexib.le means to determine risks associated with its long and short positions 
in different currencies. 
[T]he actual exchange rates experienced in a defined past observation period 
would be used to revalue the bank's present foreign exchange positions and-
from those revaluations-to calculate "simulated" profits and/or losses which 
would have arisen if those positions had remained fixed for a defined holding 
period. The capital requirement would be set in relation to the worst or near to 
the worst simulated loss which would have arisen during that period. 146 
position being hedged, which is 145 million marks less 140 million marks, or 5 million marks. 
'The final capital charge is 6.2 million marks (11.2 million marks minus 5 million marks). See id 
§ 4, at 35-36 n.27. 
143. Id. at 36. 
144. Id. at 36-38. 
145. Id. at 39. 
146. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 39-40. · 
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However, the BSC imposes four serious constraints on the use of the 
simulation method. These constraints pertain to the (1) holding period during 
which a bank is assumed to hold a position and during which losses can accu-
mulate; (2) observation period during which exchange rate data are gathered to 
capture sufficient evidence of currency volatility; (3) level of confidence re-
quired to measure the risk for determining the capital requirement; and, (4) 
scaling factor used to set the rigor of the capital charge. 147 All but the third 
constraint seem arbitrary.148 Thus, banks expressed serious concern, contend-
ing the BSC's "restrictive approach" would "undermine the incentive for 
banks to adopt sophisticated foreign exchange risk measurement systems." 149 
The BSC assumes a holding period of two weeks (i.e., ten banking days) is 
appropriate because it takes two weeks for a bank to close out its loss-making 
positions. However, this assumption is excessively conservative. The same 
criticism leveled by banks at the BSC's capital charge for equities and equity 
derivatives in the 1993 Market Risk Proposal is relevant to the holding period 
assumption: 
[S]etting capital standards with reference to unduly pessimistic simulations 
provides only marginal additional protection than under more moderate capital 
requirements, while having a disproportionate effect on the costs of doing 
business. This can harm competitiveness . . . inhibit financial innovation and 
lead to distortions in normal investment decisions.150 
In the foreign exchange risk context, as the BSC itself admits, it takes 
more than a day to close out a loss-making position only in a currency market 
that is illiquid and highly volatile. 151 By definition, all major currencies are 
liquid and the bulk of trading activity occurs in these currencies. While some 
· banks decline to close out loss-making positions in the hope the market would 
tum in their favor, others cut their losses. There is no a priori basis to presume 
banks behave in an imprudent manner . 
. The observation period set by the BSC-five years-is equally dubious. It 
is designed to be "sufficiently long to avoid over-reliance on recent exchange 
rate movements while still being practical and not too burdensome to run." 152 
Yet, the BSC gives no explanation as to why a three-year period might not be 
appropriate. Indeed, banks proposed a shorter period combined with a higher 
147. !d. at 40. 
148. With respect to the third constraint, the BSC suggests the level of confidence for meas-
uring foreign exchange risk ought to be the "worst loss, or ... in terms of loss quantiles ... the 
level which includes 95% of the hypothetical losses that would have arisen from the bank's cur-
rent set of open positions." !d. at 41. Whether this level is excessively conservative is difficult 
to judge because the BSC provides no explanation for its suggestion. 
149. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 17. 
150. !d. at 2. 
151. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 40-41. 
152. !d. at 41. 
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level of confidence (e.g., 99 instead of95 percent of simulated losses). 153 
Undoubtedly, the most arbitrary aspect of the entire foreign exchange rate 
risk measurement methodology concerns the BSC's proposal for a scaling 
factor to determine the rigor of the capital requirement produced by the simu-
lation methodology. It establishes a three percent scaling factor. A bank using 
the simulation method to calculate its capital charge also must calculate three 
percent of its hypothetical capital charge under the shorthand method. Then, 
the bank must add (on to the capital charge under the simulation method) the 
three percent figure from the shorthand method to arrive at a total foreign ex-
change risk capital charge.154 
The BSC's rationale is the scaling factor "would deliver approximate 
equivalence in terms of toughness of the capital requirement for a portfolio of 
average riskiness between the shorthand and the simulation methods." 155 
Banks justifiably complained no basis exists for the three percent add on and 
urged the BSC to drop the notion. The British Bankers' Association stated 
[t]he additive 3% requirement is in our view completely unjustified. The use 
ofthe simulation method provides a more accurate measurement of foreign ex-
change risk, and can only be undertaken by sophisticated systems aft,er consid-
erable research and investment. As a result, the Basle proposals should be 
framed in such a manner as to encourage use of this method so as to strengthen 
prudent risk management. Consequently, it is particularly objectionable that 
the Baste Committee has "approximate equivalence" as its stated goal .... 
This undermines the incentive to absorb costs required to establish a simula~ 
tion measurement system. Indeed. the additive 3% requirement raises the 
prospects that in some instances the simulation method will generate a higher 
capital requirement than the 8% charge under the shorthand method (which 
may well be too high itselj). 156 
Likewise, the Institute of International Finance indicated it opposes the 
seemingly arbitrary 3 percent add-on. Since the Bash~ Committee has not re-
leased its background papers describing the origin·ofthe 3 percent add-on, the 
Working Group cannqt evaluate it. Internal analyses at a number of the 
Working Group's banks indicate that the simulation method for calculating 
Foreign Exchange Ris~. ("FXR") is accurate without the add~on. Grafting a 3 
percent add-on to an otherwise accurate measurement system will undermine 
the credibility of. the new framework and will introduce significant regulatory 
153. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 18. 
154. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 42. As a result, the minimum capital 
charge for risks associated with a bank's mix of long and short positions in different currencies 
would never be less than three percent of its overall net open positions as measured under the 
shorthand method. 
155. !d. 
156. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 18 (emphasis added). 
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distortions by requiring banks to be overcapitalized on FXR.157 
In sum, the BSC repeats the same mistake it makes with respect to the 
treatment of alternative methodologies for measuring the market risk of debt 
derivatives. The three percent scaling factor creates a needless duplication of 
effort and a disincentive to develop sharper simulation methods. because it 
compels banks to perform both the shorthand and simulation method calcula-
tions. 
d. Denial Of The Use Of Tier III Capital 
The third step in the foreign exchange rate risk measurement methodology 
in the 1993 Market Risk Proposal provides few details, yet imposes a note-
worthy burden on banks. To be sure, the BSC grants a de minimis exception 
from the capital charge for foreign exchange rate risk for banks with negligible 
foreign exchange business. 158 But, banks subject to the charge cannot use tier 
III capital to satisfy the requirement. Accordingly, they must allocate tier I or 
tier II capital to their foreign exchange transactions. 159 
As intimated above, 160 a financial instrument must meet certain criteria to 
qualify as tier III capital. For instance, it must be unsecured, subordinated, and 
fully paid up debt; it must have an original maturity of at least two years; it 
cannot be repayable before the agreed repayment date; and it cannot be repaid 
if repayment would deplete a bank's capital base supporting the bank's trading 
activities. 161 From the BSC's point of view, these restrictions help ensure tier 
III capital is available to absorb losses. 162 
The banks have a very different view. They criticized the BSC's position 
against the use of tier III capital to absorb losses arising from foreign exchange 
risk as "unduly conservative." 163 In their view, there is "no clear prudential 
justification for prohibiting the application of tier III capital to meet foreign 
exchange risks." 164 Given the restrictions on qualifying for tier III capital, 
their view is reasonable. If a tier III capital instrument can fulfill its central 
loss-absorption function, then why preclude it from fulfilling this function? 
157. Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at v; see also !d. at 16. 
158. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 39. 
159. For a discussion of the components of tier I and II capital, see the Capital Adequacy 
Regime Appendix. 
160. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
161. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 10. The last criterion is known as a "lock-
in" provision. 
162. /d. 
163. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 6. 
164. !d. at6-7. 
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4. Recognizing Netting Arrangements And The 1994And 1995 Netting 
Amendments 
The original unamended version of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord does 
not recognize netting techniques, except for netting by novation, for the pur-
pose Of computing a bank's capital requirement to cover losses arising from 
credit risk.165 For example, close-out netting,166 a technique commonly used in 
foreign exchange contracts, 167 does not receive preferential capital adequacy 
treatment. The BSC's concern is that close-out netting clauses may not be en-
forceable in every relevant jurisdiction.168 It fears certain domestic bankruptcy 
laws might empower a receiver of a failed counterparty to "cherry pick" 
among executory foreign exchange contracts, assuming only those contracts 
favorable to the estate of the failed counterparty. 169 So long as this possibility 
exists, the BSC reasons banks should not be allowed to reduce the capital they 
maintain to support currency transactions. 
The 1994 Netting Amendment establishes conditions under which bilateral 
contractual netting techniques, in addition to netting by novation, are recog-
nized for the purpose of calculating the credit risk capital charge.170 Unfortu-
nately, the Amendment is a half-hearted effort to acknowledge the possibility 
165. See Capital Adequacy, supra note 17. 
166. Under a close-out clause in a bilateral contract, each party specifies that if "one of the 
counterparties is wound up, the outstanding obligations between the two are accelerated and 
netted to detennine the [solvent] counterparty's net exposure [if any, to the failed counter-
party]." 1988 Baste Capital Accord, supra note 5,. at Annex 3 n. 7. That is, close-out netting is 
"an arrangement whereby default by one of the counterparties creates a nondefaulting party 
right to close out all open positions and net the resulting payment streams. This net amount can 
either result in an amount owed to the defaulting party or in an amount owed by the defaulting 
party." 
An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at B-1, B-2. A bilateral net-
ting scheme is a private contractual arrangement for offsetting obligations arising between two 
parties. In a multilateral scheme, more than two parties agree to establish a central clearing-
house that acts as a counterparty to both sides of a transaction. Transactions give rise to net and 
net-net positions, and amounts owed by residual debtors are paid to creditors through the clear-
inghouse. See !d. at B-2. 
167. Indeed, a close-out netting clause exists in various standard-fonn contracts used for 
currency trading. See, e.g., FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITIEE & BRITISH BANKERS' ASSO-
CIATION, INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MASTER AGREEMENT (IFEMA) § 5 (Nov. 1993) 
(standard-fonn contract for spots and forwards); BRITISH BANKERS' ASSOCIATION & FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE COMMITIEE, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY OPTIONS MARKET (ICOM) MASTER 
AGREEMENT AND GUIDE§ 8 at 9-12 (Apr. 1992) (standard-fonn contract for currency options); 
INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, MASTER AGREEMENT AND GUIDE§ 
5(a)(vii) § 6(b), (d)-( e) (1992) (standard-fonn contract for currency swaps). 
168. See, e.g.,An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at B-2. 
169. See Capital Adequacy, supra note 17. 
170. /d. For an overview of the 1994 Netting Amendment, see Matthews, supra note 28, pt. 
I.A. 
166 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:125 
close-out netting (or another technique other than netting by novation) could 
reduce a bank's credit risk. It raises three threshold problems. 
First, its effect on spots is unclear.171 It might be argued that a spot is just 
a forward that settles in two days. In any event, the problem of application to 
spots seems to have gone unnoticed by the international banking community. 
Second, the timing of implementation is left to bank regulators. The BSC pre-
scribes no final date by which the Amendment should be incorporated into 
domestic law (it appears good faith implementation efforts are being made by 
various bank regulators in the U.S. and Europe). Third, there may be incon-
sistencies among bank regulators in interpreting the Amendment. For exam-
ple, U.S. regulators refuse to endorse a particular netting agreement, whereas 
French authorities essentially provide such endorsements, and British supervi-
sors apply their own unique criteria to netting agreements. 
In addition to these threshold difficulties, the cogency of the Amendment 
is dubious because it skews the allocation of burdens. Neither the BSC nor 
domestic bank regulators bear any responsibility for determining whether a 
netting arrangement will be upheld in the event of counterparty insolvency. 
Rather, "[u]nder the amendment [to the 1988 Accord] the primary burden rests 
on banks to demonstrate to their supervisors the legal enforceability of netting 
arrangements in all relevant jurisdictions." 172 
The 1994 Netting Amendment requires a bank to satisfy its regulator that 
its netting arrangement creates a single legal obligation to receive or pay a 
netted sum in the event its counterparty defaults or becomes insolvent. Proof 
is required in the form of written, "reasoned legal opinions." 173 These opin-
ions must be obtained from every jurisdiction in which the counterparty is lo-
cated-i.e., its home country plus the locations of any of its branches involved 
in the netted transactions-and from the jurisdiction "necessary to effect the 
netting." 174 The bank must monitor legal developments in these jurisdictions 
to ensure its netting arrangement remains viable in the event of counterparty 
failure. 175 By placing these burdens on banks, the BSC neglects four funda-
mental points. As a result, it may discourage development of new netting 
techniques. Certainly, these points provide ample legitimate basis for banks to 
oppose the Amendment. 
First, in general banks are not in as good a position as domestic regulators 
to ensure the legal enforceability of netting arrangements under the bankruptcy 
laws of various jurisdictions. (Of course, there· are instances of sophisticated 
171. The BSC mentions "forwards, swaps, options and similar derivative contracts," but not 
spots. See /994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, Annex I at 1. 
172. /994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 2. 
173. /d. at Annex I at 2. 
174. /d. 
175. !d. 
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banks from countries in which the bank regulator is unsophisticated or slow. 
The Spanish bank, .Santander, might be an example.). Banks can lobby for le-
gal change, but only regulators can make such change, and banks rely on 
regulatory leadership to effect such change. That is, banks "cannot provide 
the legal certainty needed to enforce netting agreements"-only the BSC and 
domestic bank regulators can perform this task.176 
Accordingly, the BSC ought to impose on bank regulators the obligation 
of effecting a change in their domestic laws to immunize banks from the pos-
sibility that a bankruptcy trustee might attempt to unbundle netted contracts by 
"cherry picking" in search of contracts favorable to a debtor-bank's estate. 177 
Certainly, no immunization will work every time, as much rests in the hands of 
domestic bankruptcy judges. But, the apparent unwillingness of the BSC to 
impose any obligation on regulators to work toward positive legal reform 
seems .inexplicable. 
Further, the BSC ought to assume the obligation ofcreating a central data-
base of information about the bankruptcy laws of jurisdictions around the 
world (or at least in all major currency trading centers). This database could 
be maintained at the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") in Basle, 
Switzerland or the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") in Washington, D.C. 
and be accessible to users around the world through on-line connections. A 
bank contemplating a netting arrangement could then access the database to 
check the enforceability of its proposed.scheme in relevant jurisdictions. Un-
fortunately, the BSC expressly disavows this obligation, stating that "[t]he 
Committee will not publish a list of acceptable [netting] agreements." 178 . Per-
haps there are intellectually meritorious reasons for this disavowal. For exam-
ple, a database could create a moral hazard problem, as banks conduct all their 
netting transactions in. "endorsed". jurisdictions. However, the B~C does not 
explore such reasons or explain its position . 
. Second, the precise nature of the obligations the BSC means to impose on 
banks is unclear. Perhaps it does not seem unreasonable for a bank to be re-
quired to defend its methodology for commissioning legal opinions on m~tting 
agreements, especially in light of the fact that it must defend its risk manage-
ment procedures. But, consider the ambiguities raised by the Amendme~t. 
What is a "reasoned" legal opinion? How many legal opinions for a particular 
jurisdiction are necessary? Must bank regulators independently verify the en-
forceability of a netting arrangement?179 What procedures must a bank im-
1760 An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at B-20 
177 o See Capital Adequacy, supra note 17 0 
1780 I 994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 2o 
1790 This possibility is raised because the BSC requires bank regulators to "be satisfied that 
the netting is enforceable under the laws of each of the relevant jurisdictions 0 0 0 0" 1994 Net-
ting Amendment, supra note 13, Annex 1 at 2o 
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plement to ensure that the legal characteristics of netting arrangements are re-
viewed in light of possible changes in relevant laws? How often must such re-
views be conducted? Conceivably, banks might get different answers from 
different regulators. For example, the Bank of Tokyo might get approval for 
its netting arrangements from the Bank of Japan, but not the Federal Reserve. 
The 1994 Netting Amendment contemplates "consultation when ,necessary" . 
between supervisors. 180 In the event of continued disagreement, the Amend-
ment tips the balance in favor of an objecting regulator: if any regulator is dis-
satisfied with the enforceability of a netting arrangement under its Jaws, then 
the arrangement does not qualify for preferential capital adequacy treatment. 181 
But, what if the objecting regulator is overly conservative, or withholding its 
acceptance to obtain a concession from the accepting regulator on a different 
issue? If the BSC simply published a list, acceptable to its members, of en-
forceable netting arrangements and related jurisdictions, then these ambiguities 
would be avoided. 
Third, it is unclear how a netting agreement that covers some, but not all, 
relevant jurisdictions should be treated. Suppose Citibank signs a netting · 
agreement with the London branch and Madrid headquarters of a Spanish 
bank. Citibank has obtained an acceptable legal opinion covering the U.S. and 
England, but no such opinion exists for Spain. (That is, either there is no legal 
opinion covering Spain, or the Spanish legal opinion does not state that the 
netting agreement would work under Spanish law.) Thus, the London branch 
is "clean," while the Madrid headquarters is "dirty." Does the latter fact viti-
ate the entire netting agreement in the eyes of the BSC or relevant domestic 
bank regulator? Anecdotal evidence suggests the Federal Reserve will ignore 
the "dirty" Madrid headquarters. However, other regulators might look 
askance at a netting agreement that mixes clean and dirty jurisdictions. Here, 
then, is an illustration of a threshold problem with the Amendment mentioned 
above-inconsistent regulatory interpretations. Whether the apparent Federal 
Reserve position makes sense depends in part on the likelihood of compelling 
"dirty" jurisdictions to change their netting Jaws by isolating them into sepa-
rate "dirty" agreements. 
Finally, whatever their exact nature, the banks are likely to incur signifi- · 
cant costs in meeting their obligations. It could cost hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to procure legal opinions for (1) all jurisdictions in which counterpar-· 
ties are chartered, (2) all jurisdictions in which branches of counterparties. in-
volved in netted transactions are located, and (3) every jurisdiction whose law . 
is needed to effect netting arrangements. (Of course, obtaining opinions in . 
major jurisdictions like England may be more expensive than obtaining opin-
ions in emerging markets like Turkey.) Worse yet, the costs are unnecessarily 
180. 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, Annex I at 2. 
181. /d. 
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duplicative. Suppose Citibank obtains legal opinions covering its close-out 
netting arrangements in its forward contracts with counterparties in Shanghai 
and Manila. These opinions are "reasoned" in the eyes of the Federal Re-
serve, People's Bank. of China, and Central Bank of the Philippines. Subse-
quently, the Bank of America seeks to engage in netted forward trading with 
counterparties in Shanghai and Manila. Why should the Bank of America in-
cur the cost of obtaining another set of legal opinions? Clearly, its incentive is 
. to rely on the opinions obtained by Citibank that have been filed with the rele-
vant regulators. But, of course, Citibank will object to such blatant free riding. 
It will argue its opinions are specific to its transactions, and subject to· the at-
torney-'client privilege. Bank of America will rebut that there is no material 
difference between its forwards and those entered into by Citibank, and that 
keeping the opinions privileged means banks must replicate legal work and 
thus pay unnecessary fees. The only winner will be lawyers. Again, a central 
database at the BIS would avoid these problems . 
. To be sure, an alternative solution to the fourth problem is for banks to use 
a standard form contract for their foreign exchange transactions. 182 Trade as-
sociations could obtain legal opinions on behalf of all member banks, and the 
members could share the atte~dant costs. While this alternative may lower 
transaction costs, it also may create an artificial incentive to use the standard 
form contracts, namely, the existence of a supporting legal opinion. In tum, it 
may stifle the development of innovative netting arrangements, or discourage 
netting schemes that are tailor made for specific banks-though perhaps riders 
to standard form contracts could resolve this difficulty .. Also, the standard 
form contract alternative is unhelpful to banks that are not members of a rele-
vant trade association. Such "non-club" banks are likely to be from develop-
ing and newly industrialized countries. 
In sum; the "liberalized" netting policy espoused in the 1994. Netting 
Amendment is more theoretical than real. There may be little incentive for 
banks to devise alternatives to netting by novation because of the difficulties 
associated with getting an alternative netting arrangement recognized for 
capital adequacy purposes. Once again, whether spots are covered is unclear. 
There is no timetable for implementation. There may be inconsistent regula-
tory interpretations of the Amendment. The BSC and domestic regulators 
shirk burdens and related costs they ought to assume; while at the same time 
leaving a number of critical issues unresolved. Therefore, based on the co-
gency variable, banks would have legitimate reason to object to the Amend-
ment. 
· A similar lack of cogency plagues the BSC's rules, set forth in its 1995 
182. See, e.g., FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITIEE & BRITISH BANKERS' ASSOCIATION, 
BRITISH BANKERS' ASSOCIATION & FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMIITEE, INTERNATIONAL SWAPS 
AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, supra note 167 (citing three standard-form contracts). 
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Netting Amendment, for reducing the add-ons for potential future exposure. 183 
The same obligations imposed on banks in the current credit exposure context 
are imposed on banks in the potential future exposure context. 184 Worse yet, 
the BSC's formula for limiting the amount by which add-ons for potential fu-
ture credit risk could be reduced as a result of a netting arrangement makes lit-
tle sense. Logically, the constraint should be the extent to which netting im-
pacts potential future exposure. The BSC admits it has no "precise indicator" 
to measure this impact. 185 Its proxy is the ratio of net to gross current replace-
ment costs for the transactions subject to netting. Thus, its formula is: 186 
ANET = (0.4)(AGROSS) + (0.6)(NGR)(AGROSS); where 
ANET =the add-on for netted transactions (ANET), 
AGROSS =the average of the add-on as calculated under the 1988 Accord, 187 
and 
NGR = the level of net replacement cost divided by level of gross replacement 
cost, with respect to transactions subject to legally enforceable netting ar-
rangements. 188 
The BSC tosses out this formula with little explanation. Why is NGR an 
appropriate proxy for the impact of a netting arrangement on potential future 
credit risk? Is it suitable for a wide variety of netting arrangements? Why 
does it not matter whether NGR is calculated on (1) a counterparty-by-
counterparty basis or (2) an aggregate basis for all transactions subject to le-
183. The rule was first published as a proposal in the 1994 Netting Amendment. See Capital 
Adequacy, supra note 17. 
184. 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 3. In this paragraph, the BSC states that its 
proposed fonnula for reducing the add ons would apply to "transactions subject to legally en-
forceable netting agreements consistent with the requirements set out in the attached amendment 
to the Capital Accord on bilateral netting" (emphasis added). See also 1995 Netting Amend-
ment, supra note 14, at 3-6. 
185. See 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 3. 
186. See /995 Netting Amendment, supra note 14, at 5; 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 
13, at 3. 
187. That is, AGROSS is calculated by multiplying notional principal amounts of transac-
tions by the appropriate add-on factors specified in Annex 3 of the 1994 Amendment. See 1995 
Netting Amendment, supra note 14, at 5 n. 9; 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 3 n. 3. 
188. 1995 Netting Amendment, supra note 14, at 5; 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, 
at 3. 
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gaily enforceable netting arrangements?189 Why are the factors of 0.4 and 0.6 
"an appropriate compromise" between "recognizing the effects of netting," 
on the one hand, and "providing a cushion against potential fluctuations in net 
current exposure," on the other hand?190 
The dearth of answers to these questions creates the impression the for-
mula is arbitrary, which undermines the cogency of the Netting Amendment. 
This impression is reinforced by the BSC's position on bank-devised netting 
models. In the 1994 Netting Amendment, the BSC elects not to accept in lieu 
of its formula any internal simulation model developed by a bank to measure 
the bank's potential future credit exposure under the bank's particular netting 
arrangements. 191 It confirms this refusal in the 1995 Amendment. 192 The per-
verse repercussion is banks are discouraged from devising accurate, tailor-
made models to regulate their risk exposures-with no explanation as to why. 
D. Authority: Three Problems With The Elite Club 
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") possesses a well-trained staff of 
international trade experts in its permanent secretariat in Geneva. The WTO 
consists of roughly 125 members arid does not appear to favor systematically 
any particular constituency.193 In brief, it is an exp.ert, representative, unbiased 
entity. 
Likewise, the BSC boasts expertise in international banking law. But, the 
analogy with the WTO ends here. The BSC is a club of elite central bankers 
and bank regulators shrouded in secrecy.194 Any agreement reached by the 
BSC is at best a plurilateral one. 195 This fact has a profound implication for 
189. 1995 Netting Amendment, supra note 14, at I; 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, 
at 3-4. 
190. 1995 Netting Amendment, supra note 14, at 1. When the BSC first proposed the for-
mula in the 1994 Netting Amendment, it used a 0.5 factor. See 1994 Netting Amendment, supra 
note 13, at 3. 
191. 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 4. 
192. The BSC did not mention the matter in the 1995 Amendment, thus implicitly confirm-
ing its refusal. · 
193. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:· CASES AND MATERIALS chs. 2-3 
('1996) .. 
194. See generally RAJ BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFfER BCCI 116-19 (1994) 
(discussing the exclusive nature of the Bank for International Settlements). 
195. To be sure, the Accord is relevant to central banks and bank regul!itors beyond the G-
10 countries, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. For example, the Own Funds Directive issued by 
the European Union (EU) is based on the Accord and applies to non-G-10 members of the EU: 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Authorities· from various other countries have 
declared unilaterally their fidelity to the Accord in an effort to boost the financial strength and, 
therefore, reputation, of their banks. See Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Baste 
Capital Accord, supra note 28. There appears to be ilo publicly available tabulation of the 
number of countries not represented at the BSC that have implemented the Accord and consider 
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the authority variable of the FICAS model: it casts doubt on the authority of 
the rules and proposals issued by the BSC. 
Specifically, it raises three difficulties. First, the BSC has no authority 
over securities firms that trade currencies. That authority belongs to the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissioners ("IOSCO") (and, of 
course, domestic securities regulators). The BSC and IOSCO have worked on 
joint frameworks for disclosure of derivative trading activities. 196 But, they 
have yet to reach a consensus on a harmonized set of capital adequacy guide-
lines to apply to banks and securities firms. 197 For a variety of reasons (e.g., 
variations in cross-border accounting standards, differences in regulatory cul-
tures between banking and securities regulators, and differences in as-
set/liability structures of affected banks) such a consensus is unlikely in the 
near future. 
Second, the BSC cannot purport to issue rules or proposals for banks from 
countries not represented at the BSC. At best, it could be argued that a set of 
rules (as distinct from proposals) issued by the BSC is a binding agreement 
from which customary international law develops, and that banks from non-
BSC countries are bound by the custom law. 198 However, this argument is un-
persuasive. As discussed below, the premise the agreement is binding is 
flawed. Moreover, the agreement is not conclusive evidence of a custom, but 
rather must be weighed with other evidence.199 Finally, as a political matter, 
non-BSC countries (particularly less developed and newly industrialized 
countries) may object to and even spurn an agreement made by a largely west-
em cabal and to any custom that might flow from such an agreement. 
Third, as for banks from countries represented at the BSC, the authority of 
an agreement reached at the BSC to create a binding obligation as a matter of 
public international law is dubious. Certainly with respect to proposals issued 
by the BSC (such as the 1993 and 1995 Market Risk Proposals) no binding 
obligations are created. All banks, whether or not their countries are repre-
sented at the BSC, are free to disregard entirely the proposals (unless their do-
seriously the BSC's proposed capital adequacy guidelines. 
196. See, e.g., Joint Press Statement by the Basle Committee and IOSCO Technical Com-
mittee, July 27, 1994. In addition, the BIS has produced its own discussion paper on disclosure 
of derivatives trading activities. See Working Group of the Euro-currency Standing Committee 
of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries, Public Disclosure of Market and Credit 
Risks by Financial Intermediaries (Sept. 1994). 
197. See, e.g., The Prudential Supervision of Netting, supra note 7, at 3. 
198. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 
102(3), cmts. f, i, and Reporters' Note 5; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (West Germany v. 
Denmark & Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ~ 71; ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-66 ( 1971 ). 
199. Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25, 99 (1970-1). See 
also Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988). 
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mestic regulators have implemented regulations following the proposals). 
With respect to the 1988 Accord, the problem of authority is less clear.200 
On the one hand, Article 38:1(a) of the statute of the International Court of 
Justice ("ICJ"), and Section 102(l)(b) of the Restatement (l'hird) ofthe For-
eign Relations Law of the United States, list international agreements as a 
source of internationallaw.201 Article 38 and Section 102 are widely accepted 
as accurate lists of such sources, and the Accord could be viewed as fitting 
squarely within the lists. 
On the other hand, the BSC scrupulously avoids dubbing its rules and pro-
posals as "agreements."202 It deliberately selects rubrics with no legal signifi-
cance, such as "consultative paper." The Accord itself has no formal title 
other than "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards," and paragraph 1 of the document uses the term "[t]his report. " 203 
Moreover, some commentators refer to the Accord as a "gentleman's agree-
ment" and imply obedience to it is a matter of good faith among central banks 
and bank regulators represented at the BSC.204 Indeed, the Institute of Interna-
tional Finance states "the Accord is not a binding legal document. " 205 
The plurilateral and possibly non-binding nature of BSC rules and propos-
als suggests a more authoritative forum than the BSC for developing a capital 
adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions ought to be considered. If 
a market is multilateral in nature, then so also should be the system of govern-
ance of that market. The WTO follows this principle. Cross-border trade in 
goods and services is conducted by almost every country with scores of other 
countries. Similarly, multilater~lism is a hallmark of trade in currencies. 
Accordingly, one alternative would be to reinvigorate the International 
Monetary Fund, a forum that boasts a far broader membership than the BSC.206 
An even more ambitious alternative is suggested by the Commission on Global 
Governance ("CGG"). In 1992, as a result of efforts by former West German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, the CGG was established to "analyse the main 
forces of global change, examine the major issues facing the world commu-
200. To the extent the Accord is implemented in domestic law through regulation, it creates 
legal obligations as a matter of that law. But, such obligations are conceptually and legally dis-
tinct from those created under international law. 
20 l. Statute of the International Court of Justice Annexed to the Charter of the United Na-
tions, T.X. 993; RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102. 
202. The synonymous term "Accord" is used informally by commentators but does notre-
flect the official labels on the rules or proposals. Further, the BSC tends to use the term 
"guidelines" as distinct from "rules." 
203. See 1988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 5, ~ l. 
204. See, e.g., Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Baste Capital Accord, supra note 
28, at 885. 
205. An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at app. Dati. 
206. See BHALA, supra note 194, at 267-68. 
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nity, assess the adequacy of global institutional arrangements and suggest how 
they should be refonned or strengthened. " 207 The CGG consisted of twenty-
eight distinguished representatives from around the world, and its co-
chairpersons were the fonner Prime Minister of Sweden, and Shridath Ram-
phal of Guyana, the fonner Secretary-General of the Commonw~alth. The 
CGG observed correctly that no apex organization exists to consider global 
economic matters. Presently, global economic governance is ad hoc. To be 
sure, officials from the Group of Seven ("G-7") countries discuss economic 
policy coordination. But, newly industrialized and less developed countries 
are excluded from the G-7, and enonnous economies like China and India are 
not represented. . Therefore, the CGG recommended the creation of an 
"Economic Security Council" as an apex organization. The Council's mem-
bership would be multilateral like the WTO. Its tenns of reference would in-
clude all global economic markets, including currency markets.208 
Unfortunately, while the IMF and CGG alternatives have some intellectual 
appeal, it may be politically infeasible for either option to be pursued in the 
near future. Concerns about sovereignty raised during the Uruguay Round in 
the context of international trade no doubt would be resurrected with great 
vigor. Many countries-particularly the U.S.-would look askance at the 
creation of yet another international bureaucracy and balk at· providing sup-
porting funds. A realistic alternative may be self-regulation and the develop-
ment of customary international law or an international law merchant. The 
CGG gave short shrift to this possibility. Yet, in currency markets this alter-
native is worth pursuing. 
E. Scope: Limited 
With respect to the scope variable, banks had three good reasons to oppose 
the capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions between 1988-
95. The regime was substantively incomplete, some of its details could be im-
plemented in different ways in different countries, and it did not cover all rele-
vant players. 
First, the Accord itself could not possibly be a stable equilibrium because 
of its restrictive substantive scope. It is silent with respect to interest rate and 
market risk. Indeed, the BSC admits in July 1988 that "other risks, notably 
interest rate risk and the investment risk on securities, need to be taken into ac-
count by supervisors in assessing overall capital adequacy. " 209 This admission 
could be translated as follows: "The BSC has drafted inchoate rules that 
207. COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GoVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD, THE REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GoVERNANCE: 368 (1995). 
208. /d. at 153-62. 
209. 1988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 5, ~ 8. See also Capital Adequacy, supra note 
l7,at2. 
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clearly are in need of revision, and while the BSC cannot agree upon the exact 
nature of the revisions at present, it surely will publish new proposals soon." 
As one commentator states, 
the framework does not represent an exclusive set of rules with respect to 
capital adequacy regulation, and the rules that it does endorse are "designed to 
establish minimum levels of capital for internationally active banks. National 
authorities will be free to adopt arrangements that set higher levels." 
Essentially, the methodology as currently constituted effectively captures only 
credit risk. It is left to the discretion of individual supervisory authorities to 
decide whether to attempt to account for more methodologically difficult types 
of risk, such as investment risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, or con-
centration risk.210 
At the time, the BSC's admission created uncertainty about the capital 
treatment of foreign exchange transactions. When would the BSC revisit the 
gaps (i.e., interest rate and market risk), and what rules would it propose? Un-
til the BSC proposes new rules, would some regulators promulgate rules on 
interest rate and market risk? The last question implies the possible creation of 
cross-border competitive disadvantages through differential capital rules for 
foreign exchange transactions: some, but not all, regulators might demand a 
capital charge for interest rate and market risk. 
Second, there is no guarantee G-1 0 regulators would implement the 1993 
Market Risk Proposal in a uniform way. (Of course, this problem also existed 
with respect to any non-G-10 regulator that voluntarily implemented the Pro-
posal). As with the Accord,211 the Proposal contains various provisions giving 
discretion to domestic bank regulators. Some regulators could abuse their dis-
cretion to favor their baTiks. For example, consider the use of deltas in calcu-
lating the appropriate capital charge for the market risk associated with op-
tions.212 Conceivably, different domestic bank regulators might approve 
different deltas ·for the same type of currency option. A baTik from a country 
whose regulator is permissive with respect to approving deltas could gain a 
competitive advantage in options trading. That bank would be able to convert 
the value of its options into a smaller underlying long or short currency posi-
tion and, therefore, incur a smaller capital charge. · 
Third, neither the 1988 Accord nor the 1993 Market Risk Proposal covers 
all private sector players in the foreign exchange market.213 As discussed 
210. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 5.3.3.4 at 5.106 (emphasis 
original) and 5.110 (emphasis added) (1995). 
211. See Scott & Iwahara, supra note 20; Bhala & Kapstein, supra note 20. 
212. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
213. See NORTON, supra note 4, at 40-41. 
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above,214 these documents apply only to banks from G-10 countries, and from 
non-member countries choosing to adopt the regime. For some banks, less-
than-universal coverage is an incentive to conduct their foreign exchange busi-
ness from a country outside of the BSC's regime. Certainly, G-10 bank regu-
lators can (and do) apply capital requirements to their banks' global opera-. 
tions, and thereby reach the offshore operations of their banks. But, why not 
move the bank's headquarters to the Cayman Islands, out of the reach of every 
G-1 0 regulator? 
Furthermore, the Accord and Proposal are inapplicable to investment 
banks. Yet, like commercial banks, investment banks regularly engage in for-
eign exchange transactions.215 
The need for a "level playing·field" among banks concerning their <;:apital 
adequacy requirements is perhaps more pressing today, primarily due to the 
rapid growth of a global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and the 
different approaches national regulators may take in addressing off-balance 
sheet risks. 
First, banks are undertaking increased off-balance sheet and other fee-driven 
financing activities traditionally undertaken by nonbanks. Second, growing 
global disintermediation has simultaneously enabled· non banks to· offer more 
traditional bank-like services. In sum, the traditional distinction between 
banks and nonbanks is becoming blurred and the importance of harmonized 
regulatory requirements for financial service providers is growing.216 
This situation creates "a danger that trading business will be driven to [non-
bank] competitors by a regime that imposes onerous costs on the banking in-
dustry."217 
The 1993 Market Risk Proposal furnishes two examples of such costs. 
First, because the Proposal fails to account for offsetting risks in a portfolio, it 
imposes excessively large capital requirements on banks, which in turn impair 
the ability of banks to compete with non-banks.218 Second, the treatment of 
alternative methodologies for measuring general market risk means banks· must 
maintain "a dual system, which creates costs for banks not shared by their 
nonbank competitors, ·thereby ·further weakening banks' cost competitive-
ness. " 219 
214. See supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text. 
215. A Simple Proposal, supra note 46, at 22. To be sure, in some jurisidictions investment 
banks engage in foreign exchange transactions through commercial banks because of relevant 
domestic laws. 
216. CapitaiAdequacy,supranote 17,at 12, 14. 
217. The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 3. 
218. See Capital Adequacy, supra note 17, at iv, 18. 
219. /d. at iii, 23. 
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A ware of the unlevel playing field on which commercial and investment 
banks compete, the BSC has attempted to work with securities regulators to 
harmonize bank capital rules with capital requirements for securities firms and 
develop a universal capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions. 
However, some securities regulators lack interest in a universal regime.220 
Others, most notably the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, insist on 
harsher rules than those advocated by the BSC.221 Not surprisingly, banks re-
main disappointed by the lack of progress toward common capital adequacy 
standards. 222 
Getting non-BSC countries to adopt the BSC's capital adequacy regime 
for foreign exchange transactions is equally problematic. To be sure, several 
countries-Singapore and Malaysia, for example-profess adherence to the 
Accord. Yet, the overall regime does not enjoy the support of the international 
banking community in the same manner the Uruguay Round agreements are 
accepted by the international trade com!llunity. Without broader support, 
complaints from banks subject to the regime that they are handicapped by it 
are likely to be heard with increasing force. Or, banks may elect to take the 
"Caymans option:" 
Ill. TOWARD STABILITY?: THE 1995 MARKET RISK PROPOSAL AND 1996 
. . . 
MARKET RISK AMENDMENT 
The objective in introducing this significant [1996] amendment to the [1988 
Basle] Capital Accord is to provide an explicit capital cushion for the price · 
risks to which banks are exposed, particularly those arising from their trading 
activities. Introducing the discipline that capital requirements impose is seen 
as an important further step in strengthening the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system and of financial mar\<ets generally. 
The [Basle] Committee notes that the use of proprietary in-house models to 
measure market risk for supervisory capital purposes represents a significant 
innovation in supervisory methods. 
Baste Committee on Banking Supervision, Overview of the Amendment to 
the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, 1[1[1 at 1 and II.21 at 6, Janu-
ary 1996 (emphasis original). 
The principal fear is that the Basle' methodology may in some cases require 
·banks ... to be vastly overcapitalized, which, in tum, could diminish profits 
220. A Simple Proposal, supra note 46, at 22 .. 
221. Elderfield, Developments in EC and International Capital Adequacy Regulations, supra 
note 28, at 318. 
222. See, e.g., The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risk, supra note 17, at 3. 
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and liquidity and stymie financial innovation. 
End-users ofbanking products and services have their own reasons to be con-
. cemed: If capital requirements jump, so will prices and fees. 
Karen Spinner, Test-drive the New BIS Value-at-Risk Model . .. Before 
It's Too Late!, DERIVATIVES STRATEGY, May 29, 1995, at 4. 
A. The BSC 's New Two-Track Approach To Market Risk 
Part II of this article has argued the capital adequacy regime for foreign 
exchange transactions as it existed through the issuance of the 1995 Netting 
Amendment was not a stable dynamic equilibrium. Legitimate bank objec~ 
tions to the pre-1995 regime were so fundamental as to undermine the stability 
of that regime. Indeed, with respect to the 1993 Market Risk Proposal, even 
the BSC itself admitted there were a number of important common underlying 
themes [to the banks' criticisms of the 1993 Proposal] which the Committee 
felt to be worthy of a considered response. These were, in brief, that: 
a. the proposal did not provide sufficient incentive to improve risk man-
agement systems because it did not recognize the most accurate risk manage-
ment techniques; 
b. the proposed methodology did not take sufficient account of correlations 
and portfolio effects across instruments and markets, and generally did not suf-
ficiently reward risk diversification; 
c. the proposal was not sufficiently compatible with banks' own measure-
ment systems; 
d. there is a need to widen the scope of the institutions subject to the rules 
to include, notably, major securities firms. 
A strong common theme among the responses was the argument that pro-
prietary risk management models developed by some of the more sophisticated 
banks produce far more accurate measures of market risk and that there would 
be costly overlaps if those banks were required to calculate market risks in two 
different ways. A supporting argument was the risk that the proposed meas-
urement framework and resulting capital charges might impede development 
of sound risk management practices within the banks.223 
The current Part of this article paints a very different picture. As a result 
ofthe 1995 Market Risk Proposal and 1996 Market Risk Amendment, there-
gime may be headed toward a stable dynamic equilibrium. The basis for this 
argument is the new Proposal and Amendment allow for constrained self-
223. Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note IS, at 2 (emphasis in original). See also 
April 199S Press Release, supra note IS, at 1; Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note IS, 
at I. 
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regulation by banks. 
When the BSC issued its 1995 Market Risk Proposal in April 1995, it trig-
gered a veritable revolution in international banking law. For the first time, the 
BSC opened the door for banks to self-regulate in the area of capital adequacy. 
The BSC confirmed its revolutionary approach 'in January 1996 when it pub-
lished· its 1996 Market Risk Amendment. With one exception mentioned be-
low concerning the treatment of correlations across market risk categories, the 
1996 Amendment to the 1988 Basle Capital Accord makes no material 
changes to the 1995 Proposal. Thus, by the end of 1997 when the Amendment 
takes effect, banks will have new freedom to determine the amount of capital 
they must maintain against market risk associated with foreign exchange (and 
other) transactions.224 As the Chairman of the BSC, Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, says, the international banking community is entering a new era of 
"market-friendly" regulation.225 · 
How did this revolution happen? In the 1995 Proposal and 1996 Amend-
ment, the BSC adopts a two-track approach to calculating the market risk 
capital charge.226 Now, a bank can calculate the amount of capital it must 
maintain against possible losses arising from. market risk by using the method 
prescribed in the 1993 Market Risk Proposal-renamed the "standardized~' 
methodology.227 Alternatively, a bank can ignore the standardized methodol-
ogy and devise its own calculation methodology-technically referred to 8$ the 
"internal model" methodology.. . · 
The internal approach is based on a sophisticated m~thematica1 model de-
signed by a bank to measure Value at Risk. VaR is an e.stimate of the amount 
of earnings a bank could lose on its trading portfolio as a result of the market 
risks inherent in that portfolio.228 Maintaining, upgrading, and implementing 
224. See December 1995 Press Statement, supra note 16, at 1; December 1995 Commu-
nique, supra note 16, at 1; Overview, supra note 16, at 1; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra 
note 16, at 1 and 5. For an overview of the 1995 Market Risk Proposal, see Matthews, supra 
note 28, at pt. I. B. . 
· 225. Safe Banking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996 at 27 .. 
226. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15, at 1-2; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note I~. at 3; December I995 Communique, 
supra note I6, at I; Overview, supra note .16, at 2; 1996 Market Risk Amendm.ent, supra note. I6, 
at 3; Final Market Risk Capital Standards Published, FIN. REG. REPORT (Jan . .1996). 
227. The I995 Proposal and I996 Amendment make minor modifications to the standard-
ized methodology. These modifications are explained in ihe Capital Adequacy, supra note I7. 
228. See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.· For discussions of the array and limi-
tations ofVaR models currently in use, see Can One Value-at-Risk System Adequately Measure 
a Bank's Total Risk Exposure?, AM. BANKER, May 6, I996; Justin Fox, Debate: Risk Standards 
Based on Computer Models Series: 2, AM. BANKER, Feb. 22, I996. The internal model meth-
odology is somewhat distinct from the "pre-commitment" idea raised by the Federal Reserve. 
Its idea would allow a bank to pre-commit a level of capital it deemed appropriate to cover any 
losses from market risk. Periodically, the bank's regulator wo~ld review whether that pre-
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the model require high-powered computer systems and a full-time professional 
staff that understands both trading operations and the technical engineering as-
sociated with the design and use of the model. 
To be sure, as discussed below, a bank's internal VaR model must satisfy 
qualitative and quantitative standards set forth in the 1995 Proposal and final-
ized in the 1996 Amendment.229 Otherwise, the BSC and domestic regulators 
will second-guess the bank's calculations. Nevertheless, the key feature of the 
revolution is that a bank is free to develop its own means for measuring and 
monitoring market risk capital requirements. 
What currency trading activities do the standardized and internal VaR 
methodologies cover? Both methodologies produce a market risk capital re-
quirement pertaining to two categories of activities. First, the requirement ap-
plies to the mark-to-market value of interest-rate related instruments in a 
bank's trading book.230 These instruments include foreign exchange transac-
tions sensitive to interest rate changes, namely, forwards, swaps, and op-
tions.231 Second, the requirement applies to foreign exchange risk associated 
with a bank's total foreign currency positions.232 A bank must meet the market 
risk capital requirement on a continuous basis, specifically, at the close of each 
committed amount was sufficient and, if not, could impose a sanction such as a fine or disclos-
ing to the market that the bank was undercapitalized. See Risk Management: Bettering Baste, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995 at 76; Matthews, supra note 28, at pt. LB. 
229. See infra notes 235 and 256; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15 at 3-4, and at 
38; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 3-4 and 38. In addition to the qualitative 
and quantitative standards, the BSC set forth "general criteria." For example, in the judgment 
of the bank's regulator, a bank must have "sufficient numbers of staff skilled in the use of so-
phisticated models not only in the trading area but also in the risk control, audit, and if neces-
sary, back office areas." 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15 at 38. See also 1996 Mar-
ket Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 38. Once a bank adopts the internal model methodology, 
it cannot revert to the standardized approach, save in "exceptional circumstances." Overview, 
supra note 16, at 9; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 5-6. The BSC does not 
define what circumstances may be "exceptional." 
230. The "mark-to-market" value refers to the current market value of an instrument. See 
1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 2. 
231. With respect to the standardized methodology, see 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra 
note 15 at 9 and 14; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 9 and 14. It is implicit in 
the BSC's discussion of the internal model methodology that such instruments are included. See 
1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.3(a), at 42; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, su-
pra note 16, pt. B.3(a), at 42. 
232. With respect to the standardized methodology, see 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra 
note 15 at 1-2 and 22-25; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 1-2 and 23-26. ·The 
BSC allows "some discretion to exclude structural foreign exchange positions." 1996 Market 
Risk Proposal, supra note 16, at 2 and 24-25. It is clear from the BSC's discussion of the inter-
nal model methodology that a VaR model must account for foreign exchange risk. See 1995 
Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. BJ(b), at 42-43; 199§ Market Risk Amendment, supra 
note 16, pt. B.3(b ), at 42-43. 
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business day.233 A bank's total capital charge is the sum of its market risk 
capital charge and its capital charge for credit risk established by the 1988 Ac-
cord.234 
As intimated above,235 the amended capital adequacy regime for foreign 
exchange transactions does not amount to unrestricted self-regulation. Rather, 
it is best characterized as "constrained self-regulation." The BSC's qualitative 
and quantitative standards are the constraints, and within them a bank is free to 
determine its market risk capital requirement using its internal VaR model. 
The constrained self-regulatory regime raises two significant issues for analy-
sis using the FICAS model. The analyses are set forth in Parts III.B and C re-
spectively, and the results are summarized in Table 2 below. 
First, to what extent is the regime moving toward the ideal type of self-
regulation and, therefore, toward a stable dynamic equilibrium? Part III.B ar-
gues that with respect to the frequency, intricacy, and authority variables of the 
FICAS model, the regime is beginning to resemble the ideal type. The con-
straints imposed by the BSC seem unlikely to be adjusted frequently and are 
not intricate. A bank can take advantage of the self-regulatory opportunity af-
forded by the regime and establish a frequency of adjustment and level of in-
tricacy with which it is comfortable. The authority of the regime may be en-
hanced insofar as its self-regulatory features become customary international 
law or international law merchant.236 
233. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15 at 5; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra 
note 16, at 5. 
234. Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15 at 7; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra 
note 15 at 4; Overview, supra note 16, at 9; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 4. 
The credit risk capital charge applies to derivatives, including foreign exchange derivatives such 
as options and swaps. Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15 at 7. To be sure, the VaR 
methodology also covers non-currency trading activities, for example, trading in equities and 
commodities. Thus, conceptually, the "true" total capital charge equals the sum of (1) the 
credit risk requirement, (2) the VaR amounts for interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, and 
commodity positions, as adjusted by the multiplication factor of three (discussed below), and (3) 
an add on factor (discussed below) based on backtesting results. 
235. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
236. Of course, to the extent banks use the standardized methodology, none of these benefits 
is obtained. 
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FICAS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND RESULTS 
STABILITY OF BSC'S CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGIME 
FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTION 
Fnquenq of AtQulltmtnts Favon Stability Because:. 
Inverse relalionsbip between ftequeocy aod slllbility-bigh 
(I) The qualitative and quantitative standards for self-regulation adjustment frequency is likely to undermine slllbility. 
ore broad aod flexible, and they seem unlikely to require 
frequent revision. 
(2) Baoks can deterntine when and bow often to adjust their 
internal VaR models. 
lntrlracy of rules Favon Stability Because: 
Inverse relationship between (I) VaR is an intuitively appealing concepl 
inaicacy aod slllbili~ler, more flexible rules are likely to (2) The qualitative and quantitative standards for self-regulation 
enhaoce slllbility. 
are stmightforward. 
(3) Baoks can deterntine the degree ofinaicacy of their internal 
VaRmodels. 
Cogenq ofruks Does Not Favor Stability Because: 
Direct relationship between cogency and stability-persuasive. (I) The 99 percent confidence level and ten-day holding period 
well-grounded rules are likely to contribute to stability. quantitative standards are excessively conservative. 
(2) There is no rationale for the correlation standard or 
multiplication factor. 
(3) The m~ltiplication factor leads to excessive capitalization. 
Authority ofrults Favon Stability Because: 
Direct relationship between authority and stability-binding (I) Self-regulation through internal VaR modeling could become 
obligations are likely to enhance slllbility. customary international law or international law merchant 
Scopt ofrults Does Not Favor Stability Because: 
Direct relalionsbip between scope and stability-<:omprehensive (I) The scope of application of the 1995 Market Risk Proposal 
applicability of rules is likely to foster slllbility. and 1996 Market Risk Amendment is limited to G-1 0 
commercial banks. 
TABLE2 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF APPLYING THE FICAS MODEL TO 1995 MARKET RISK 
PROPOSAL AND 1996 MARKET RISK AMENDMENT 
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Second, to what extent does the regime still fall short of the self-regulatory 
ideal type and thereby generate the potential for opposition from banks? Part 
III.C argues that the BSC's two-track approach does not yield a regime that is 
as cogent or comprehensive in scope as the ideal type. Arbitrary features of 
the BSC's quantitative standards undermine the cogency of the regime. The 
scope of the regime still does not encompass similarly situated parties involved 
in trading currencies.237 Thus, if the BSC resolves the cogency and scope dif-
ficulties associated with constrained self-regulation, then the regime will more 
closely resemble the ideal type and, therefore, progress toward a stable dy-
namic equilibrium. Fixing these problems requires the BSC to reduce, and 
perhaps abandon, certain quantitative standards.238 
B. How Constrained Self-Regulation Contributes To Stability 
It is not surprising banks express strong support for the BSC's willingness 
to recognize internal VaR models.239 As the Executive Director of the Bankers 
Roundtable stated in response to the 1995 Market Risk Proposal, "[i]t sounds 
like a great approach. We would be very pleased with it. It is a great step 
237. Here, too, insofar as banks use the standardized approach, the critique offered in Part II 
of this article of the 1993 Market Risk Proposal remains relevant. See also Letter from Evans, 
supra note 18, at 3 (stating the standardized approach described in the 1995 Market Risk Pro-
posal "contains all the limitations" of the 1993 Proposal, including "(i) Jack of accuracy, (ii) 
incompatibility with internal risk measurement systems and (iii) Jack of flexibility to incorporate 
new products"). 
238. Of course, there may be a political limit on the extent to which the BSC is willing or 
able to fix the problems. Put bluntly, the BSC may fear unconstrained self-regulation as a threat 
to its self-interest as a leading forum for international banking law development. See Equilib-
rium Theory, supra note 1 (manuscript pts. II.B.2 and V., on file with author). Accordingly, the 
BSC's constraints on self-regulation could reflect its own political constraints against moving 
the regime aggressively toward the ideal type. 
If pressed, the BSC might justify the qualitative and quantitative standards for internal 
VaR modeling as follows: in an unconstrained self-regulatory regime, each bank might publish 
the VaR model it uses to measure its market risk exposures and determine corresponding capital 
levels. Some banks might be tempted to disclose false and misleading information, perhaps to 
appease their creditors and thereby avoid a liquidity crisis or even a bank run. However, this 
justification ought not to be overblown. A bank that fails to publish accurate information about 
its VaR model and capital positions no doubt would be ostracized by the rest of the international 
banking community, as well as face penalties for violating applicable securities law disclosure 
requirements. 
239. See, e.g., Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 2-3 (stating that the 1995 Proposal is "a 
significant improvement over the" 1993 Proposal); Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, at 2 and 
Attachment at 2 (supporting the BSC's "decision to provide for the use of banks' internal mod-
els for measuring market risks as an alternative to the standardized approach"); Overview, supra 
note 16, at 2. 
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forward. "240 Three of the FICAS variables-frequency, intricacy, and author-
ity-suggest that as a result of the 1995 Market Risk Proposal and 1996 Mar-
ket Risk Amendment the capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange trans-
actions is moving toward the ideal type of self-regulation. It is unlikely the 
BSC will adjust frequently the qualitative and quantitative standards for the 
use of internal VaR models to determine market risk capital charges. Moreo-
ver, these standards are not intricate. Therefore, subject to the standards, 
banks can tailor the intricacy and adjustment frequency of their internal mod-
els. Finally, the authority of at least the self-regulatory features of the regime 
may be enhanced. These features could develop into customary international 
Jaw or international law merchant. 
1. Frequency: The BSC Is Unlikely To Adj.ust The Standards 
Frequently 
Will the BSC adjust frequently the qualitative and quantitative standards 
for the use of internal models to determine market risk capital charges? To be 
sure, there are no formal constraints on the frequency with which the BSC 
makes adjustments. In fact, in its 1995 Market Risk Proposal it reserves the 
right to make changes. However, this reservation is remarkably tentative. 
The use of proprietary in-house models to measure market risk for supervisory 
purposes represents a significant innovation in supervisory methods, and im-
plementation ofthe approach will of necessity be to some extent evolutionary. 
The Committee thus reserves the right to modify the specifications required for 
banks using models as more experience is gained .... 241 
In other words, there is reason to believe the BSC will exercise restraint in 
adjusting the qualitative and quantitative standards. 
The BSC appears to realize it laid a trap for itself in its 1993 Market Risk 
Proposal. On the one hand, the BSC cannot keep pace with market develop-
ments. When it issued its 1995 Proposal, the BSC admitted it "has gain~d a 
heightened appreciation for the rapid pace of change within the industry which 
is prompting banks to make ... major investments in [human and technologi-
cal] resources". to develop their own market risk models._242 On the other hand, 
the standardized methodology in the 1993 Proposal does not account for these 
investments. The significant bank opposition to the standardized methodology 
means the BSC would have to make constant adjustments to that methodology. 
240. Anthony Cluff, Executive Director, Bankers Roundtable, quoted in Jaret Seiberg, Basel 
Committee Drops Formula Approach to Weighing Market Risk, AM. BANKER, Apr. 13, 1995, at 
2. 
241. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15 at 3 (emphasis in bold in original, emphasis in 
italics added). See also Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15 at 3-4; Overview, supra 
note 16, at 2. 
242. Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15, at 3. 
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In tum, frequent adjustments raise the specter that the methodology would be-
come even more intricate and less cogent. As the Institute of International Fi-
nance puts it, 
[s]ince the methods for dividing and measuring risk components are evolving 
at a very fast pace, banks believe that the proper regulatory focus should be on 
management's ability ... to identify and adapt to technological and analytical 
developments. For this reason, it would be short-sighted for bank supervisory 
agencies to impose specific technical methods that could rapidly become ob-
solete.243 
To escape the trap, the BSC wisely gives banks the option of self-
regulation through internal VaR modeling in the 1995 Market Risk Proposal, 
and confirms this option in the 1996 Market Risk Amendment. 
There is no need for the BSC to monitor and· upkeep constantly the hew 
constrained self-regulatory regime. Internal VaR modeling is subject only to 
broad, inherently flexible standards that can capture a range of future market 
developments. Indeed, with the exception of somewhat more liberal treatment 
for empirical correlations among market risk categories, there are no material 
differences between the 1995 Proposal and 1996 Amendment.244 In sum, the 
BSC seems to concede banks are in the best position to adjust their internal 
models to account for new developments. 
2. Intricacy: VaR Is Intuitively Appealing And The Standards Are 
Straightforward · 
a. VaR 
The internal model methodology is based on the intuitively appealing con-
cept of VaR. ·The amount of capital to safeguard against market risk should 
depend on :•an estimate of the likely maximum amount that could be lost on a 
bank's portfolio with a certain degree of statistical confidence" as a result of 
·market movements.245 
[A]n internal valuation' model calculates the potential change in the value of 
each position resulting from specified movements in the relevant underlying 
risk factors. · The changes in value are then aggregated, taking account of his-
torical correlation between the different risk factors to varying degrees-either 
· .. at the level of an individual portfolio or across trading activities throughout the 
bank. The movements in risk factors and the historical correlations between 
_ them are measured over the observation period chosen by. the bank as appro-
243. An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at 3. 
244·. See Overview, supra note 16, at 2-3. 
245. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 4. See also Supervisory Framework 
for the Use of" Backtesting," supra note 16, at 2. 
186 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:125 
priate for capturing market conditions within its overall strategy. 246 
Accordingly, with respect to foreign exchange transactions, a VaR model 
simply measures how much a bank stands to lose as a result of exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
Banks are free to use a variety of specific methodologies to measure 
VaR.247 One alternative is an historical simulation approach. A bank calcu-
lates the hypothetical change in the value of its current portfolio of transactions 
based on actual historical movements in risk factors such as exchange rate 
fluctuations.248 A second alternative is to use a variance/covariance methodol-
ogy. A bank calculates the change in the value of its portfolio of transactions 
by considering the sensitivity of these positions in relation to a matrix of vari-
ances and covariances that is based on risk factor volatilities and correla-
tions.249 A third alternative is the Monte Carlo simulation method. It tests the 
value of a bank's portfolio under a large sample of randomly chosen combina-
tions of risk factor scenarios whose probabilities are based on historical expe-
rience.250 All three methodologies produce a final VaR number.251 
Once a bank obtains this number, it sets its market risk capital requirement 
at the higher of (1) the previous business day's VaR or (2) the average of its 
V aR figures during the previous sixty business days, multiplied by a factor of 
at least three.252 It must meet this requirement on a daily basis. Suppose yes-
terday a bank stood to lose $100 million from its foreign exchange transac-
tions, and it had no other transactions subject to a market risk capital charge. 
During the last sixty days its average VaR was $40 million. The bank's mar-
ket risk capital requirement would be $120 million ($40 million multiplied by 
the minimum factor of three, which exceeds the $100 million figure from yes-
terday). 
Why compare the previous day's VaR figure with the sixty day average? 
The previous day's figure is particularly important during periods of market 
246. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 4. Of course, the mathematics of a 
VaR model are likely to be highly sophisticated. 
247. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(t), at 44; 1996 Market Risk Amend-
ment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(t), at 44. 
248. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 5. 
249. /d. 
250. /d. 
251. ld. Technically, a Monte Carlo simulation produces more than a single VaR estimate. 
It also yields a distribution of potential profit and loss outcomes, which is even more useful than 
a single estimate. 
252. See infra notes 273-278 and 303-305 and accompanying text; Proposal to Issue a Sup-
plement, supra note 15, at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4 (i), at 45; Inter-
nal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, § IV(f), at 15-16; December 1995 Communique, 
supra note 16, at 2; Overview, supra note 16, at 2; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, 
pt. B.4(i), at 45. 
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stress, when a higher capital cushion is needed.253 Conversely, the sixty day 
average provides stability and a cushion for potential losses in the event the 
previous day's VaR is relatively low as a result of day-to-day fluctuations.254 
Taking the higher of these two numbers means there is a built-in lo':Ver limit on 
the capital charge. This limit helps prevent a bank from obtaining a competi-
tive advantage through imprudently low capital charges.255 
b. Qualitative Standards 
The qualitative standards in the .constrained self-regulatory regime are not 
intricate. Certainly, banks would not have reason to oppose the regime on the 
grounds that the BSC engages in micro-management. To the contrary, the 
broad qualitative standards "are designed to ensure that banks' measurement 
systems are conceptually sound and that the process of managing risks is car-
ried out with integrity. " 256 Possibly, banks might fear capricious implementa-
tion due to overly broad standards. 
First, a bank must have "an independent risk control unit that is responsi-
ble for the design and implementation of the bank's risk management sys-
tem. " 257 This unit must be distinct from trading units and report directly to 
senior management.258 This standard directly addresses problems that contrib-
uted to the Barings Bank and Daiwa Bank scandals.259 Moreover, "[t]he 
bank's internal risk measurement model must be closely integrated into its 
day-to-day risk management processes. " 260 In this respect, it should not be 
considered a substitute for trading and exposure limits.261 The model should 
be well-documented, and a routine for ensuring compliance with the market-
253. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, §IV( d), at 16. 
254. /d. 
255. /d. 
256. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2. See also 1995 Market Risk Proposal, 
supra note 15, pt. B.l at 38 and pt. B.2, at 39; Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, 
at 2; 1996 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 16, pt. B.1 at 38 and pt. B.2 at 39. 
257. Aprill995 Press Release, supra note 15 at 2. See also Proposal to Issue a Supplement, 
supra note 15 at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(a), at 39; December 1996 
Communique, supra note 16, at 1; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.2(a), at 
39. 
258. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(a), at 39. See also December 1995 
Communique, supra note 16, at 2; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.2(a), at 
39. 
259. See Equilibrium Theory, supra note 1 (manuscript pt. I., on file with author). 
260. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15 at 2. See also 1995 Market Risk Proposal, 
supra note 15, pt. B.2(d), at 39; December 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 2; 1996 Market 
Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.2(d), at 39. 
261. .1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(e), at 39; Overview, supra note 15, 
at 15; 1996 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 16, pt. B.2(e), at 39. 
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risk related capital level generated by the model should exist.262 Also, "an in-
dependent review of the risk measurement system should be carried out regu-
larly as part of the bank's internal audit, which should include a review of the 
independent risk control unit." 263 This review should determine whether the 
bank's internal model is well designed and implemented with integrity.264 
Second, senior management must be actively involved in the design and 
implementation of the bank's internal modet.265 For instance, daily reports 
about market risk exposures produced by the internal model must be for-
warded to senior managers. These managers must be empowered to act on the 
reports, namely, to order reductions in positions taken by individual traders 
and the bank's overall risk exposure.266 
Third, a bank's internal model must have "a proven track record of rea-
sonable accuracy in predicting losses."267 Accordingly, the bank must have a 
backtesting program whereby V aR estimates generated by the internal model 
are compared ex post to actual daily changes in the bank's portfolio value.268 
In its 1995 Proposal, the BSC offers little explanation of backtesting. How-
ever, in response to banks' concerns about vagueness and the relationships 
between backtesting and a multiplication factor the BSC dedicates an entire 
document to the matter in its 1996 Amendment.269 As the BSC points out, 
backtesting is a simple way to ensure the accuracy of a V aR model. 270 
262. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(g), at 40. See also December 1995 
Communique, supra note 16, at 1; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.2(g), at 
40. 
263. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2. See also Proposal to Issue a Supple-
ment, supra note 15, at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(h), at 40; Decem-
ber 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 1; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. 
B.2(h), at 40. 
264. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, §VI, at 15. 
265. Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15, at 3. See also 1995 Market Risk Pro-
posal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(c), at 39; December 1996 Communique, supra note 16, at 1; 1996 
Market Risk Proposal, supra note 16, pt. B.2(c), at 39. 
266. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(c), at 39; 1996 Market Risk Amend-
ment, supra note 16, pt. B.2(c), at 39. 
267. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.1, at 38; 1996 Market Risk Amend-
ment, supra note 16, pt. B.1, at 38. 
268. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(b), at 39; Internal Model-Based Ap-
proach, supra note 15, § Vl(f), at 16; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.2(b), 
at 39. 
269. See Supervisory Framework for the Use of 'Backtesting,' supra note 16. 
270. Backtesting is not the only means to check the accuracy of a VaR model. "Stress 
tests" help determine the performance of a model, and thereby a bank's vulnerability, during 
periods of extreme market turbulence. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, § V(c), 
at 18. See also December 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 1. Accordingly, the BSC re-
quires a bank to conduct regular stress tests. 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. 
B.5, at 46-47. For instance, a bank should test the effect on its foreign exchange positions 
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The essence of all backtesting efforts is the comparison of actual trading re-
sults with [VaR] model-generated risk measures. If this comparison is close 
enough, the backtest raises no issues regarding the quality of the risk meas-
urement model. In some cases, however, the comparison uncovers sufficient 
differences that problems almost certainly must exist, either with the model or 
with the assumptions of the backtest. In between these two cases is a grey area 
where the test results are, on their own, inconclusive. 
[B]acktesting programs typically consist of a periodic comparison of the 
bank's daily value-at-risk measures with the subsequent daily profit or loss 
("trading outcome"). The value-at-risk measures are intended to be larger 
than all but a certain fraction of the trading outcomes, where that fraction is 
determined by the confidence level of the value-at-risk measure. [As dis-
cussed below with respect to quantitative standards, that level is 99 percent.] 
Comparing the risk measures with the trading outcomes simply means that the 
bank counts the number of times that the risk measures were larger than the 
trading outcome. The fraction actually covered can then be compared with the 
intended level of coverage to gauge the performance of the bank's risk model. 
The framework adopted by the [Baste] Committee, which is also the most 
straightforward procedure for comparing the risk measures with the trading 
outcomes, is simply to calculate the number of times that the trading outcomes 
are not covered by the risk measures ("exceptions"). For example, over 200 
trading days, a 99% daily risk measure should cover, on average, 198 of the 
200 trading outcomes, leaving two exceptions. 
The appeal ofusing the number of exceptions as the primary reference point in 
the backtesting process is the simplicity and straightforwardness of this ap-
proach.271 
189 
For instance, as a statistical matter, focusing on the number of exceptions 
does not require a bank to make a large number of assumptions. The key as-
sumption is that "each day's test (exception/no exception) is independent of 
the outcome of any of the others. " 272 
Just as the assumptions underlying backtesting are simple, so too are the 
caused by a disturbance like the 1993 European exchange rate mechanism crisis. April 1995 
Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; Proposal to Issue Supplement, supra note 15, at 3; 1995 
Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.2(f), at 40; Internal Model-Based Approach, supra 
note 15, § V(b), at 18; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.2(f), at 40. 
271. Supervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting," supra note 16, 1-5 (emphasis 
added). 
272. /d. at 5. 
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inferences that may be drawn from test results. In general, if backtesting 
shows a bank's internal VaR model consistently underestimates the amount of 
capital the bank needs, then the bank's regulator can demand improvements in 
the model. Alternatively, the regulator can increase the bank's multiplication 
factor (a quantitative standard discussed below) or even disallow the model.273 
The BSC urges a simple three-zone approach. to determine the appropriate 
regulatory response to backtesting results. 
The green zone corresponds to backtesting results that do not themselves sug-
gest a problem with the quality or accuracy of a bank's model. The yellow 
zone encompasses results that do raise questions in this regard, but where such 
a conclusion is not definitive. The red zone indicates a backtesting result that 
almost certainly indicates a problem with a bank's risk mode1.274 
The BSC defines the green zone in terms of zero to four exceptions, the 
yellow zone in terms of five to nine exceptions, and the red zone in terms of 
ten or more exceptions.275 For example, if a bank's VaR model generates a 
capital requirement that does not cover trading outcomes on two occasions, 
then that model is in the green zone. It is, therefore, deemed accurate and no 
regulatory response is necessary.276 If the resulting capital requirement is defi-
cient on fifteen occasions, then the model is in the red zone and presumed de-
fective. The bank's regulator will increase the multiplication factor (e.g., from 
three to four), investigate why the bank's VaR model produces so many 
misses, and require the bank to improve the model.277 A model falling in be-
tween these extreme zones, that is, a yellow-zone model, might trigger an in-
crease in the multiplication factor if the bank cannot prove the model is fun-
damentally sound. The size of any increase will vary directly with the number 
of exceptions. 278 
The BSC does not mandate a bank adopt a particular type of backtesting 
because it recognizes "the [banking] industry has not yet settled on a single 
backtesting methodology."279 Instead, the BSC sketches a framework to 
273. See infra notes 303-305 and accompanying text; Internal Model-Based 'Approach, su-
pra note IS,§ IV( f), at 16. 
274. Supervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting," supra note 16, at 5. The zones 
are designed to balance "type l" errors (the possibility that an accurate VaR model is classified 
as inaccurate and rejected because ofbacktesting results) and "type 2" errors (the converse pos-
sibility, i.e., erroneous acceptance of an inaccurate model). /d. at 6. 
275. These definitions are based on a 99% confidence level and 250 daily observations. Su-
pervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting," supra note 16, at 7. Arguably, the BSC is 
relatively lax in defining the zones. For example, with a 99% confidence level and 250 obser-
vations, the green zone should be from 0 to 2.5 exceptions. 
276. Supervisory Framework for the Use of"Backtesting, "supra note 16, at 7-8 .. 
277. /d. at 11. 
278. /d. at 8-9. 
279. /d. at l. 
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which a bank should pay attention when customizing its methodology. First, 
the observed percentage of outcomes covered by a VaR model should be con-
sistent with a 99 percent level of confidence, i.e., the backtest should deter-
mine whether a model generates risk measures covering 99 percent of a bank's 
trading outcomes. Second, model-generated risk measures should be com~ 
pared with actual one-day trading outcomes. In reality, the composition of a 
bank's portfolio changes on an inter- and even intra-day basis. Moreover, a 
bank earns fee income from executing trades on behalf of customers, and sepa-
rating fee from trading income is a costly and time-consuming process. In 
contrast, a VaR model assumes a static portfolio without fee income. Hence, 
focusing on one-day outcomes provides a snapshot of a bank's portfolio and 
helps minimize "contamination" from portfolio changes or fee incorrie.280 
Third, backtests should be performed on a quarterly basis using the most recent 
twelve months of data.2SI 
In sum, the three qualitative standards cover the design and implementa-
tion of an internal model, the role of senior management, and testing. Cer-
tainly, banks may have questions for the BSC and regulators about how to im-
plement the standards in particular contexts.282 However, the crucial point is 
to contrast the complexity of the eight-step standardized methodology in the 
1993 Market Risk Proposal discussed above in Part II with the simplicity of 
the three qualitative standards. Because the standards are relatively more 
straightforward than the eight steps, the standards represent a shift in the capi-
tal adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions toward reduced intri-
cacy. 
c. Quantitative Standards 
. The quantitative standards established by the BSC for VaR modelling are 
designed to ensure a bank's VaR model is sufficiently conservative in the way 
it measures potential losses arising from market risk. From the BSC's per-
spective, these standards have a harmonizing effect. They help guard against 
self-serving attempts by an unscrupulous bank to obtain a competitive advan-
tage by using a sub-standard VaR model that consistently produces lower 
capital requirements than models designed and implemented by the bank's 
competitors. 
There are eight basic quantitative standards, "expressed as a number of 
280. /d. at 2-3. See also Jaret Seiberg, Bankers Dispute Regulators' Plan to Verify Models 
Used to Set Capital Series: 3, AM. BANKER, Apr. 24, 1996, at 1. Of course, as the BSC ac-
knowledges, the same contamination concern exists with respect to one-day trading outcomes. 
The fact that a bank's portfolio changes on an inter- and intra-day basis helps explain why banks 
oppose the ten-day holding period quantitative standard. 
281. Supervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting," supra note 16, at 4. 
282. See, e.g., Banks Struggle with Bas/e 's Qualitative Directive, DERIVATIVES WEEK, Apr. 
29, 1996, at 1 (discussing the integration ofVaR models into the risk management process). 
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broad risk measurement parameters for banks' internal models, with a simple 
rule for converting the models-based measure of exposure ('value-at-risk') into 
a supervisory capital requirement. " 283 The key point is that like the qualitative 
standards, the eight quantitative standards are not intricate. A brief explana-
tion of the quantitative standards illustrates that they are readily comprehensi-
ble. 
First, VaR must be computed daily.284 Every day a bank must enter into 
its V aR model the price and position data arising from its trading activities. 285 
The price data should cover all relevant exchange rates.286 The position data 
should cover all relevant foreign exchange transactions.287 . 
Second, a VaR model must use what the BSC deems a prudent level of 
protection against the risk of loss associated with changes in market prices, 
specifically a 99 percent, one-tailed confidence level.288 This level means 
there is only a one percent probability based on historical experience that the 
combination of positions in a bank's portfolio will result in a loss higher than 
that measured by the VaR model.289 
Third, a V aR model must assume that in the event of market disruption, a 
bank is forced to hold its positions for a minimum often business days.290 To 
be sure, under normal market conditions a bank may be able to adjust risk ex-
posures on a daily basis. But, during crises markets may become illiquid, 
hence banks may not be able to offload immediately their losing positions.291 
During this minimum holding period, the value of the bank's positions could 
continue to deteriorate. The longer the holding period, the greater the potential 
deterioration. A minimum ten-day period guards "against the consequences of 
banks being locked into unprofitable positions. " 292 
Fourth, a VaR model must be based on risk factor data (e.g., data on ex-
283. Apri11995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2. 
284. /d.; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15, at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, 
supra note 15, pt. 8.4(a), at 44; December 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 2; Overv~ew, 
supra note 16, at 2; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(a), at 44. 
285. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 4. 
286. /d. 
287. /d. 
288. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15, at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. 8.4(b) at 44; December 1995 
Communique, supra note 16, at 2; Overview, supra note 16, at 2; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, 
supra note 16, pt. 8.4(b) at 44. 
289. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 12. 
290. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15, at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. 8.4(c), at 44; December 1995 
Communique, supra note 16, at 2-3; Overview, supra note 16, at 3; 1996 Market Risk Amend-
ment, supra note 16, pt. 8.4(c), at 44. 
291. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 10. 
''' 
292. /d. 
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change rates, volatilities, and correlations) gathered over an historical observa-
tion period of at least one year.293 ·Of course, a bank is free to use a longer 
data-gathering period.294 In addition, a bank should update. its data set every 
three months.295 
Fifth, a VaR model must "incorporate risk factors corresponding to the in-
di'-:idual foreign currencies in which the bank's positions are denominated."296 
Because the capital charge resulting from a bank's VaR model is expressed in 
the bank's reporting (i.e., home country) currency, any net position denomi-
nated in a foreign currency introduces a foreign exchange risk. Consequently, 
a bank must specify in its VaR model the exchange rates relevant to risks in-
herent in its portfolio of foreign exchange transactions. That is, it must ac-
count for the exchange rates between the reporting currency and each currency 
in which the bank has a significant exposure.297 
Sixth, to a certain extent a bank can recognize empirically-observed cor-
relations within a particular risk factor category (e.g., exchange rate risk), and 
293. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15 at 2; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15 at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(d) at 44; December 1995 Com-
munique, supra note 16, at 2; Overview, supra note 16, at 2; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, su-
pra note 16, pt. B.4(d) at 44. 
294. As the BSC explains, 
the choice of historical sample period can have a significant impact on the size of the es-
timated value-at-risk produced by an internal model. Short sample periods are more sen-
sitive to recent events than long sample periods but this very ~ensitivity means that for a 
fixed set of positions a short sample period leads to greater variability in the measure of 
value-at-risk relative to a longer measurement horizon. Although a longer time horizon 
may sound more conservative, the value-at-risk depends on how rapidly prices have 
changed in different time periods. If recent price volatility has been high, a measure 
based on a short horizon could lead to a higher risk measure than a horizon covering a 
longer but overall less volatile period. The disadvantage of a short time horizon is that it 
captures only recent "shocks", and it could lead to a very low measure of risk if it coin-
cides with an unusually long stable period in the markets. The disadvantage of a longer 
time horizon is that it does not respond rapidly to changes in market conditions .... 
. . . [T]he Committee does not feel it would be desirable to impose a fixed historical 
sample period for all institutions that use the internal models approach. 
Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 11. See also Overview, supra note 16, at 4. 
295. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(e), at 44; 1996 Market Risk Amend-
ment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(e), at44. 
296. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.3(b), at 42; 1996 Market Risk Amend-
ment, supra note 16, pt. B.3(b), at 42. The BSC discusses this topic in the context of specifying 
market risk factors, but in effect it represents a quantitative standard. 
297. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.3(b), at 42; 1996 Market Risk Amend-
. ment, supra note 16, pt. B.3(b), at 42. In addition, a VaR model must contain at least six 
"maturity buckets" to account for interest rate risk arising from material exposures in major 
currencies. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra 
note 15, pt. B.3(a), at 42; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.3(a), at 42. 
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across such categories (e.g., exchange rate and interest rate risk). Within a 
given risk factor category, a bank can recognize a correlation that is also rec-
ognized by its regulator.298 However, as for correlations across risk factor 
categories, the 1995 Proposal states a bank must aggregate its VaR numbers on 
a simple sum basis.299 In other words, a bank cannot offset risks across differ-
ent categories. In the 1996 Amendment, the BSC liberalizes its position: . a 
bank can recognize correlations across risk categories, but only if its regulator 
is "satisfied that the bank's system for measuring correlations is sound and 
implemented with integrity."3oo 
Seventh, a VaR model must capture accurately the unique risks associated 
with a bank's options positions.301 For instance, it must account for non-linear 
price characteristics (measured by gamma risk), the volatility of the rate and 
price of an underlying instrument (measured by vega risk), and the effect of a 
ten-day price shock to options positions.302 
Finally, the market risk capital charge resulting from a bank's VaR model 
must be scaled up by a multiplication factor of at least three.303 Depending on 
the discretion of a bank's regulator, a factor greater than three could be re-
quired. That is, on the basis of backtests of a V aR model and an assessment of 
the overall quality of a bank's risk management system, the bank's regulator 
may add a "plus" factor to the multiplication factor.304 If the results of back-
testing are satisfactory and a bank meets all of the qualitative standards, then 
the plus factor is zero.305 
298. December 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 2; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra 
note 15, pt. B.4(g), at 44; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(g), at 44. 
299. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15, at 3; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(g), at 44; Internal Model-Based 
Approach, supra note 15, at 12-13. See also Karen Spinner, Test-drive the New BIS Value-at-
Risk Model ... Before It's Too Late!, DERIVATIVES STRATEGY, May 29, 1995, at 5. 
300. December 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 3. See also Overview, supra note 16, 
at 5; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(g), at 44. 
301. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(h), at 44-45; 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(h), at 44-45. 
302. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(h), at 44-45; 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(h), at 44-45. 
303. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15, at 3-4; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(i), at 45; December 1995 
Communique, supra note 16, at 2-3; Overview, supra note 16, at 3-4; 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(i)-(j), at 45. 
304. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15, at 4; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. B.4(i), at 45; December 1995 
Communique, supra note 16, at 3; Overview, supra note 16, at 5; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, 
supra note 16, pt. B.4(j), at 45. See also Supervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting," 
supra note 16 (presenting the BSC's requirements for backtesting). 
305. Overview, supra note 16, at 5; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. B.4(j), 
at 45. 
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These eight quantitative standards are a marked contrast from the eight 
steps in the standardized methodology developed in the 1993 Market Risk 
Proposal and discussed above itt Part II. No doubt banks will have questions 
for the BSC and regulators about the details of implementing certain standards. 
Nevertheless, like the qualitative standards, they evince a decided shift toward 
reducing intricacy in the capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange trans-
actions. 
3. . Authority: The ssc:s Standards As Customary International Law 
The 1996 Market Risk Amendment enhances the authoritative basis for the 
capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange transactions. First, as discussed 
below, the BSC's qualitative and quantitative standards could become custom-
ary international law. Second, as discussed in the next section,306 internal VaR 
methodologies that banks design and implement could become international 
law merchant. 
Custom is a widely acknowledged source of international law.307 It is no 
less authoritative than an international agreement.308 Could the BSC's qualita-
tive and quantitative standards become customary international law? The an-
swer depends on whether they meet the public international law criteria for the 
formation of that law. There are two criteria: general practice and a sense of 
obligation. 
Article 38:l(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states 
that "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," 
constitutes international law.309 Section 102(2) of the Restatement (l'hird) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that "[c]ustomary in-
ternational law results from a general and consistent practice of states fol-
306. See infra notes 326-369 and accompanying text. 
307. ICJ Statute, supra note 201, art. 38:1(b); RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, at §§ 
102(1)(a), (2). See also JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1-9 (1996); JOHN MERRILLS, ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2nd ed. 1981); 
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59-62 (1963). For a critique of customary international 
law doctrine, see Anthony D'Amato, Sources ofGenera/International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ANTHOLOGY 51-94 (Anthony D'Amato, ed. 1994). 
The fonnulation of custom as a source contained in ICJ Statute is backwards. The ICJ 
Statute refers to "custom, as evidence of a general practice." In fact, as Section 102(2) of the 
Restatement correctly indicates, "[c]ustomary international law results from a general and con-
sistent practice." (emphasis added). See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restatement's Treatment 
of Sources and Evidence of International Law, in COMMENTARIES ON THE RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 9 n. 34 (International Law-
yer, ed., 1992). 
308. RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102 cmt. j. See also WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, 
FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-12 (2nd ed. 1995). 
309. Emphasis added. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102 at Reporters' Notes I. 
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lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation."310 Accordingly, both formu-
lations require general practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis,311 and theRe-
statement expressly mentions state action.312 
These formulations suggest the BSC's standards could become customary 
international law if they are followed by states as a matter of general practice 
out of a sense of legal obligation.313 That is, the formulations present a two-
part issue: does a sufficiently large number of not only G-1 0, but also non-G-
10, countries apply the standards to their banks' internal VaR models, and if 
so, is their compliance based on a belief the standards are binding? Unfortu-
nately, it is too soon to answer the issue. The 1996 Market Risk Amendment 
has not operated for a sufficiently long period to determine whether the general 
practice and opinio juris criteria are satisfied. Of course, longevity per se is 
not required for the creation of customary international law. As the Restate-
ment indicates, "[t]he practice necessary to create customary law may be of 
comparatively short duration .... " 314 But,_one or two years is an extremely 
short duration on which to base an inference that a custom has been estab-
lished. At present, the issue can be addressed only by sketching out potentially 
relevant features of general practice and opinio juris. 
a. General Practice 
What constitutes general practice? More specifically, what if some states 
opt out and decline to apply the BSC's qualitative and quantitative standards to 
their banks' internal VaR models? Unanimity of practice is not required to cre-
ate customary law. As the Restatement indicates, 
[a] practice can be general even if it is not universally followed; there is no 
precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it should 
reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant 
activity. Failure of a significant number of important states to adopt a practice 
can prevent a principle from becoming general customary law though it might 
310. RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102(2) (emphasis added). 
311. A sense of legal obligation. See also MERRILLS, supra note 307, at 4-5; BRIERLY, su-
pra note 307, at 51-52, 60-61; MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
41-48 (2d ed. 1993 ). 
312. Because the ICJ adjudicates disputes between states, the element of state action could 
be viewed as implicit in Article 38:1(b). 
313. To be sure, Section 102 of the Restatement refers to "states," not plurilateral organiza-
tions like the BSC or private actors like banks. The Section contemplates "diplomatic acts and 
instructions as well as public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of 
policy." However, the BSC's membership consists of central bank and finance ministry offi-
cials from states. Thus, the BSC's standards represent coordinated state action. 
314. RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102 cmt. b. See also§ 515; North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, supra note 198, at 43-44; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5 (4th ed. 1990). 
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become "particular customary law" for the participating states.315 
This passage suggests two alternative scenarios in the event the BSC's 
quantitative standards are not universally followed. 
First, states in a particular region of the world-for example, South Asian 
countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh-might apply a different set 
of standards to their banks' internal VaR models. These standards might qual-
ify as "regional" customary law,316 which would apply to internal models de-
veloped and used by banks in that region. If the BSC's standards are applied 
by non-South Asian states, then the standards would be customary law wher-
ever they are followed. 
A second scenario is that a large number of states apply the BSC's stan-
dards, so there is no question of confining custom to a particular region. But, 
the states apply the standards only to commercial banks, not securities firms. 
Given the nagging scope problem discussed in Part II of this article and below, 
this scenario is quite realistic. In· this scenario, the standards might become 
"special" customary law.317 That law would bind only commercial banks. 
b. Opinio Juris 
The Restatement indicates "a practice that is generally followed but which 
states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law."318 
Would states follow the BSC's qualitative and quantitative standards out of a 
sense of legal obligation? There is no multilateral body to enforce interna-
tional banking law akin to the WTO, which enforces international trade law.319 
But, an organization is not the only way to enforce legal obligation in a cross-
border context. Reputational integrity can be the "stick" that creates an at-
mosphere of legal obligation. 
Consider the possible fate of a state and its banks that do not view the 
BSC's standards as obligatory. The state fails to develop substantively 
equivalent alternative standards for internal VaR models. That state's short-
sighted imprudence undermines the long-term reputation of its banks in cur-
rency markets. Banks from other countries obliged to follow the BSC's stan-
dards, or substantive equivalents, may eschew dealing with banks from the 
"rogue" state. Extensions of credit may be made on very conservative terms, 
such as higher interest rates, lower principal amounts, and stringent capital re-
315. RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102 cmt. b. See also /d. cmt. e. 
316. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102 cmt. e; Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 
1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20). 
317. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102 cmt. e; Case Concerning Right of Passage 
Over Indian Territory (Merits) (Portugal v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12); BROWNLIE, supra 
note 314, at 9-10. 
318. RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, at§ 102 cmt. b. 
319. See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 193, ch. 2. 
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quirements, to reflect the extra risk in dealing with the rogue state's banks. 
Foreign exchange transactional volumes may be noticeably lower-in response 
to this risk. In brief, banks obligated to follow the BSC standards may adjust 
their behavior because they perceive non-obligated banks as operating in an 
unsafe and unsound manner (To take an extreme example, notwithstanding in-
frastructural barriers in Myanmar, U.S. banks are unlikely to trade currencies 
in large volumes with banks from Myanmar.). 
Thus, as a practical matter, as banks gain experience with the BSC stan-
dards, reputational pressure may compel states to regard the standards as 
obligatory. Indeed, the Restatement indicates 
[a] practice initially followed by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may be-
come law when states generally come to believe that they are under a legal 
obligation to comply with it. It is often difficult to determine when that trans-
formation into law has taken place. Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obli-
gation (e.g., by official statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be in-
ferred from acts or omissions.320 · 
The relevant point is that in the currency trading business a reputation for 
integrity is perhaps a bank's most important asset and source of competitive 
advantage. This reputation is integrally related to compliance with widespread 
practices, including the application of the BSC's standards. Following the 
standards is a symbol, or markef signal, of a bank's integrity, which has finan-
cial consequences. This signal and its repercussions are the reputational pres-
sures that cause a state to believe it is under a legal Qbligation to follow the 
BSC's standards. Put bluntly, a rogue state becomes a compliant state when it 
prefers its banks to have reputations like J.P .. Morgan and Chase Manhattan 
instead ofBarings and Daiwa.321 
320. RESTATEMENT, supra note 198, § 102 cmt. c (emphasis added). 
321. It is an unfortunate fact that from time to time a Barings, Daiwa, or BCCI affair occurs 
(though none was infamous because of its currency trading activities). See, e.g., BHALA, 
FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AITER BCCI, supra note 194. The reputational enforcement 
mechanism is not failsafe. From the perspective of a rationally-calculating state inclined to 
violate a customary regime, the mechanism works if the state's cost-benefit calculation leads it 
to believe its banks will incur a net cost if it perpetrates a bad act. Accordingly, it is important 
for the state not to miscalculate the costs and benefits as a result of, for example, imperfect in-
formation or failure to internalize certain costs or benefits. /d. 
At the same time, it is also important not to demand more of customary international 
law than is demanded of law created and enforced, respectively, by domestic legislative and 
adjudicatory institutions. No institutional enforcement mechanism is an infallible deterrent. 
Indeed, the Daiwa and BCCI scandals occurred with the Federal Reserve check in place. See id; 
Bhala, Equilibrium Theory, supra note 1 (manuscript pt. 1., on file with author). . 
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4. Authority: Bank Practices As International Law Merchant 
a. The Need For An International Law Merchant On VaR Modeling 
As argued above, the BSC's qualitative and quantitative standards for in-
ternal VaR models could develop into customary international law. However, 
customary international· law cannot be the source of authority for the many 
bank practices that are sure to evolve as banks gain more experience in de-
signing and implementin.g VaR models. Customary law arises from the ac-
tions of states. Internal VaR modeling is conducted by private players. 
Recently, J.P. Morgan developed a sophisticated risk-measurement meth-
odology knowri as "RiskMetrics."322 This methodology measures and moni-
tors market risks associated with a bank's trading portfolio and thereby ascer-
tains the VaR associated with the portfolio. Using the VaR generated by 
RiskMetrics, a bank can calculate its market risk capital charge. J.P. Morgan 
provides information on RiskMetrics free of charge to any bank upon request. 
The information includes pamphlets summarizing the system, a sizeable 
booklet explaining the system's design and operation details, and a computer 
diskette containing necessary software to implement the system.323 A bank 
can adopt RiskMetrics without variation, or may tailor the methodology to suit 
its individual needs. In sum, RiskMetrics is J.P. Morgan's internal VaR model 
that it shares with its peers for their consideration. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates RiskMetrics has aroused a great deal of in-
terest in the international banking community. Indeed, one observer states 
"[i]t's very possible that when the history of finance in the 1990s is written, 
J.P. Morgan's sharing of its highly respected in-house risk management system 
will be cited as the most important financial development of the decade." 324 
Of course, J.P. Morgan does not offer RiskMetrics for purely altruistic mo-
tives. Widespread adoption of RiskMetrics surely would bring great repute to 
Morgan and help it shape how market risk is measured and monitored in the 
banking industry. Morgan could obtain a dominant position in internal VaR 
modeling in the way Microsoft has such a position in computer operating sys-
tems. Further, from J.P. Morgan's perspective, financial transactions with 
banks that use RiskMetrics may entail less risk than transactions with banks 
322. J.P. Morgan, Introduction to RiskMetrics (4th ed: Nov. 21, 1995). Other banks may 
develop similar methodologies, and this article does not endorse any particular methodology. 
323. The information package may be obtained by writing to J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., Risk 
Management Services, 60 Wall Street, New York, N.Y. 10260 or by e-mail at riskmet-
rics@ipmorgan.com. It should be noted that RiskMetrics has a VaR component, but also it is 
able to provide risk figures according to categories of underlying instruments. See Iberdro/a 
Rejects VAR; Eyes RiskMetrics, DERIVATIVES WEEK, Nov. 27, 1995, at 4. 
324. Desmond MacRae, Is Risk Management the Next Hot Custody Product?, AM. BANKER, 
Apr. 3, 1995, at lOA (emphasis added). 
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that use an unfamiliar or untested risk management system. Finally, wide-
spread adoption of RiskMetrics might stave off heavy-handed regulation of 
trading operations by Congress or the Federal Reserve. Legislators and regu-
lators might be less inclined to impose new rules if they believe banks are en-
gaging in responsible self-regulation. 
Assume Riskmetrics conforms with ~;til applicable qualitativ~_andquaptita­
tive standards issued by the BSC. Suppose it becomes the standard inte,rnal 
VaR modeling methodology. What legal authority, if any, would Riskmetrics 
have? The issue may be put in a generic way. In the next few years banks are 
sure to experiment with different VaR modeling methodologies as they take 
advantage of the constrained self-regulatory opportunity provided by the 1995 
Market Risk Proposal and 1996 Market Risk Amendment. Over time, they 
will develop standard practices for designing and implementing these method-
ologies. What legal authority, if any, would such methodologies have? 
The problem is not as academic as it may appear. Suppose a dispute arises 
between J.P. Morgan and another bank, or between J.P. Morgan. and the Fed-
eral Reserve, as to the design or implementation of RiskMetrics. Assume there 
is no governing domestic banking statute or case law addressing the dispute, 
which concerns design and implementation of the methodology. A potentially 
important threshold question is the authority of the methodology: is RiskMet-
rics legally binding on banks?325 If the methodology is binding, then presuma-
bly there is a particular design and implementation pattern every bank must 
follow. If it is not binding, then a bank is free to deviate from the pattern in 
any way it chooses as long as the bank's idiosyncratic methodology satisfies 
the BSC's quantitative and qualitative s~andards. 
The answer may lie in lex mercatoria, or law merchaQt. RiskMetrics, or 
any internal VaR methodology, could develop .into. lilfl authoritative interna-
tional law merchant. However, this answer begs four important questions. 
What is law merchant? Why is it authoritative? How is it created? How is it 
enforced? These questions are addressed below. 
b. The Authority Of Law Merchant 
Law merchant is "simply an enforceable set of customary practices" for 
the benefit of merchants that is reasonably uniform across all jurisdictions in 
325. This issue is pertinent not only to internal VaR models, but also other self-regulatory 
techniques banks have developed for the foreign exchange market. Such techniques include 
master agreements for spot, forward, and option contracts, and a code of conduct. See, e.g., the 
standard-form contracts cited supra note 167; Foreign Exchange Committee, Guidelines for 
Foreign Exchange Trading Activities (Mar. 1996) (prescribing practices for the conduct of cur-
rency trading). Unfortunately, the Foreign Exchange Committee's documents are not yet avail-
able through an electronic legal database. They may be obtained by writing the Committee in 
care of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33 Liberty Street, New York, N.Y. 10045, or by 
calling the Committee at 212-720-6651. 
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which the merchants operate.326 The essence of law merchant is respect for 
'"merchant' practice as a primary source of regulation and the "law" as a sec-
ondary control over commerce. " 327 That is, law merchant is a self-regulatory 
apparatus.: 
[I]ntemational merchants are themselves very often well able to regulate their 
own business dealings byrecourse to their trade devices .... The role of the 
m6dem Law·Merchant lies in enhancing rather than subverting the will.ofa 
merchant community expressed in terms of business institutions.328 
The law merchant does not displace extant law governing a particular mer-
chant transaction. Rather, it supplements governing law with rules more spe-
cific than that law.329 The law merchant is "a secondary force" that reinforces 
"the cycle of. business practice" and commands "merchants to do that which 
· 326. See I. Trotter Hardy,1he Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. Pm. L. REv. 
993 (1994). ·In this context, a "merchanf'. is a person who dedicates herself to a particular line 
of comrn·erce, though sometimes even a solitary act of trading suffices to qualifY a person as a 
merchant. See WYNDHAM ANS1JS BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT 12-13 
(1923). 
Interestingly, Karl Llewellyn developed the·concept of "situation sense," which closely 
resembles the law merchant. In Llewellyn's jurisprudence, 
.a "sound" decision uncovering the "immanent law" would be one in which the judge 
has sufficient experience and understanding of the usages and ethics of the particular 
trade and the way this kind of transaction would be conducted and how it fitted into the 
general pattern of commercial usage to be able to know what kind of solution would be 
likely to be deemed reasonable and acceptable by the mercantile community. A judge in 
a commercial case who can see the fa.cts in the way businessmen would see them, as well 
as from the ·lawyer's point of view and from the point of view of the ''mores" of the 
community as a whole, has grasped the "situation sense." 
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYNAND Tiffi REALIST MOVEMENT, 225 (1973). See also 
John F. Dolan, Standby Letters of Credit and Fraud (Is the Standby Only Another Invention of 
the Goldsmiths in Lombard Street?), 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 42-45 (1985) (arguing that "for the 
merchant invention to succeed in the courts, judges must pe willing to learn mercantile practices 
or to defer to the judgment of the merchants"); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 60-61, 206, 228, 232-35, 261 (1960) (discussing the duty of counsel to inform a 
judge about relevant usages and transactional details); Karl N. Llewellyn, Qn Warranty of 
Quality, and Society (pt. 2), 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341,349-50 (1937) (noting judges sometimes 
learn about commerce through dinners with merchants). 
327. LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 9-
10 (1983). 
328. ld. at 44 (emphasis added). 
329. See Hardy, supra note 326, at 1019. For example, Section 1-103 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code recognizes the vitality of the law merchant, stating "principles of law and equity, 
including the law merchant ... shall supplement" the U.C.C. (emphasis added). See infra 
note 337; but see Peter Winship, Contemporary Commercial Law Literature in the United 
States, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 643, 645 n. 8 (1982) (arguing Section 1-103 is "increasingly cryptic, is 
relied upon infrequently, and is usually only a minor factor in a decision when it is referred to"). 
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they themselves had promised to do" as reflected in the law merchant.33° For 
example, if a V aR methodology develops into law merchant, then it will sup-
plement the BSC's qualitative and quantitative standards for internal VaR 
modeling. 
Why is the law merchant authoritative? After all, from an Austinian posi-
tivistic perspective, the law merchant cannot be law. While it may be followed 
habitually, it lacks the imprimatur of a sovereign whose orders are backed by 
threats of punishment.331 Elsewhere, in the context of trade usages, I have ar-
gued the Austinian approach is unduly narrow.332 The argument applies a for-
tiori in the context of law merchant. While trade usages traditionally are seen 
as a device for interpreting a provision of an agreement, law merchant presents 
a system of rules governing all or many aspects of a contractual relationship. 
In jurisprudential terms, the argument relies on H.L.A. Hart's positivism tore-
but the Austinian perspective. For Hart, there is room for law to be created 
without the formal enactment of a sovereign, and many laws confer power on 
private parties to engage in self-regulation.333 Law merchant is one such ex-
ample. It is a body of customs that over time acquires "powerful legal force 
without the backing of the sovereign."334 
Hart's rebuttal to Austin has triumphed. Just as public international law 
doctrine embraces customary international law as a source of legal obligation, 
commercial law doctrine recognizes the binding force of law merchant.335 The 
330. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 18. 
331. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), in 1HE GREAT 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 338 (Clarence Morris, ed., 1959); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN 
CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 339-40 (1993); M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S 
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 256-57 (1985); J. W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 24-48 
(1980); MARTIN P. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 24-27 (1975); EDGAR BODENHEIMER, 
JURISPRUDENCE 95-99 (rev'd ed. 1974). Among the commentators who take an Austinian posi-
tivistic approach to law merchant are: Georges R. Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of 
. Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REv. 575, 577-78 (1989) 
(questioning whether lex mercatoria is a viable alternative to a legal system); Keith Highet, The 
Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REv. 613 (1989) (discussing the extent to which lex 
mercatoria has replaced national laws with respect to contract interpretation); John S. Ewart, 
What is the Law Merchant?, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 135, 138 (1903) (arguing commercial law is 
"nothing but a heterogeneous lot of loose undigested customs, which it is impossible to dignifY 
with the name of a body oflaw"). 
332. See Raj Bhala, Self-Regulation in Global Electronic Markets Through Reinvigorated 
Trade Usages, 31 IDAHOL. REv. 863,895-97 (1995). 
333. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-78 (1961). 
334. Hardy, supra note 326, at 1021. See also TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 17 (stating 
"[t]he Medieval Law Merchant does reveal the ability of merchants to regulate their business 
affairs within the broad framework of a suppletive legal order"). 
335. See, e.g., TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 10 (stating the law merchant was "a primary 
source of regulation" and "'intended' to be binding," thereby allowing "[t]he merchant ... to 
be master of his own destiny"). 
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most obvious example is Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C."), which is called "probably the most important single provision in 
the [Uniform Commercial] Code."336 It states provisions of the U.C.C. may 
be supplemented by law ·merchant.337 Subject to an initial proviso concerning 
displacement, Section 1-103 does not create a hienirchy of obligation as be-
tween the U.C.C. and law merchant. The U.C.C. is by no means the only ex-
ample of the recognition of law merchant. Belgian, Dutch, English, French, 
German, Italian, Korean, Panamanian, and Philippine law provide for the pos-
sibility of drawing upon law merchant to resolve commercial disputes,338 and 
the preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts expressly acknowledges the existence and vitality oflaw merchant.339 
In practical terms, the binding nature of law merchant, i.e., the reason it is 
authoritative, flows from the intention of merchants. 340 Merchants voluntarily 
accept it as conferring legal obligations upon them because it promotes their 
336. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 6 (3d ed. 
1988). 
337. This section, entitled "Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable," states: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, ~e principles of law and eq-
uity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal 
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or 
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. 
U.C.C. § l-103 (1991) (emphasis added). For discussions of the law merchant and the 
U.C.C., see Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and Contract: The Uniform Commercial Code as Law 
Merchant, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 91 (1992); David Frisch, Buyer's Remedies and Warranty Dis-
claimers: The c;ase for Mistake and the Indeterminacy of U.C.C. Section 1-103, 43 ARK. L. 
REV. 291 (1990); TRAKMAN, supra note 327; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbi-
trator's View, 6 ARB. INT'L 133 (1990); J. H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law 
Before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295 (1979); Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Inca-
pacitation IV: The Nature of Civilian Influence on Modern Anglo-American Commercial Law, 
67 B.U. L. REV. 877 (1987); RobertS. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-
/03 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 906 (1978); Robert A. Hillman, Con-
struction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-103 and "Code Methodology," 18 
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 655 (1977); Steve H. Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Rela-
tionships Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Part 1: The Methodological Problem and the 
Civil Law Approach, 31 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1977); Steve H. Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law 
Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Part II: The English Approach and a 
Solution to the Methodological Problem, 31 ARK. L. REV. 171 (1977),-Mitchell Franklin, On the 
Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951). 
338. Barton S. Selden, Lex Mercatoria in'European and U.S. Trade Practice: Time to Take 
a Closer Look, 2 ANN. SURVEY INT'L & COMP. L. Ill, 124-25 (1995). However, the number of 
cases actually drawing on law merchant in some of these countries is small. /d. at 125. 
339. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT}, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS ( 1994 ): 
340. See TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 10 (stating "[t]he ordinary undertakings of mer-
chants were binding because they were 'intended' to be binding, not because any law compelled 
such performance"). 
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interests.341 The "primary source" of law merchant lies in "mercantile values 
and practices."342 Merchants in different trades (e.g., banking and telecom-
munications) develop these customs over time to facilitate their interests, 
which include promoting commercial activity, minimizing commercial dis-
putes, and resolving swiftly any disputes that arise. 343 As one scholar puts it, 
[t]he success of merchant law did not depend on a totally undefined _standard 
of universal justice; nor could it be subject to juristic malleability in the hands 
of an overindulgent tribunal if commerce was to be truly enhanced in world 
trade. Merchants required a particular form of justice to be administered which 
rendered their dealings most efficacious in the context of free trade.344 
Therefore, if a VaR methodology such as RiskMetrics qualifies as law 
merchant, then it will be accepted by banks as authoritative because it pro-
motes their interests. As I have argued in Equilibrium Theory, the FICAS 
Model and International Banking Law, this interest is to achieve a high vol-
ume of profit-maximizing currency transactions. 345 
c. Ingredients Necessary For The Creation Of Law Merchant 
By what means might a VaR methodology become law merchant? More 
generally, how is law merchant created? Typically, the origins of law mer-
chant are said to lie in medieval Europe, 346 though some scholars trace its roots 
to ancient Phoenician traders, caravan commerce in Mesopotamia, Persia, 
Arabia, and Egypt, and shipping trade involving the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, In-
dia, and China.347 Unfortunately, in contrast to the public international law ju-
risprudence on the formation of customary law, historical accounts of law 
merchant do not contain a neat "list" of essential ingredients.348 There is no 
341. The importance of voluntary acceptance as the ultimate basis for authority is discussed 
in my previous article, Equilibrium Theory, supra note 1 (manuscript pt. IV.D, on file with 
author). See also Chen, supra note 337, at 108-09 (stating "only those customs that evoked 
subjective feelings oflegal obligation could bind commercial parties"). 
342. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 13. 
343. ld. at 11-13. 
344. !d. at 12 (emphasis added). 
345. See Equilibrium Theory, supra note 1 (manuscript pt. II.B.1, on file with author). 
346. See, e.g., TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 7-22; Hardy, supra note 326, at 1019; Charles 
A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikojf: The Progressive 
Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 352-56 (1983); R.M. GOODE, 
COMMERCIAL LAW 31-33,988-89 (1982). 
347. See, e.g., BEWES, supra note 326, at 2-4. 
348. For example, none of the following works on the law merchant provides such a Jist: 
TRAKMAN, supra note 327; BEWES, supra note 326; 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 543 (1903); Chen, supra note 337; Harold J. Berman, The Law of International 
Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 235, 238-44 
(1988); Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Re-
dux, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1495 (1984) (reviewing TRAKMAN, supra note 327); Bane, supra note 
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definitive list of ingredients necessary to create law merchant in the contempo-
rary global economy.349 Instead, it is necessary to infer from various sourc~s 
the ingredients from which law merchant was created during the middle 
ages.350 Arguably, it is also necessary to assume the same ingredients are 
needed to make law merchant today. 
There are five such ingredients. First, the custom must reflect "trade hab-
its and market usages. " 351 Law merchant embodies actual merchant practice 
and "echo[es] the existing sentiments of the merchant community."352 Sec-
ond, the custom must persist over a sustained period of time. That is, it must 
be constant or established.353 Third, the custom must be universal.354 The 
custom cannot rest on the institutions or practices of one or a few jurisdictions 
in which merchants operate.355 Rather, it must promote the needs and con-
venience of merchants in all relevant jurisdictions, and merchants in these ju-
risdictions must follow the custom in a consistent manner. Fourth, the custom 
must be extrinsic to the legal system. There can be "no statute or other 
authoritative pronouncement of law [that gives] rise to its existence."356 Fi-
346; Harold J. Bennan & Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex 
Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978); William C. Jones, An Inquiry into the History of 
the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 445 (1958); Philip W. Thayer, Comparative Law and the Law Merchant, 6 BROOK. L. 
REv. 139 (1936); Ewart, supra note 331. 
349. Consider two recent articles discussing international law merchant: Francesco Gal-
gano, The New Lex Mercatoria, 2 ANN. SURVEY INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 107-10 (1995) and 
Selden, supra note 338, at 111-15. Neither piece deals squarely with the problem of how such 
law is fonned. 
350. The temporal caveat is important. The ingredients required in the middle ages were 
considerably more flexible than those demanded by fonnalistic common law judges in post-
medieval England. It was not until the 19th and 20th centuries that needless inflexibility was 
avoided, in part as a result of decisions by Judge Learned Hand and the operation of§ 1-205 of 
the U.C.C. See TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 23-37; Chen, supra note 337, at 110-11. 
351. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 2. See also BEWES, supra note 326, at 8 (noting the law 
merchant reflected the "habitual practice" of merchants); Chen, supra note 337, at 108 (stating 
"custom arises from the practices of a cohesive mercantile community .... "). 
352. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 9. 
353. Id. at 11. See also BEWES, supra note 326, at 9 (noting the law merchant developed 
"from the oldest times"); Chen, supra note 337, at 108 (noting the importance of the 
"continuous use" of custom). 
354. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 11. See also BEWES, supra note 326, at 8 (noting 
"[t]here was no substantial difference" in the law merchant across different jurisdictions). 
355. See TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 11-12. 
356. Hardy, supra note 326, at 1019. See also CLIVE M. SCHMITIHOFF, CLIVE M. 
SCHMITIHOFF'S SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 31-36, 188-204, 243-51 
(Chia-Jui Cheng, ed., 1988) (proclaiming a "new law merchant" that "provide[s] its own legal 
regulation without reference to, and independent of, any municipal system of law"); John 0. 
Honnold & Detlev F. Vagts, Clive M Schmitthoffs Select Essays on International Trade Law, 
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1991) (book review). 
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nally, an adjudicator cannot accept a custom as part of the body of law mer-
chant if that custom does not confer a utilitarian benefit on the merchant com-
munity. As intimated above,357 the custom must promote the maximum bene-
fit (or greatest good for the greatest number) ofmerchants.358 
Assuming these medieval ingredients are required for a modern-day rec-
ipe, to what extent do they exist in modern-day internal V aR methodologies 
like RiskMetrics ·for measuring and monitoring market risk and calculating 
capital requirements? The first ingredient is present. All internal VaR meth-
odologies reflect practices among banks because they are designed and imple-
mented by the banks themselves. The fourth ingredient also is present. The 
methodologies are not pre-empted by existing statutes. Likewise, the fifth in-
gredient is apparent. As demonstrated in Part II, banks oppose the BSC's 
standardized methodology contained in the 1993 Market Risk Proposal. In 
contrast, they find the internal models methodology of the 1995 Market Risk 
Proposal and 1996 Market Risk Amendment to be more consistent with their 
interests. 
However, the second and third ingredients-persistence and universality-
in the recipe for law merchant are not yet present. No internal VaR methodol-
ogy has persisted for a sustained period. The leading model, RiskMetrics, has 
been available to banks only since the mid-1990s. More generally, there is a 
tension between constancy and utilitarianism. Customs change over time to 
accommodate the interests of merchants, hence law merchant needs to be 
flexible. How persistent must a custom be before it is accepted as part of the 
law merchant?359 Must RiskMetrics be used for twenty years before it quali-
fies as law merchant? Perhaps in response to these questions it may be argued 
that the medieval requirement of persistence is inappropriate for the modern 
era. After all, at least in fast-paced markets like international banking (or, for 
example, computer software and hardware), customs evolve rapidly. Why 
wait twenty years if RiskMetrics is accepted within two or three years?360 
357. See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
358. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 9. 
359. In post-medieval English law, custom had to be "ancient" in its origins or in existence 
"since time immemorial," and also had to be "certain" and "predictable," to qualifY as law 
merchant. See TRAK.MAN, supra note 327, at 27, 30, 35. The U.C.C. dispenses with this inter-
pretation and states a custom need only be "reasonable" in the circumstances. See U.C.C. § 1-
205 cmts. 4-6; Chen, supra note 337, at 110-11. 
360. This argument harkens back to Professor Gilmore's point in The Ages of American Law 
about statutory drafting. "[T]he more tightly a statute was drafted originally, the more difficult 
it becomes to adjust the statute to changing conditions without legislative revision." GRANT 
Gn..MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977). Professor Gilmore suggests that at best a 
well-drafted statute can deal with issues raised during the 20 or 25 years preceding the drafting 
of the statute. /d. Given the pace of developments in international banking markets, Professor 
Gilmore's time limit might be reduced to less than a decade. If so, then the futility of a BSC-
imposed scheme is apparent, and greater emphasis should be placed on law merchant. See also 
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Universality also is missing. No internal VaR methodology has become 
the clear industry standard. At best, RiskMetrics may be analogous to Micro-
soft's Windows 95 operating system. Both are used to an increasing extent, 
but other viable competitors remain. Further, just as a personal computer user 
can configure her own Windows 95 desktop, a bank can tailor the basic Risk-
Metrics methodology to suit its own needs. Unfortunately, there is no clear 
definition of what "universal" means. Suppose banks in London and New 
York, but not Tokyo, use RiskMetrics, and that several London and New York 
banks adjust RiskMetrics for their individual needs. Does the methodology 
qualify as law merchant?361 In sum, until the temporal and universality ingre-
dients exist, no internal VaR methodology can be accepted as international law 
merchant. 
Despite the missing ingredients, developments concerning two aspects of 
currency trading other than capital adequacy give reason for optimism that an 
international law merchant in the capital adequacy area might emerge. Banks 
have laid the foundation for an international law merchant to regulate contrac-
tual obligations and proper trading practices. This foundation was created by 
associations of banks in each of the three major currency trading centers: in 
London, the British Bankers' Association; in Tokyo, the Tokyo Foreign Ex-
change Association; and in New York, the Foreign Exchange Committee, In-
ternational Swaps and Derivatives Association, Emerging Markets Traders As-
sociation, New York Clearing House Association, Public Securities 
Association, and Securities Industry Association. Each association is com-
prised of representatives from dozens of banks and securities firms that ac-
tively trade currencies. For instance, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association boasts roughly 163 of the world's largest commercial, merchant, 
and investment banks involved in currency trading.362 While most banks hap-
pen to be from BSC countries, this fact is not the result of a membership crite-
rion, and there is no distinction between banks or firms from BSC or non-BSC 
countries. 
With respect to contractual obligations, the Foreign Exchange Committee, 
British Bankers' Association, and Tokyo Foreign Exchange Association har-
monized contract rules for all OTt foreign exchange transactions. In 1992 
supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of the BSC to keep pace with 
market developments). 
361. See Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn 
Redux, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1495, 1505-07 (1984) (reviewing TRAKMAN, supra note 327) 
(arguing "(n]either Trakman nor Llewellyn offers any insight regarding how much agreement 
on a trade practice is necessary for that trade practice to become an appropriate basis of deci-
sion"); TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 36-37, 42-43, and 102 (discussing the "nationalization'' 
of the law merchant and the problem of balancing between a harmonized law merchant, on the 
one hand, and the recognition of diverse customs across jurisdictions, on the other hand). 
362. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at I; Letter from Joseph Bauman, supra note 17, at 1. 
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they published the International Currency Options Market ("ICOM") master 
agreement, a standard-form contract for currency option transactions. In 1993, 
they issued the International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement 
("IFEMA"), a standard-form contract for spot and forward transactions. In 
addition, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association has published a 
master agreement for swap transactions that is used not only for swaps; but 
virtually any OTC trade. 
With respect to proper trading practices, in 1995 banks and securities firms 
published a code of conduct for trading practices in OTC markets. Through 
the Foreign Exchange Committee, International Swaps and Derivatives Asso-. 
ciation, Emerging Markets Traders Association, New York Clearing House 
Association, Public Securities Association, and Securities Industry Associa-
tion; banks and securities firms issued a document entitled Principles and 
Practices for Wholesale Financial Market Transactions. 363 This document is a 
code of conduct that defines the relationship between participants in OTC ·fi-
nancial markets. It specifies a set of "best" trading practices.364 Simparly, in 
1996· the Foreign Exchange Committee published a revised. version of its 
lengthy Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Trading Activities.365 The Guide-
lines articulate key issues arising in currency trading and offer ways to resolve 
such issues.366 In effect, the Guidelines are an industry code of conduct. In 
1996 the Committee also published a paper entitled Management of Opera-
363. Aug. 17, 1995 (on file with author). Membership of the New York Clearing House in-
cludes only commercial banks, while the members of the Securities Industry Association in-
cludes only securities firms. 
The Principles and Practices resulted in part because of a general concern about de-
rivatives transactions. In tum, this concern arose in part because of Bankers Trust's well-
publicized legal problems with derivatives contracts with its clients Procter and Gamble and 
Gibson Greetings, Inc. A similar effort undertaken by the Derivatives Policy Group yielded the 
Framework/or Voluntary Oversight in March 1995. 
364. /d. at intro. Also in 1995, the Bank of England published a set of "best" practice prin-
ciples in consultation with market practitioners. See BANK OF ENGLAND, THE LONDON CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR PRINCIPALS AND BROKING FIRMS IN THE WHOLESALE MARKETS (July 1995) (on 
file with author). 
365. Jan. 1996. While the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is an ex officio member of the 
Foreign Exchange Committee and facilitates the process of drafting standard-form contracts and 
codes of conduct, it' is incorrect to suggest this process is one led by that Reserve Bank .. Its role 
is to coordinate meeting times and places, and offer comments on draft documents. It does not 
assume primary drafting responsibilities. Of course, commercial bank members of the Foreign 
Exchange Committee must be mindful of central bank interests throughout the drafting process. · 
No doubt commercial banks realize if they fail to arrive at an acceptable outcome, then the Fed-
eral Reserve-or worse, Congress-might preempt their self-regulatory efforts through regula-
tion or statute. 
366. Letter from John Finigan, Chairman, Foreign EXchange Committee revising Guidelines 
for Foreign Exchange Trading Activities (Mar. 25, 1996). 
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tiona/ Risks in Foreign Exchange.361 This paper, a supplement to the Guide-
lines, addresses operational risks associated with currency trading and pre-
scribes a set of best practices.368 
· No significant problems appear to have occurred during the process of 
preparing the master agreements or code of conduct. Through their represen-. 
tative ~sociations, banks and securities firms took responsibility for research-
ing issues, negotiating and writing preliminary drafts, exchanging and com-
menting upon preliminary drafts, and agreeing upon a final . version. 
Thereafter, the associations commended the documents to their members.369 
Certainly, not every bank agrees with every provision of the master agree-
ments and code of conduct. Still, these regimes· seem to have. gained wide-
spread acceptance. 
In sum, the record· on foreign exchange contracts and trading practices is 
positive. Banks have proven themselves capable of self-regulation through 
master agreements.and a code of conduct.· These documents appear destined 
to become international law merchant. Given this rec.ord, there 'is no reason to 
doubt the capacity of banks to create an international law merchant for internal 
V aR modeling. 
d. Banker Adjudicators? 
Discerning the ingredients necessary to create an international law mer-
chant may be less difficult than devising a system to adjudicate disputes about 
that law. Consider a dispute between J.P. Morgan and another bank, or be-
tween J.P. Morgan and the Federal Reserve, concerning the RiskMetrics meth-
367. Apr. 1996. 
368. Letter from John Finigan, Chairman, Foreign Exchange Committee Controlling Opera-
tional Risks of Foreign Exchange (Apr. 5, 1996). 
369. For example, with respect to the Principles and Practices for Wholesale Financial 
Market Transactions, see Letter from· Lewis w .. (Woody) Teet, Chairman, The Foreign Ex-
change Committee (Sept. 12, 1995) (on file with author) ("strongly urg[ing]" foreign exchange 
professionals to send copies of the Principles and Practices to their customers and counterpar-
ties); Federal Reserve Bank of New York News Release, Final Version of Voluntary OTC Con-
duct Guidelines Issued (no. 2080, Aug. 17, 1995) (on file with author) (stating "it is expected 
that each trade association will recommend the best practices code to its members"); Emerging 
Markets Traders Association, EMTA Welcomes OTC Principles (Aug. 17, 1995) (on file with 
author) (announcing "support of the year-long effort to develop. the Principles and Prac-
tices .... "); Securities Industry Association Comment, SIA Backs Plan for Use of "Principles 
and Practices" for Wholesale Financial Market Activities (Aug. 17, 1995) (on file with author) 
(stating the Securities Industry Association "will recommend to its members who· regularly par-
ticipate in the wholesale financial markets that they adhere to the voluntary "principles and 
practices .... "); ISDA News Release, ISDA Statement on Principles and Practices Guidelines 
(Aug. 17, 1995) (on file with author) (indicating that "ISDA [International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association] will strongly recommend the Principles and Practices to our U.S. members for 
implementation as they deem appropriate for their business"). 
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odology. A threshold issue might be whether law merchant ingredients exist 
in RiskMetrics. Additional key issues might be how a bank should implement 
RiskMetrics, and whether a bank properly implemented RiskMetrics. . 
Is the modem adjudicatory system equipped to resolve these issues? Ar-
guably, it may need reform to make it resemble more closely the medieval 
system and thereby better interpret and administer law merchant. In medi~~al 
times, law merchant was interpreted and enforced by merchants. 
Adjudicators were generally selected from the ranks of the merchant class on 
the basis of their commercial experience, their objectivity and their seniority 
within the community of merchants. The rationalization for the choice of mer-
chants rather than lawyers is apparent from an analysis of the premises under-
lying the Law Merchant.. A merchant judge reputedly could beller evaluate 
commercial mailers. He was equipped to assess mercantile custom. He was 
expected to appreciate the needs of merchants, especially their desire to attain 
a speedy and low-cost determination of their disputes. He was able to perceive 
of changing trade dynamics and the need to reach a decision in accord lvith · 
the realities of business. Most significantly, the merchant judge was in a po-
sition to assess the relevance of the facts surrounding the transaction-to give 
justice according to the realistic needs of merchants. Lawyers applying in-
digenous rules of substance and procedure were unsuitable adjudicators in 
merchant matters for various reasons. A lawyer who lacked traditional com-
mercial training was necessarily tainted by a particularly legalistic perspective. 
He was presumably preoccupied with his duty to enforce forum law rather than 
rules of commerce. Furthermore, strict law as applied by lawyers involved 
· formalities which hindered commerce. The needs of the Law Merchant were 
founded in commerciality first and foremost, rather than in strict legalism. 
Therefore, commercial judges suited the primary goals of business more read-
ily than lawyers who were trained in matters of law .... 370 
In contrast, the modem system relies exclusively on government officials 
as adjudicators. In addition, even when cross-border trading issues are at 
stake, the system is confined by national boundaries. 
For example, a dispute like the hypothesized ones between J.P. Morgan 
and another bank, or between J.P. Morgan and the Federal Reserve, is a matter 
for a domestic bank regulator and court system to decide. The case might be 
brought by the Federal Reserve against J.P. Morgan and heard by an adminis-
trative law judge. That judge's decision may be appealed to the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, whose decision may in tum be ap-
pealed to the appropriate federal court.371 
370. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at IS (emphasis added). 
371. See 12 C.F.R. § 263 (1996) (rules of practice for hearings). In general, private parties 
do not have standing to bring suits against banks for violation of federal banking law, hence ac-
tions typically are brought by a regulator (albeit sometimes as a result of a tip or encouragement 
from a bank, group of banks, or bank customer). 
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The same logic in favor of merchant adjudicators in medieval times might 
apply to the contemporary system.372 Few Federal Reserve lawyers, adminis-
trative law judges, or federal district court judges practice international bank-
ing law in the private sector before joining the regulatory agency or bench. 
Typically, their knowledge of practices in the arena is vicarious, i.e., learned 
from practitioners. They have little idea of what it "feels like" to have large 
sums of money "on the line" as a result of foreign excharige transactions. Ac-
cordingly, they may be less likely to adjudicate in a manner that best promotes 
the interests of banks. This logic suggests it is worthwhile· to consider replac-
ing the present system with one that relies on panels of international bankers to 
resolve disputes. The hallmark of a hew system would be its use of experi-
enced practitioners to address concerns about risk measurement. · 
Already, the infrastructure to develop a practitioner-based adjudicatory 
system exists. The practitioners could be drawn from the ranks of the mem-
bership of leading trade associations such as the Foreign Exchange Committee, 
British Bankers' Association, and Institute of International Finance. Each as-
sociation could produce a· roster of eligible adjudicators on the basis of their 
experience, competence, and integrity. A'disj:mte betWeen members of a single 
association could be resolved by a panel of adjudicators drawn from that asso-
ciation's roster. A dispute involving members of different associations could 
be dealt with by a panel of adjudicators drawn from the rosters of the relevant 
associations. In these respects, the roster-panel system would resemble the 
way WTO and North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFT A") panels are 
selected.373 Of course, as occurred in the international trade context, the new 
system might require domestic legislative action to confer adjudicatory juris-
diction on association panels and guarantee panel decisions will be recognized 
and enforced.374 
372. Interestingly, it is my understanding that certain specialized courts in Austria that han-
dle business and labor matters are comprised of a three-member panel where two of the mem-
bers are experienced practitioners. These practitioners sit as "lay judges," offering their exper-
tise where necessary to direct the case or settlement negotiations. 
373. See BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note .193, chs. 2-3 (1996); FRANK W. 
SWACKER, I<ENNETII R. REDDEN & LARRY B. WENGER, WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS 
ch. 6 (1995); JAMES R. CANNON, JR., RESOLVING DISPUTES UNDERNAFTA CHAPTER 19 chs. 1· 
6 (1994). 
374. See, e.g., URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENT,·H.R. DOC. No. 316; vol. 1, 103d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1008-36 (1994) (stating of administrative action on the Uruguay Round Under-
standing on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes); NORTII 
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, H.R. Ddc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess~ 194-207 
(1993) (stating of administrative action concerning NAFTA Chapter 19 on dispute settlement in 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases). 
Certainly, there are a inyria~ of further details associated with a new system that would 
need careful consideration. For example, what procedural and evidentiary rules would apply? 
What rights of appeal would disputants have? These important questions are beyond the scope 
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Still, a difficult case arises when one disputant is a regulator, such as the 
hypothesized dispute between J.P. Morgan and the Federal Reserve. Should a 
panel of practitioners be used to resolve this dispute? If so, then how should a 
panel adjudicating the dispute be comprised? The difficulties are compounded 
when a bank and regulator are not from the same country (e.g., a dispute be-
tween J.P. Morgan versus the Bank of Japan concerning activities of Morgan's 
Tokyo office). 
It is unrealistic (if not ridiculous) to expect a regulator to submit to an ad-
judicatory panel comprised solely of practitioners, especially practitioners 
from foreign countries. The very notion destroys the distinction between a 
regulator and the regulated. A more plausible alternative is to rely on a hybrid 
panel. The hybrid panel would consist of two types of adjudicators: regula-
tory officials, and practitioners drawn from association rosters.375 
Undoubtedly, agreeing upon the ratio of regulators to practitioners is 
problematic. But, the presence of at least a few practitioners on the panel 
might have a salutary effect on dispute resolution outcomes. For instance, 
practitioners are likely to pay attention to the goals of the applicable law mer-
chant. That is, because of their expertise and experience, they are likely to in-
sist panel decisions comport with the "realistic needs of the merchants. " 376 
Therefore, a report on the hypothesized J.P. Morgan-Federal Reserve dispute 
produced by a hybrid panel is likely to evince a deep understanding of the de-
sign and implementation of RiskMetrics. The report also is likely to balance 
the regulatory interest in conducting foreign exchange transactions in a safe 
and sound manner with banks' interest in securing maximum profits from such 
transactions. 377 
In sum, once the ingredients for creating law merchant are in place, a 
problem of great concern is the administration and enforcement of that law. 
The current system relies on domestic administrative and judicial procedures. 
The continuing vitality of this system is questionable. When they apply highly 
technical rules in a cross-border marketplace, can adjudicators in the system 
properly account for the interests of banks? The medieval system, with appro-
priate modifications, could provide useful insights in reforming the modem 
system. 
of the present article. 
375. Here again, appropriate domestic law changes may be necessary. 
376. TRAKMAN, supra note 327, at 15. 
377. See Equilibrium Theory, supra note 1 (manuscript pts. II.B.l, 3, on file with author) 
(discussing the interests of banks and regulators). 
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C. Lingering Reasons For Bank Opposition That Undermine Stability 
1. Cogency: The "One Size Fits All" Quantitative Standards 
While the 1996 Market Risk Amendment allays concerns pertaining to the 
frequency, intricacy, and authority variables of the FICAS model, there are 
lingering problems with respect to the cogency variable. Of course, it would 
be wrong to suggest the BSC's qualitative standards set forth in the 1996 
Amendment are not cogent. To the contrary, the qualitative standards can be 
defended on the basis of bitter experience. A common denominator in the 
collapse of Barings in 1994 and the Daiwa treasury loss scandal in 1995 was 
poor risk management. Neither bank separated entirely its trading and risk 
management functions, neither bank's senior management was sufficiently at-
tentive to risk exposures, and neither bank engaged an independent third party 
to review its risk measurement systems.378 Thus, it is not surprising the quali-
tative standards have not engendered significant opposition from banks.379 
Likewise, the quantitative standards could be defended as cogent. They 
provide a common set of parameters for internal VaR models to promote uni-
formity and consistency across banks using the internal model approach. Ac-
cordingly, they prevent a "race to the bottom" among banks. As the BSC ar-
ticulates with respect to the 1995 Market Risk Proposal, "[i]t is important to 
ensure ... that the use of [internal] models as a basis for measuring capital re-
quirements does not introduce a bias in favor of less rigorous assumptions in 
terms of measurement parameters. " 380 
However, this defense of the cogency of the BSC's quantitative standards 
is only part of the story. The defense assumes banks would behave impru-
dently if left to build internal VaR models without regulatory guidance. But, 
reputational and systemic pressures might be a constraint on such behavior.381 
Few banks knowingly will do business with a rogue bank that is undercapital-
ized as a result of its slack internal V aR model. 
Moreover, the defense ignores the fact that four quantitative standards are 
excessively conservative, even arbitrary, and may lead to over-capitalization: 
the 99 percent one-tailed confidence level; the 1 0-day holding period; the sim-
378. See supra note 259. 
379. See Overview, supra note 16, at 2. In response to the 1995 Market Risk Proposal, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association called upon the BSC to clarify that a bank 
would not have to obtain prior approval or certification from its regulator for its risk manage-
ment system. See Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 15. J.P. Morgan suggested the specific 
methodology for backtesting should not be standardized because no industry consensus existed 
on optimal methodology. Even if one were to exist, Morgan said backtesting ought to be part of 
a bank's proprietary risk management process. See Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, Attach-
ment at 8. 
380. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 8. 
381. See Equilibrium Theory, supra note 1 (manuscript pt. V., on file with author). 
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pi~. sum approach to risk diversification with respect to VaR estimates across 
market risk categories; and the multiplication factor.382 Consequently, there 
are serious doubts as to the cogency of at least these four quantitative stan-
dards. 
a. Excessive Conservatism: The 99 Percent Confidence Level And The 
Ten Day Holding Period 
The BSC forgets it is impossible to turn currency trading, or international 
banking generally, into a risk-free business. The 99 percent confidence is 
"substantially more conservative. than the confidence intervals used by many 
banks." For example, J.P. Morgan's RiskMetrics model uses a 95 percent 
confidence interval. 383 
If changes in market prices are assumed to be normally distributed ... the 99% 
one-tailed confidence interval (2.33 standard deviations below the mean) is 
more than 40% higher than the 95% one-tailed confidence interval ( 1.65 stan-
dard deviations below the mean).384 
Thus, it is all the more puzzling the BSC frets that "even under a ninety-
nine percent confidence interval, extreme market conditions are excluded. " 385 
Moreover,. the BSC's 99 percent standard neglects the fact that banks 
"routinely reprogram their [VaR] models once mistakes are uncovered."386 
Therefore, penalizing a bank by imposing an increased capital charge for a 
model with more than the allowed number of misses means "punishing a bank 
for a program it no longer uses." 387 
Similarly, "the I 0-day holding period ... is an order of magnitude more 
than 3 times higher than the standard 1-day holding period used by many" 
ban~s. " 388 The standard one-day period is not an attempt by banks to reduce 
their capital charges. Rather, it reflects the fact. they rarely hold financial in-
struments in their proprietary trading accounts for 10-day periods.389 
The BSC is properly concerned about liquidity risk during severe market 
382. See generally Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, at 2 (arguing "the specified assump-
tions ... are not based upon empirical evidence and, consequently, are inherently biased toward 
an excessively conservative capital ·requirement"); Overview, supra note 16, at 2-5 
(summarizing banks' criticisms of the 1995 Market Risk Proposal). 
383. Spinner, supra note 299, at 4. Banks such as J.P. Morgan are researching the distribu-
tional assumptions that underlie_ VaR models. Presently, these models assume normal distribu-
tions, but in most markets normal distributions do not occur. 
384. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 5. 
385. Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 14. 
386. Bankers Dispute Regulators' Plan to Verify Models Used to Set Capital, supra note 
280, at I. -
387. /d.' 
388. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 6. 
389. /d. 
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stress. However, it provides no evidence in the I995 Market Risk Proposal or 
I996 Market Risk Amendment that such risk necessitates a I 0-day holding pe-
riod. Instead, in the I996 Amendment it states ambiguously that "[t]o limit 
industry burden, banks will be allowed to scale up or down their value-at-risk 
measure to arrive at the required 10 day holding period."390 Under what cir-
cumstances can a bank scale down its VaR estimate? For example, is regula-
tory approval needed? By what amount can the estimate be scaled down? For 
instance, is there a limit on the scale factor? These questions remain unan-
swered. 
Faulty assumptions are the central reason the I 0-day holding period stan-
dard lacks cogency. J.P. Morgan rightly challenges implicit assumptions un-
derlying the standard. 
The assumption of a 10-day holding period implies that the daily risk calcula-
tion is based on a 10-day price change with zero liquidity in all markets. Such 
an assumption is appropriate only in very extreme market conditions and is 
clearly more severe than historical experience would warrant for the vast ma-
jority of markets. In fact, in abnormal market conditions, certain markets may 
become more liquid as investors move towards higher quality instruments. 
The use of a 1 0-day holding period for the purposes of backtesting also im-
plies that the portfolio would remain unchanged for 10 days, an assumption 
that is not realistic. In practice, portfolio changes over a 1 0-day horizon are 
substantial. The comparison of I 0-day profit and loss with a 1 0-day holding 
period VaR calculation is a poor indication of the predictive capabilities of the 
internal model, so that backtesting of such a VaR calculation would be diffi-
cult to achieve.391 
Possibly the most significant assumption J.P. Morgan questions is that illi-
quidity can be measured. It argues "the 1 0-day holding period assumption 
achieves no greater degree of accuracy for illiquidity" than a 1-day holding 
period.392 After all, "illiquidity risks are generally poorly understood and dif-
ficult to quantify." 393 
b. No Rationale: Correlations Between Risk Factors And The 
· Multiplication Factor 
The BSC fails to articulate a persuasive reason for its relu~tance to recog-
nize historical, empirically-based correlations across different risk categories. 
It appears concerned historical correlations will break down because of illi-
quidity during periods of market turbulence.394 But, this concern "is premised 
390. Overview, supra note 16, at 4. 
391. Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, attachment at 3 (emphasis added). 
392. /d. at 4. 
393. Jd. 
394. For example, suppose a bank observes a close correlation between price movements of 
certain paired currency instruments. See Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 12. 
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on the unrealistic presumption that all markets will become illiquid simultane-
ously."395 As J.P. Morgan rightly notes in response to the 1995 Market Risk 
Proposal, "[t]he requirement that VaR [estimates] be aggregated across broad 
risk categories on a simple sum basis penalizes firms that diversify risks across 
markets as a risk management strategy and does not reflect the actual correla-
tion of certain risk factors, such as · interest rates and foreign exchange 
rates. " 396 Discouraging a bank from reducing· market risks associated with 
foreign exchange rates is a "result ... at odds with widely accepted portfolio 
risk management theory. "397 
The 1996 Market Risk Amendment does not go far enough toward re-
solving these concerns. Different domestic regulators may require different 
amounts and types of evidence to prove a bank's system for measuring corre-
lations is sound and implemented with integrity. Some regulators may take an 
unrealistically strict approach. In turn~ banks subject to the jurisdiction of such 
regulators may be placed at a competitive. disadvantage relative to banks from 
other jurisdictions. · 
Likewise, the BSC offers no serious explanation why the multiplication 
factor is necessary, or why three is·the appropriate minimum factor. The BSC 
attempts to justify the factor by saying it "reflect[s] various concerns about the 
limitations of the statistical assumptions on which modelling is based 
and ... guard[s] against rare market occurrences."398 A daily VaR estimate 
"needs to be translated into a capital charge that provides a sufficient cushion 
for cumulative losses arising from adverse market conditions over an extended 
The BSC appears to . fear that in unusual market conditions the observed correlations may be 
unstable or breakdown, resulting in unanticipated losses. Therefore, the BSC seems unwilling 
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate a priori prudent correlation assumptions. 
39S. Letter from Evans,. supra note 18, at 6. 
396. Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, attachment at S. · 
397. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 6. 
398. April l99S Press Release, supra note l S, at 2. See also Internal Model-Based Ap-
proach, supra note IS, at IS; December l99S Communique, supra note 16, at 2; Overview, su-
pra note 16, at 3. Thus, for example, the BSC repeats platitudes like "the past is not always a 
good guide to the future," "the correlations assumed in the model may prove to be incorrect," 
and "market liquidity may become inadequate to close out positions." Internal Model-Based 
Approach, supra note 15, at IS. See also December 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 2-3; 
Overview, supra note 16, at 3-4. 
The BSC's point that "[t]he multiplication factor takes into account the fact that the 
actual capital charge is smoothed by its application to an average which may contain much 
higher daily exposures" makes little sense. December 1995 Communique, supra note 16, at 2. 
The BSC could require the capital charge to equal the previous day's VaR, instead of setting it 
at the higher of this figure or three times the average daily VAR for the previous sixty days. 
Some banks speculate the BSC seeks to equate the results of the internal· models and 
standardized approaches. Of course, this objective would undermine a different aim of the BSC, 
namely, to promote the development of sophisticated risk measurement methodologies. Letter 
from Evans, supra note 18, at 11. 
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period of time. " 399 The BSC urges the plus factor is "a positive incentive to 
measure risks accurately and to warn banks whose moqels produce consis-
tently low value-at-risk estimates that their capital charges will be adjusted 
upwards. " 400 
, The justification must be rejected as an asserti9n. The BSC fails to present 
any supporting ~tatistical analysis .. Ironically, at present banks such as J.P. 
Morgan are conducting research to determine whether a convincing rationale 
exists.~01 · Until their results are clear, the multiplication factor must be deemed 
arbitrary at least in the way the BSC arrived at it, and possibly also in its value 
and effects. 
. Further, this factor reveals an unfounded lack of confidence in self-
regulation. If the BSC is serious about these.concerns, then why allow banks 
to use internal VaR models in the first place? No VaR model can render the 
past a good guide to the future, ensure all correlations withstand extreme mar-
ket conditions, and be a failsafe check against the risk of market illiquidity. 
Possibly, the BSC ought to place greater faith in the reputational and systemic 
pressures against rogue behavior in risk measurement. As J.P. Morgan states 
in response to the 1995 Proposal, "most banks desire, and, indeed, are ex-
pected to hold capital well in excess of the minimum standards,"402 and "the 
Regulators should recognize that most banks have a strong inclination to hold 
·capital well above. the required minimums."~03 
. c. Excessive Capitalization: The Multiplication Factor 
Not only is the multiplication factor arbitrary, but also its consequences are 
damaging. Empirical evidence provided by banks in response to the 1995 
Market Risk Proposal shows the multiplication factor results in overcapitaliza-
tion against market risks. The International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion performed two backtests on historical time series data from trading port-
folios of a subset of its members.404 The backtests accounted for two different 
399. Overview, supra note 16, at 3. 
400. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 2. See also Proposal to Issue A Supple-
ment, supra note 15, at 4; Internal Model-Based Approach, supra note 15, at 15. 
401. See, e.g., Peter Zangari, A Value-at-Risk Analysis of Currency Exposures, RISK-
.METRICS MONITOR, Second Quarter 1996, at 26 (June 11, 1996). · 
402. Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis added). 
403. /d. at Attachment at 3 (emphasis added). In light of these statements, J.P. Morgan's 
support, albeit lukewarm, for the multiplication and plus factors seems contradictory. It sug-
gests these factors may be appropriate to penalize a bank that adopts insufficiently conservative 
assumptions in its VaR model, and proposes that the BSC establish a matrix of multiples. A 
bank could select any combination of confidence level and holding period it desired, but the 
lower the level and period, the higher the multiple. /d. at 2 and attachment at 2-5. 
404. See Letter from Evans, supra note. 18, at 7-12. J.P. Morgan also performed tests 
showing the multiplication factor results in ridiculously high capital requirements. See Letter 
from Sidwell, supra note 18, at 6-7 (acknowledging the multiple will result in overcapitaliza-
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economic roles of market risk capital: that capital is a cushion to absorb trad-
ing losses, and that it is a cushion against volatility in a bank's earnings from 
trading. Accordingly, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
compared the market risk capital requirement resulting from the internal model 
methodology with actual trading losses. It also compared this requirement 
with the total trading profit and loss ("P&L'~) statement associated with repre-
sentative portfolios. The Association adhered to the BSC's quantitative stan-
dards. However, the Association recognized varying degrees of correlations 
among risk factors. More importantly, the Association did not include a mul-
tiplication factor. 
In the first backtest, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
took time series data from December 1993 through June 1995. The P&L data 
included both proprietary trading and customer flow income (i.e., income from 
non-trading sources). For all banks, the ratios of trading losses to capital, and 
trading P&L to capital, were far less than one.405 "In other words, the capital 
cushion, however defined, always exceeded the relevant income result, 
whether measured against P&L or losses. " 406 Hence, with no multiplication 
factor, the VaR capital figures "were sufficiently large to exceed the trading 
P&L or loss figures at a ninety-nine percent confidence interval. " 407 
In the second backtest, the International Swaps and Derivatives Associa-
tion broadened the time period of the data sample to include 1987-95. The 
sample highlighted five stress events: the 1987 stock market crash, 1991 Gulf 
War, 1992 European exchange rate mechanism crisis, 1994 bond decline, and 
1995 Kobe earthquake.408 The Association also excluded customer flow in-
come, focusing on proprietary trading income.409 Again, the results supported 
the contention that even with no multiplication factor, banks would have been 
excessively capitalized.410 Their capital would have been three to eleven times 
greater than their largest losses.411 With a multiplication factor of three, bank 
capital would have exceeded maximum trading losses by nine to thirty-three 
times. Thus, both backtests illustrate the multiplication factor is unnecessary 
to protect banks against market risks.412 
tion, and proposing to calculate VaRon the basis of bank-specific parameters and then translate 
this risk measurement into a capital requirement using some minimum multiple); Spinner, supra 
note 299, at 5 (illustrating the overstatement of market risk through an example of a 10-year, 
franc-denominated French OAT strip security). 
405. /d., Table 1 at 8. 
406. /d. at 8 (emphasis added). 
407. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 7-8. 
408. /d. 
409. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 9. 
410. /d. at 10. 
411. /d. 
412. Id. at 11. Excessive capitalization may not be the only deleterious result of the multi-
plication factor. Banks may be motivated to shift to activities not covered by the capital re-
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d. Abandon The Quantitative Standards 
From its backtests, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
draws an even stronger conclusion than that the multiplication factor leads to 
excessive capitaJization. It argues the BSC's 99 percent confidence level, 10-
day holding period, and correlations standards-as well as the multiplication 
factor_;are unnecessary and should be abandoned.413 
Even if the parameter values of the [1995] Proposal [and 1996 Market Risk 
Amendment] were more consistent with the actual VaR values (in order to 
render capital requirements that more closely mirrored firms' actual trading 
loss experiences), ISDA [the International Swaps and Derivatives Association] 
believes that the specification of any generic set of model parameters may not 
provide the best methodology for accurately measuring firm-specific market 
risks. 
In many ways, the Proposal's [and Amendment's] "one size fits all" internal 
model approach can be considered only an alternative standardized method. 
Because of [their] ... inflexibility, [they] ... sufferD from many of the draw-
backs of the standardized approach. As an alternative, ISDA recommends that 
firms should be permitted to use their own internal models to compute their 
market risk capital requirements using parameter assumptions that are appro-
priate for each firm, rather than a standardized set ofparameters.414 
J.P. Morgan offers the same observation, noting bank-specific parameters 
lead to greater accuracy in estimating VaR.415 
To enhance the cogency of the constrained self-regulatory regime, the 
BSC, in drafting the 1996 Market Risk Amendment, should have heeded the 
points made by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association and J.P. 
Morgan. It did not. Instead, the BSC declared steadfastly it had "concluded 
that the overall approach of the Apri/1995 proposal remains appropriate. " 416 
The BSC failed to appreciate that by abandoning the quantitative standards 
lacking cogency, the constrained self-regulatory regime would become less 
constrained and, therefore, more closely resemble the ideal type. A bank 
would be able to measure its market risk more accurately by using a VaR 
model whose parameters were specific to the bank's market risk characteris-
tics. For instance, if its primary business is intra-day trading in liquid markets, 
then a bank could use a holding period of less than ten days.417 If it engaged 
principally in positioning illiquid securities~ then it COl;lld use a holding period 
quirements. Such activities could entail greater risk than those . subject to the high capital 
charges. This paradoxical result could undermine the interest of bank regulators in a safer and 
sounder financial system. 
413. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 11. 
414. /d. at 4-5. 
415. Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, at 2 and Attachment at 2-3. 
416. Overview, supra note 16, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
417. Letter from Evans, supra note 18, at 12. 
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of longer than ten days.41 8 
In contrast, retaining the quantitative standards means some banks, by de-
fault, may use the flawed standardized methodology. 
[A]necdotal evidence ... reveals that despite the weaknesses of the standard-
ized approach, some institutions that have developed sophisticated risk man-
agement systems would still opt to use the standardized method for supervi-
sory purposes. The explanation for this paradox is that for many portfolios, 
the standardized method generates lower capital requirements than the internal 
model approach. 
This outcome is an unintended consequence of the particular specifications 
and limitations of the ... internal model approach. . . . [T]hese specifications 
and limitations are highly conservative (i.e., 99% confidence interval, 10-day 
holding period, no benefit for diversification of risk in aggregating VaR's 
across market risk categories, and the inclusion of a multiplication factor 
whose minimum value is 3). The net result is that the ... internal model ap-
proach can be less attractive as a basis for calculating supervisory capital re-
quirements than the ... standardized method.419 
This result is ironic because it discourages banks from improving the accu-
racy of their risk management systems. Another equally ironic possibility, 
suggested by J.P. Morgan, is that a bank might use two internal models: one 
based on particularized parameters for internal risk management purposes; and 
another for capital adequacy calculations that conforms to the BSC's quantita-
tive standards.420 Because it would be costly to maintain two models, the bank 
might elect not to upgrade consistently both models. For example, it might re-
fine only the regulatory model when required to do so by the BSC. Plainly, 
regulatory costs ought not to undermine bank efforts to strengthen their risk 
management systems. 
Retaining the BSC's quantitative standards that lack cogency also may 
cause some banks to be priced out of currency trading activities. This phe-
nomenon would occur because of the excessive capital charges associated with 
these activities, assuming the charges cannot be passed onto customers. In 
tum, market liquidity may be reduced. 
For example, consider J.P. Morgan's contention the 10-day holding period 
may substantially raise a bank's transaction costs. In practice, sophisticated 
banks monitor trading activity through daily VaR estimates. Therefore, banks 
would have to calculate V aR twice every day: once for internal risk manage-
ment purposes on the basis of a one-day holding period, and once for regula-
418. /d. 
419. /d. at 4 (emphasis added). 
420. Letter from Sidwell, supra note 18, at 2-3. 
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tory capital purposes on the basis of a ten-day holding period.421 Possibly, 
banks from less developed and newly industrialized countries would find it 
particularly difficult to absorb the costs of these calculations. To the extent 
banks cannot afford market risk capital charges associated with spots, for-
wards, options, and swaps and curtail trading activities, liquidity in these mar-
kets is reduced. Ultimately, there may be a trade-off between capital levels 
relating to market risk, on the one hand, and reducing liquidity risk, on the 
other hand. 
In sum, backtests conducted by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association cast doubt on the cogency of four of the BSC's quantitative stan-
dards that constrain self-regulation: the 99 percent confidence level, 1 0-day 
holding period, correlations requirements, and multiplication factor. These 
backtests signify serious bank opposition to the constrained self-regulatory re-
gime and, therefore, potentially undermine its stability. Arguments concerning 
excessive capitalization and reduced market liquidity suggest the BSC ought to 
abandon the four standards. 
2. Scope: Still Limited 
Part II identified problems of scope that plagued the capital adequacy re-
gime for foreign exchange transactions before the BSC issued the 1995 Market 
Risk Proposal and 1996 Market Risk Amendment.422 These problems remain 
unresolved in spite of the new BSC Proposal and Amendment. Neither com-
mercial banks from non-G-1 0 countries nor securities firms are bound by the 
Proposal or Amendment. Indeed, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissioners opposed the 1995 Proposal. The Organization argued it was 
premature to allow banks to use V aR models to set market risk capital re-
quirements. 423 
The BSC cannot be faulted for a lack of understanding of the scope prob-
lems or for failing to try to resolve the problems. When it issued the 1995 
Proposal, the BSC admitted it was "mindful of the fact that a level playing 
field is not achievable in the absence of consistent regulatory treatment of 
market risk for all types of players in all financial centers. " 424 Similarly, when 
it issued the 1996 Amendment the BSC declared achieving "more consistent 
regulatory treatment where different types of institutions engage in similar 
types of activities" was "a long-standing objective."425 Thus, the BSC has 
421. !d. at 3 and attachment at 4. 
422. See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text. 
423. See the Technical Committee, International Organization of Securities Commissioners, 
The Implications for Securities Regulators of the Increased Use of Value at Risk Models by Se-
curities Firms (July 1995). 
424. Proposal to Issue A Supplement, supra note 15, at 7 (emphasis added). 
425. Overview, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis original). 
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pledged to "make every effort" to work jointly with the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissioners on harmonizing capital requirements.426 
However, until such effort yields results, the scope variable of the FICAS 
model is a basis for banks to object to the capital adequacy regime for foreign 
exchange transactions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The equilibrium theory of international banking law posits a legal regime 
is likely to be a stable dynamic equilibrium if banks would have no legitimate 
reasons to present significant opposition to that regime. The FICAS model 
identifies five determinants of stability, i.e., five variables that assess and pre-
dict whether banks will have such reasons. These variables are the (1) .fre-
quency of adjustment to rules and proposals in the regime; (2) intricacy of the 
rules and proposals; (3) cogency of the rules and proposals; (4) authority of 
rules and proposals; and (5) scope of rules and proposals. Banks have legiti-
mate reasons for significant opposition if the rules and proposals in the regime 
are changed frequently, are intricate, lack cogency, have little authoritative ba-
sis, or are incomplete in scope. The FICAS model suggests a self-regulatory 
regime is an ideal type because it" does not engender bank opposition in terms 
of the five variables. Therefore, a self-regulatory regime represents a stable 
dynamic equilibrium. 
Equilibrium theory is a useful conceptual framework. It helps scholars and 
practitioners make sense of, and appraise critically, a bewildering blur of rules 
and proposals. It also helps the BSC predict the possible reactions of banks to 
new rules and proposals. The capital adequacy regime for foreign exchange 
transactions is a case in point of the utility of the theory. 
Until the BSC issued its 1995 Market Risk Proposal and finalized this Pro-
posal in 1996, the regime was not a stable dynamic equilibrium. Banks had 
reason to oppose, and indeed did oppose, the regime on the basis of each of the 
FICAS variables. The regime hardly resembled the ideal type. 
In contrast, the regime is now a constrained self-regulatory one due to the 
1995-96 revolution. Constrained self-regulation does not give banks reason 
for opposition on the grounds of three of the five FICAS variables, frequency, 
intricacy, or authority. However, important cogency and scope problems must 
be addressed. If and when they are resolved, the regime will resemble more 
closely the ideal type self-regulatory regime and, consequently, move toward a 
stable dynamic equilibrium. In that equilibrium, the BSC and domestic bank 
regulators stay out of the way of the foreign exchange market. 
426. December 1995 Communique, supra note 15, at 4. See also Overview, supra note 16, 
at 10. 
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CURRENCY TRADING APPENDIX 
(1) Spots and Forwards 
The basic and most significant transactions in which banks in the OTC 
currency markets engage are spots and forwards.427 In tenns of average daily 
turnover, spots are the "single most important segment of the foreign exchange 
market," though between 1989-92 spots grew less rapidly than other types of 
transactions.428 The spot market is driven in part by profit seeking through 
speculating and investing in anticipated currency movements. Indeed, recent 
interest in "·exotic" currencies such as the Thai bhat has created whole new 
avenues for speculation and investment.429 The spot market also is driven by 
demand for foreign currency arising from transactions in goods and services-
i.e., international trade-and in international finance-i.e., investment in fi-
nancial instruments. 
In a spot transaction, two parties agree to exchange amounts of two cur-
rencies in two business days.430 The date on which the agreement is fonned is 
the "trade date," or "T," while the date on which value is exchanged is the 
"value date," or "T +2." (Spot trades involving certain currencies, such as 
Canadian dollars and Mexican pesos, settle on a "T+ I" basis.) Typically, the 
settlement of currency delivery obligations that occurs on T+2 is effected by 
wire transfer. The rate at which the currencies are exchanged is the "spot" 
rate. By way of example, the Bank of America might agree on day 1 to sell 5 
million deutsche marks to Deutsche Bank in exchange for dollars at a rate of 
DM 2 per dollar.431 On day 3, the parties exchange value, with the Bank of 
America wiring DM 5 million to Deutsche Bank in exchange for $2.5 million. 
Conceptually, a forward is the same as a spot except the value date is more 
than two days after the trade date.432 Usually, settlement occurs within seven 
days of the trade date, and few forwards have maturity exceeding one year.433 
The rate of exchange is the "forward" rate. Accordingly, the Bank of Amer-
ica-Deutsche Bank illustration becomes a forward transaction if settlement oc-
427. For a more detailed discussion of spots and forwards, see Raj Bhala, Risk Trade-Offs in 
the Foreign Exchange Spot, Forward and Derivatives Markets, I THE FINANCIER 34, 36-43 
(Aug. 1994). 
428. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 16. 
429. See Philip Gawith, Exotic But Not for Faint Hearts, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 1996, at 13. 
430. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 427, at 16; Bhala, Risk Trade-Ojfs, supra note 
427, at 36. 
431. In 72% of all spots, the U.S. dollar is on one side of the transaction. The deutsche mark 
is on over 50% of all spot market deals. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 17-18. 
432. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 18; Bhala, Risk Trade-Ojfs, supra note 
427, at 40. 
433. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 19. 
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curs on or after day 4. 
During 1989-92, business in forwards grew much more rapidly than in 
spots.434 The motivations for forward transactions resemble those. for spot 
transactions. In addition, a forward may be used to hedge currency risk. Sup-
pose, for example, the Bank of America wants to invest in German govern-
ment bonds that will be issued 30 days hence, but fears the mark will appreci-
ate relative to the dollar during the next 30 days, thus making the bonds more 
expensive. Through a forward contract, the Bank can lock in a specified dol-
lar-mark rate and thereby protect itself against the possibility of spending ad-
ditional dollars for the marks needed to buy the bonds. 
(2) Options 
An OTC currency option comes in two generic forms.435 A "call" option 
gives the purchaser (also called the "holder") the right, but not the obligation, 
to buy a certain amount of one currency in exchange for a second currency on 
or before a particular date at a predetermined rate from the seller (also called 
the "writer") of the option.436 The amount of currency is the "notional princi-
pal" of the option contract, the date is the "expiration date," and the rate is the 
"exercise" or "strike" price.437 A "put" option gives the holder the right, but 
not the obligation, to sell a notional principal of a currency in exchange for a 
second currency on or before the expiration date at the strike price.438 With 
respect to both calls and puts, the holder pays a fee to the writer for the right to 
exercise the option. Whether the holder of a currency option exercises its right 
depends on the movement in the spot rate for the underlying currency pair. 
For instance, on November I, when the dollar-mark spot price is DM 1.2 
per dollar, NationsBank sells a dollar/deutsche mark put (i.e., a dollar 
call/deutsche mark put) option for DM 1 million to the Bank of Tokyo with an 
expiration date of December I and a strike price of DM 1.3 per dollar.439 Sup-
pose the spot dollar/mark rate on November 15 is DM 1.5 per dollar. If the 
Bank of Tokyo were to sell DM 1 million on the spot market, then it would re-
ceive $666,666.67. However, if the Bank of Tokyo exercises its put option, 
434. Id. at 18. 
435. For a more detailed discussion of currency options, and for tre·atment of currency 
swaps, see Bhala, Risk Trade-O.ffs, supra note 427, at 43-48. 
436. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 22; Bhala, Risk Trade-O.ffs, supra note 427, 
at 45-48. 
437. An "American-style option" can be exercised on any business day up to and including 
the expiration date. Bhala, Risk Trade-O.ffs, supra note 427, at 46. A "European-style option" 
can be exercised only on the expiration date. /d. 
438. /d. 
439. Dollar/deutsche mark option transactions are the most significant of any currency pair, 
accounting for 34% of total net options turnover. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 
23. 
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then NationsBank must pay $769,230.77. Abstracting from the cost of the 
premium and other applicable fees, the option is "in the money," i.e., it is 
profitable for the Bank of Tokyo to exercise the option based on the relative 
spot market. movements of the underlying currencies. In this sense, the 
"intrinsic" value of the put option-the economic benefit gained if the option 
is exercised immediately based on the strike price and the spot rate440-is de-
rived from the value of the underlying currencies. It is also a derived value in 
another sense. The Bank of Tokyo could sell the option on the secondary 
market before the expiration date. The secondary market price of the option is 
dependent upon a number of factors, including the spot rate of the underlying 
currencies.441 
Several motivations could lie behind a bank's rationale for buying or 
writing an OTC currency put or call. For instance, with respect to writing a 
put or call, a bank may desire premium income and believe the option will not 
enter into the money. 
With respect to a currency call, a bank may anticipate needing the under-
lying currency at a future date and expect the relevant spot rate to move in a 
direction that will cause the option to become in the money. If the bank's ex-
pectation is met, then it could sell on the spot market the currency gained from 
exercising the option at the strike price, earning a profit because the strike 
price is cheaper than the spot price. 
In addition to seeking delivery of a currency or speculating on spot rate 
movements, a bank may view a put or call as a short-term investment. In this 
case, a bank plans to sell its call or put on a secondary market for a profit. 
Finally, a bank may rely on a currency option to hedge a currency risk as-
sociated with a particular long or short position it has taken in a currency. For 
example, suppose the Bank of Tokyo sells short OM 1 million against dollars. 
It does so because it expects the mark will depreciate relative to the dollar. 
The Bank of Tokyo seeks to profit from the difference between the lower rate 
at which it covers its short position and the higher rate at which it sold short. 
But, the short position entails a currency risk that marks might appreciate rela-
tive to dollars. To hedge against this risk, the Bank of Tokyo buys a call op-
tion on marks. The Bank of Tokyo strategizes that if marks appreciate against 
the dollar, then the option is likely to move into the money. To cover its short 
position, the Bank of Tokyo can exercise the option at a strike price cheaper 
than the spot rate. 
Using actual numbers may help illustrate the above Bank of Tokyo exam-
440. Bhala, Risk Trade-Offs, supra note 427, at 47; JOSEPH A. WALKER, HOW TilE OPTIONS 
MARKETS WORK 35 (1991). 
441. See Bhala, Risk Trade-Offs, supra note 427, at 48. For in-depth treatments of various 
models to value options generally, see GASTINEAU, supra note 27, at 163-223, WALKER, supra 
note 440, at 31-49 ( 1991 ); COURTNEY SMITH, OPTION STRATEGIES 24-33 ( 1987). 
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ple involving a currency option to hedge currency risk. Suppose the Bank of 
Tokyo sells short DM 1 million against dollars at the cost of DM 1.50 per dol-
lar, for a dollar equivalent of $666,666.67. It does so because it expects the 
mark will depreciate relative to the dollar. Assuming the Bank of Tokyo ex-
pects the mark to fall to DM 1.51 per dollar, it will wait to cover its short posi-
tion in order to realize a profit. If the Bank of Tokyo fills its position at DM 
1.51 per dollar, then it pays only $662,251.66 for the million deutsche marks. 
The Bank of Tokyo realizes a profit of $4,415.01 (the difference between 
$666,666.67 and $662,251.66). Thus, the Bank of Tokyo profits from the dif-
ference between the lower rate at which it covers its short position and the 
higher rate at which it sold short. 
But, the short position entails a currency risk that deutsche marks might 
appreciate relative to dollars. If the mark appreciates to DM 1.49 per dollar, 
then the Bank of Tokyo must spend $671,140.94 to cover the mark position it 
sold. The Bank of Tokyo realizes a loss of $4,474.27 (the difference between 
$666,666.67 and $671,140.94). To hedge against this risk, the Bank of Tokyo 
buys a call option on deutsche marks. Assume it buys a call option with a 
strike price of DM 1.4950 per dollar. The Bank of Tokyo strategizes that if 
marks appreciate against the dollar, then the option is likely to move into the 
money. If the mark does strengthen to DM 1.49 per dollar, then the Bank of 
Tokyo will exercise its call option and buy the million deutsche marks it needs 
at DM 1.4950 per dollar, thereby paying $668,896.32. In tum, the Bank of 
Tokyo will limit its loss to $2,229.65 (the difference between $666,666.67 and 
$668,896.32), thus hedging its short position. 
(3) Swaps 
After the spot market, the swap market is the second largest segment of the 
currency markets. In contrast to spots, swaps are the fastest growing transac-
tions in the currency markets.442 Indeed, 
[n]o other markets have ever grown or evolved as rapidly as have the swaps 
markets. This is a testament to the efficacy and flexibility of the instrument, 
the resourcefulness and the professionalism of the new breed of financial engi-
neer, and the increased appreciation by financial managers of the importance 
of risk management in a volatile interest rate [and] exchange rate environment. 
The original swap products, now known as "plain vanilla" swaps, have given 
way to hundreds of variants designed to serve very special purposes. Swaps 
are now used by industrial corporations, financial corporations, thrifts, banks, 
insurance companies, world organizations, and sovereign governments. They 
are used to reduce the cost of capital, manage risks, exploit economies of scale, 
arbitrage the world's capital markets, enter new markets, and to create syn-
thetic instruments. New users, new uses, and new swap variants emerge al-
442. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 19. 
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most daily.443 
An important motivation for counterparties to enter into swaps is to exploit 
comparative advantages in borrowing costs (i.e., reduce financing costs).444 
This motivation is highlighted in the fixed-for-floating and fixed-for-fixed cur-
rency swap example below.445 Another important motivation is risk manage-
ment (i.e., offset, or "hedge" against a risk created by a different financial 
transaction). This motivation is illustrated in the fixed-for-floating currency 
swap example below.446 
The basic idea behind a swap is simple. A swap is a "contractual agree-
ment evidenced by a single document in which two parties, called counterpar-
ties, agree to make periodic payments to each other. " 447 The contract specifies 
the currencies to be exchanged, which (as explained below) are not the same in 
a currency swap. It also specifies the applicable interest rates, which may be 
fixed or floating. 
The periodic payments exchanged by the counterparties are called "service 
payments." They commence on the "effective date" or "value date" of the 
swap, are made on "payment dates," and continue until the "termination date" 
or "maturity date." The time period between the effective and termination 
dates is the "maturity" or "tenor" of the swap. Typically, service payments 
· 443. MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at iii. See id. at 115-16 for a discussion of vari-
ants of plain vanilla swaps. 
444. If international credit markets were perfectly efficient, then arbitrage activity ought to 
eliminate any comparative advantages. Put differently, the existence of comparative advantages 
suggests there are imperfections in international credit markets. 
Imperfections in the world's capital markets include controls on the movement of capital 
across national borders, unequal access to the world's capital markets due to differences 
in borrower size and market acceptance, government-granted loan guarantees, differing 
tax treatments of interest paid and/or received (both internationally and intranationally), 
and, finally, different yield curve behaviors in different countries for both fixed-rate and 
floating-rate borrowings. In addition to these obvious imperfections, there are less obvi-
ous ones as well. For example, a potential lender may have unequal access to, or knowl-
edge of, legal· protections afforded to lenders in the world's capital markets. Concern 
over the validity and enforceability of protective covenants can diminish a potential 
lender's willingness to lend to a nondomestic borrower. The end result is a higher cost 
of funds for the nondomestic borrower. Thus, domestic borrowers often enjoy a com-
parative borrowing advantage over nondomestic borrowers. 
/d., supra note 27, at 108-109. 
445. A different way of expressing this point is that a swap transaction may allow a counter-
party to gain access to a new market that otherwise would be unprofitable to enter. See 
MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 114-15. 
446. Hedging may make it possible for a swap counterparty to operate on a larger scale, that 
is, exploit economies of scale. Through hedging, a counterparty may be able to enter additional 
transactions for a given capital base. See MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 113-114. 
447. MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 3. The discussion below is based on 
MARSHALL & KAPNER at 3, 6, 9, 12-17,32-34, 41-44, 90-96. 
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are made annually, semi-annually, quarterly, or monthly during the tenor. The 
amounts of the service payments are calculated on the basis of a hypothetical 
quantity of underlying assets, called a "notional." (When the assets are 
money, the term "notional principal" is used.) 
The two service payment streams running between the counterparties in 
opposite directions are the "legs" or "sides" of the swap. One counterparty 
makes payments at a fixed price or rate, called the "swap coupon," that does 
not change during the tenor of the swap. The other counterparty may make 
payments at a floating rate, which is reset during the tenor on "reset dates" ac-
cording to a "reference rate." 
Due to imperfect information and search costs, it is often difficult for a 
counterparty to learn of other potential counterparties. Accordingly, counter-
parties rely on an intermediary-a swap dealer-to learn of each other's fi-
nancing or hedging requirements. Commercial and investment banks serve as 
swap dealers. The dealer will meet any counterparty's currency or interest rate 
requirements by becoming a counterparty itself. To avoid bearing currency or 
interest rate risk, the dealer then finds another counterparty with which to enter 
into a second swap that offsets risks created by the first swap. This strategy is 
known as running a "matched" swap book. The swap dealer profits by im-
posing a "pay-receive" (or "bid-ask") spread on the swap coupon. That is, 
there will be a difference of several basis points between the payments the 
dealer makes to a counterparty and the payments it receives from that counter-
party.448 
In a currency swap, the counterparties agree to exchange payments in dif-
ferent currencies.449 In addition, the notional principal amounts also are likely 
to be exchanged twice, on the effective and termination dates.450 Thus, there 
448. A basis point is 1/100 of a percent (0.01%). Pricing swaps is a complicated exercise 
typically performed by a bank's capital markets division. This division periodically publishes 
base rates that may be adjusted to account for the needs or creditworthiness of particular clients, 
the frequency of interest payments, and other factors. See MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 
27, at 96-99, 117; COOPERS& LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 17-18. 
449. Currency swaps are not the only type of swap transactions. Indeed, in terms of market 
size they are overshadowed by interest rate swaps. At the end of 1991, the outstanding amount 
of currency swaps was $807 million, whereas the outstanding amount of interest rate swaps was 
$3.065 billion. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at ix. 
450. The exchange of notional principals renders the word "notional" misleading because 
real quantities are involved, but the term remains commonplace. 
Not every currency swap entails an exchange and subsequent re-exchange of notional 
principals. For an example where the counterparties have liabilities denominated in different 
currencies as a result of existing financing and seek to hedge by means of a currency swap the 
exchange and interest rate risks associated with such financing, see MARSHALL & KAPNER, su-
pra note 27, at 100-102. As another example, the counterparties might not undertake an initial 
borrowing and have no desire to acquire the principal amount of one of the currencies being 
swapped. In this instance, there may be an exchange of notional principals at the termination, 
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are three distinct sets of cash flows: (1) an initial exchange of notional princi-
pals; (2) interest payments made by each counterparty to the other; and (3) the 
re-exchange of the same principal amounts that were previously exchanged. 
Because different currencies are involved, the initial exchange and re-
exchange of notional principals must occur at a certain rate. The first ex-
change is made at the spot foreign exchange rate prevailing on the day the 
counterparties agree to the swap contract.451 The re-exchange may occur at 
that same rate, in which case the currency swap is sometimes called a "par 
swap."452 Alternatively, it could occur at the forward rate prevailing on the 
contracting day, in which case the currency swap is sometimes described as a 
"spot plus a forward" transaction.453 
The exchange and re-exchange give rise to a delivery risk. A counterparty 
may fail to exchange or re-exchange the notional principal amount. Because 
of this risk, currency swaps bear a heavy capital requirement under the 1988 
Basle Capital Accord. Arguably, this requirement (which is discussed below) 
"probably explains much of the slowdown in the currency swap market in 
1990. " 454 Nonetheless, the market did not experience a severe contraction 
during the July 1988-December 1990 transitional phase of implementation of 
the 1988 Accord. 455 (The Accord came into full force on December 31, 
1992.456) To the contrary, the currency swaps market proved resilient and de-
veloped in a robust manner, in part because of "the prudent approach which 
intermediaries have adopted without official encouragement. " 457 
That prudent approach is a self-regulatory device, namely, an insistence 
that counterparties be of high quality, i.e., creditworthy. This insistence fol-
lows logically from the reasons counterparties enter into currency swaps. Of-
ten, counterparties are motivated to enter into a currency swap to exploit com-
parative advantages and thereby reduce financing costs. This result follows 
from the fact a currency swap makes "it possible to raise funds in any currency 
and use those funds to invest in an asset denominated in any other currency," 
i.e., "to transform the currency of a liability or asset." 458 In addition, counter-
parties may seek to hedge against a particular currency or interest rate risk by 
means of a swap. In sum, risk-taking is not a common reason for entering into 
a currency swap, which helps explain the creditworthiness of the counterpar-
but not commencement, of the currency swap. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 1-4. 
451. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 5. 
452. See id. at 3, 5. This scenario presumes that the difference between the spot and forward 
rates is accounted for in the applicable interest rates on the swap. See MARSHALL & KAPNER, 
supra note 27, at 92. 
453. See, e.g., Bhala, Risk Trade-Ojfs, supra note 427, at 43-45. 
454. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at ix. 
455. 1988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 5, at~~ 46, 49. 
456. /d. at~ 46. 
457. /d. at x. 
458. MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 116. 
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ties. 
The interest rates associated with payment streams in a plain vanilla cur-
rency swap may be fixed or floating rates.459 For example, a fixed-for-floating 
transaction involves an exchange of fixed-rate payments in one currency for 
floating-rate payments in a different currency. Consider a fixed/floating cur-
rency swap motivated by comparative advantages in borrowing costs.460 Sup-
pose Sumitomo Bank seeks five-year, floating-rate U.S. dollar financing. If it 
borrows dollars, then it will pay a floating rate of the London Interbank Offer 
Rate ("LIBOR"). Sumitomo also could borrow yen at a fixed interest rate of 
nine percent. Suppose also Chase Manhattan Bank wants five-year, fixed-rate 
yen financing. If Chase borrows the yen itself, then it will pay a fixed interest 
rate of 10.1 percent. In addition, Chase is able to borrow dollars at a floating 
rate ofLIBOR. These assumptions are set forth in Chart 1. 
In addition to the above assumptions, suppose the Hongkong Shanghai 
Bank is a swap dealer that makes a market for dollar-yen currency swaps. Its 
pricing schedule indicates it will pay a fixed rate of9.45 percent on yen against 
LIBOR. It will pay LIBOR against a fixed rate of 9.55 percent on yen. The 
ten basis point differential (9.55 - 9.45 percent) is the pay-receive spread. 
Given the above assumptions, Sumitomo and Chase can minimize their fi-
nancing costs by entering into fixed/floating currency swaps with the 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank. Sumitomo and Chase each borrow in their respec-
tive cash markets. Sumitomo borrows five-year yen at nine percent, and Chase 
borrows five-year dollars at LIBOR. 
459. One source suggests that the term "currency swap" should be used only for fixed-for-
fixed swaps between currencies, and refers to a fixed-for-floating transaction as a "cross-
currency coupon swap." See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 9. (A floating-for-
floating transaction involving two currencies is a "cross-currency basis swap.") Depending on 
the terms of the fixed-for-floating transaction, this source suggests the proper rubric is a 
"generic" or "plain vanilla" swap. /d. at II. Finally, this source suggests that where a swap 
dealer is involved, the appropriate term is a "cocktail swap." /d. at 12. The point is that there 
appears to be no definitive usage, hence what is most important is to consider the exact terms of 
each transaction. 
460. The numerical values in this example are taken from MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 
27, at 40-44. 
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Sumitomo Bank Chase Manhattan Bank 
Seeks 5 year, Seeks 5 year, 
floating rate, dollar fixed rate 
financing. yen financing. 
Cost of Borrowing LIBOR LIBOR 
Dollars Directly (Floating) (Floating) 
Cost of Borrowing 9 Percent I 0.25 Percent 
Yen Directly (Fixed) (Fixed) 
Chart 1 
Assumptions for Fixed/Floating Dollar-Yen Currency Swaps 
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Sumitomo then enters into a swap agreement with Hongkong Shanghai 
Bank. It delivers the yen-denominated notional principal to Hongkong Shang-
hai Bank.461 Similarly, Chase enters into a swap agreement withHongkong 
Shanghai Bank and delivers to it the dollar-denominated notional principal.462 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank passes the notional principles through to its 
counterparties. Sumitomo receives the dollar principal, and Chase receives the 
yen principal. The dollar-yen exchanges are made at the prevailing spot tate. 
These initial cash.flows are depicted in Figure lA. 
During the five-year tenor of the two swaps, yen and dollar payment 
streams run among the counterparties so as to meet the financing needs of Su-
mitomo and Chase. These streams are depicted in Figure lB. Because Sumi-
tomo seeks floating-rate dollar financing, it swaps its initial yen obligation for 
new dollar-denominated debt. That is, Sumitomo makes LIBOR payments 
denominated in dollars to Hongkong Shanghai Bank. It receives 9.45 percent 
yen-denominated yen payments from Hongkong Shanghai Bank. Sumitomo 
can use these yen payments to service its obligations from its initial yen bor-
rowing.463 
This swap converts Sumitomo's initial yen borrowing into a dollar obliga-
tion. Moreover, it lowers Sumitomo's financing costs. Had Sumitomo bor-
rowed dollars itself, it would have paid LIBOR. With the swap, Sumitomo's 
net cost is LIBOR- 45 basis points, i.e., Sumitomo saves 45 basis points. This 
saving results from two facts. First, Sumitomo pays nine percent on its initial 
yen borrowing, plus LIBOR to Hongkong Shanghai. Second, Sumitomo re-
ceives 9.45 percent from Hongkong Shanghai. Thus: 
[9 percent+ LIBOR]- 9.45 percent= LIBOR- 0.45 percent, 
which is 45 basis points below the cost of borrowing dollars directly. 
461. As of the end of 1991, yen were one leg in 22.3% of all currency swaps. COOPERS & 
LYBRAND, supra note 27, at xi. 
462. By one account, as of the end of 1991, dollars were one leg in 36.2% of all currency 
swaps. /d. A different source indicates that the U.S. dollar is involved in one leg in 95% of all 
currency swaps, and dollar/yen transactions account for 25% of all currency swaps. CENTRAL 
BANK SURVEY, supra note 21, at 20. 
463. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 5. 
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I Delivery.ofYen 1 I Delivery of Yen 1 I Principle I Principle ~~----------------~ ~--------------~ Sumitomo Bank 
( Counterparty) 
Delivery of 
Dollar Principal 
Borrowing of 5 Year 
Yen at 5 Percent 
Credit Market 
ForYen · .. 
Sumitomo Bank 
Honkong Shanghai Bank 
(Swap Dealer & Counterparty) 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
(Counterparty) 
Delivery of 
Dollar Principal 
Results 
Borrowing of 5 Dollars 
atLIBOR 
Credit Market 
For Dollars 
Has a fixed-rate yen obligation that it swaps for a floating-rate dollar obligation. 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Has a floating-rate dollar obligation that it swaps for a fixed-rate yen obligation. 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank . 
Essentially passes through notional principal amounts from Sumitomo to Chase 
and vica-versa. 
Figure lA 
Initial Borrowing in Cash Markets and Exchanges of Notional Principals 
at Commencement of Fixed/Floating Dollar-Yen Swaps 
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Delivery of Yen 
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I Delivery of Yen 1 I Principle p-____________ ._ ____ ~ 
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1 
Sumitomo Bank 
( Counterparty) 
Honkong Shanghai Bank 
(Swap Dealer & Counterparty) 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
(Counterparty) 
Delivery of 
Dollar Principal 
Borrowing of 5 Year 
Yen at 5 Percent 
Credit Market 
For Yen 
Sumitomo Bank 
Results 
Delivery of 
Dollar Principal 
Borrowing of 5 Dollars 
atLIBOR 
Credit Market 
For Dollars 
Yen-for-dollar fixed/floating currency swap, coupled with 
initial yen borrowing, means Sumitomo pays out LIBOR + 9.55 percent and 
receives 9.45 percent. The difference is LIBOR- 0.45 percent, a saving of0.45 
percent over the 9 percent cost of direct yen borrowing. 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Dollar-for yen fixed/floating currency swap, coupled 
with initial dollar borrowing, means Chase pays out LIBOR + 9.55 percent and 
receives LIBOR. The difference is 9.55 percent, a saving of0.55 percent over the 
I 0.1 percent cost of direct yen borrowing. 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank 
Earns a pay-receive spread of9.55 percent, or 0.10 percent. 
Figure lB 
Payment Streams During Tenor of Fixed/Floating Dollar-Yen Currency 
Swaps and Debt Service Payments on Initial Borrowings 
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Similarly, Chase benefits from the swap with Hongkong Shanghai Bank. 
Because Chase wants fixed-rate yen financing, it swaps its initial dollar obli-
gation for new yen-denominated debt. That is, Chase makes 9.55 percent 
fixed-rate yen payments to Hongkong Shanghai Bank. It receives LIBOR 
payments denominated in dollars from the swap dealer. Chase can use the 
dollars received to pay off its initial dollar borrowing.464 Accordingly, the 
swap converts Chase's initial dollar borrowing into a yen obligation. Further, 
it reduces Chase's funding costs. Had Chase borrowed yen itself, it would 
have paid 10.1 percent. With the swap, Chase's net cost is 9.55 percent, which 
is a 55 basis point saving. This benefit results from two facts. First, Chase 
pays LIBOR on its initial dollar borrowing, plus 9.55 percent to Hongkong 
Shanghai. Second, Chase receives LIBOR from Hongkong Shanghai. Thus: 
[LIBOR + 9.55 percent]- LIBOR = 9.55 percent, 
which is 55 basis points below the 10.1 percent cost of borrowing yen di-
rectly. 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank also benefits from the two swaps. It obtains a 
pay-receive spread of ten basis points because it pays Sumitomo 9.45 percent 
and receives from Chase 9.55 percent. In addition, the swaps are matched. 
That is, by entering into the two swaps, Hongkong Shanghai Bank hedges for-
eign exchange and interest rate risk.465 For instance, if LIBOR increases, the 
amount of the payments it must make to Chase will increase, but so also will 
the amount of the payments it receives from Sumitomo. If the yen appreciates 
(or depreciates) relative to the dollar, then there will be a corresponding appre-
ciation (or depreciation) in the yen payments Hongkong Shanghai receives and 
makes relative to the dollar payments it receives and makes. 
Finally, when the swap matures, the counterparties will again exchange 
notional principal amounts at the prevailing spot rate. These amounts are used 
to pay off the initial borrowings made by Sumitomo and Chase.466 The re-
exchanges and payoffs are depicted in Figure 1 C. 
464. See id. 
465. In the above example, the swap dealer enters into an offsetting currency swap transac-
tion to hedge risks arising from its first swap deal. For example, a risk from the first deal might 
be a depreciation in the value ofthe yen relative to the dollar, which entails a depreciation in the 
value of the 10 basis point spread Hongkong Shanghai Bank receives (as denominated in dol-
lars). For an illustration of an end user hedging currency risk with a fixed-for-fixed currency 
swap, see MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 109-13. 
466. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 5. 
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_r---- Delivery of Yen l _r---- Delivery of Yen l f Principle f Principle 
~----------------~ ~----~------~ Sumitomo Bank 
(Counterparty) 
Honkong Shanghai Bank 
(Swap Dealer & Counterparty) 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
(Counterparty) 
Delivery of 
Dollar Principal 
Delivery of 
Dollar Principal 
Borrowing of 5 Year 
Yen at 5 Percent 
Credit Market 
For Yen 
Sumitomo Bank 
Results 
Repays its fixed-rate yen with the notional principal it receives. 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Borrowing of 5 Dollars 
atLIBOR 
Credit Market 
For Dollars 
Repays its floating-rate dollar obligation with the notional principal it receives. 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank 
Essentially passes through the notional principal amounts from Sumitomo to Chase 
and vice versa. 
Figure lC 
Re-Exchange of Notional Principals at Termination of Fixed/Floating 
Dollar-Yen Swaps and Repayment of Initial Borrowings 
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Sumitomo Bank Chase Manhattan Bank 
Seeks 5 year, Seeks 5 year, 
fixed rate, dollar fixed rate 
financing. yen financing. 
Cost of Borrowing 11.5 Percent 11.75 Percent(Fixed) 
Dollars Directly (Fixed) 
Cost of Borrowing 9.5 Percent 10.25 Percent 
Yen Directly (Fixed) (Fixed) 
Chart 2 
Assumptions for Fixed/Fixed Dollar-Yen Currency Swaps 
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One way of characterizing the plain vanilla fixed-for-floating currency 
swap depicted above is that it is an exchange of borrowings. Sumitomo ex-
changed its fixed-rate yen obligation for a floating-rate dollar obligation, while 
Chase did the reverse. However, there are a myriad of variations on the plain 
vanilla currency swap. For example, in a fixed-for-fixed currency swap, each 
swap counterparty pays and receives a fixed rate of interest, hence the swap 
involves exchanges of fixed-rate payments in one currency for fixed-rate pay-
ments in a different currency. The above example can be altered to illustrate 
this variation. 
Suppose Sumitomo Bank needs five-year fixed rate U.S. dollar funding, 
and Chase Manhattan Bank needs five-year fixed rate yen funding.467 Sumi-
tomo can raise yen directly at 9.5 percent and dollars directly at 11.50 percent. 
Chase Manhattan Bank can borrow yen directly at 10.25 percent and dollars 
directly at 11.75 percent. These assumptions are set forth in Chart 2. Inter-
estingly, even though Sumitomo has an absolute borrowing advantage over 
Chase Manhattan-i.e., it can borrow both yen and dollars more cheaply than 
Chase-both banks can reduce their financing costs, because Chase has a 
comparative advantage in the dollar market. Each bank borrows in its domes-
tic market and, assuming no swap dealer is used, enters into a fixed-for-fixed 
currency swap directly with one another. The initial borrowing and exchanges 
of notional principals are depicted in Figure 2A. The exchanges occur at the 
spot rate prevailing on the day the counterparties enter into the swap contract. 
Assume Sumitomo makes dollar-denominated fixed-rate payments to 
Chase at 11.5 percent, while Chase makes yen-denominated fixed-rate pay-
ments to Sumitomo at 9.75 percent. Consequently, Sumitomo swaps its yen 
obligation for a dollar obligation, and Chase does the reverse. The payment 
streams during the tenor of the swap are depicted in Figure 28. At these inter-
est rates, both banks benefit through lower funding costs. Sumitomo must pay 
9.5 percent on its initial yen obligation and 11.5 percent to Chase on the swap, 
but it receives 9.75 percent from Chase on the swap. The net result is [9.5 + 
11.5] - 9.75, or 11.25 percent.468 Had Sumitomo borrowed dollars directly, it 
would have paid 11.5 percent. Thus, Sumitomo saves 25 basis points by bor-
rowing yen and swapping the yen obligation for a dollar obligation. 
467. The numerical values for the example are drawn from MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra 
note 27, at 92-96. 
468. Strictly speaking, interest rates applicable to payment obligations denominated in dif-
ferent currencies are not directly comparable. However, the comparison is valid as a first ap-
proximation. For a discussion of how to adjust interest rates on different currencies to make 
them exactly comparable, see MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 102-07. 
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Delivery ofYen 
(notional principal) 
239 
Sumitomo Bank I Chase Manhattan Bank I 
t 
Borrows 5-year Yen at 
· 9.5 Percent Fixed 
Credit Market 
for Yen 
Sumitomo Bank 
Delivery of Dollars 
(notional principal) 
Results 
_j 
Borrows 5-year Dollars at 
11.75 Percent Fixed 
Credit Market 
For Dollars 
Has a fixed-rate yen obligation that it swaps for a fixed-rate dollar obligation. 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Has a fixed-rate dollar obligation that it swaps for a fixed-rate yen obligation. 
Figure 2A 
Initial Borrowing In Cash Markets and Exchanges of Notional Principals 
at Commencement of Fixed/Fixed Dollar-Yen Swaps 
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+ I Sumitomo Bank I I Chase Manhattan Bank I 
t 9.75 Percent 
Yen Payments 
9.5 Percent Service Payments on 
Initial Yen Borrowing 
Credit Market 
for Yen 
Results 
----JI . 
11.75 Percent Service Payments 
on Initial Dollar Borrowing 
• Credit Market 
For Dollars ·. 
(Using interest rates applicable to payment obligations denominated in different. 
currencies as a first approximation) 
Sumitomo Bank 
(9.5% + 11.5%]- 9.75% = 11.25%. A saving of25 basis points, 
because Sumitomo'~ direct cost of~orrowing dollars is 11.5%. 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
[11.75% + 9.75%]- 11.5% = 10%. A saving of25 basis points, because Chase's 
direct cost of borrowing yen is 10.25%. 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank 
Essentially passes through the notional principal amounts from Sumitomo to Chase 
and vice versa. 
Figure 2B 
Payment Streams During Tenor of Fixed/Floating Dollar· Yen currency 
Swaps and Debt Service Payments on Initial Borrowings 
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Similarly, Chase saves 25 basis points on its funding costs. It pays 11.75 
percent on its initial dollar debt, plus 9.75 percent to Sumitomo on the swap. It 
receives 11.5 percent from Sumitomo. The net difference is 
[11.75 + 9.75]- 11.5, or 10 percent. 
The ten percent difference represents a saving of 25 basis points in com-
parison·with Chase's cost of directly borrowing yen. 
Until the swap matures, Sumitomo uses the yen payments received from 
Chase to service its initial borrowing. Likewise, Chase uses the dollar pay-
ments received from Sumitomo to service its initial borrowing.469 When the 
swap matures, the counterparties re-exchange notional principals, as shown in 
Figure 2C, and thereby pay off their initial borrowings.470 Thus, as with the-
fixed-for-floating currency swap, in a fixed-for-fixed currency swap each 
counterparty services the debt of the other.471 The re-exchanges of notional 
principals may occur at the spot rate as of the day _of contracting, or at the for-
ward rate on that day. The entire transaction is, in effect, an exchange of the 
initial borrowings, and currency swaps sometimes are referred to as such.472 
The above examples of a fixed-for-floating and fixed-for-fixed currency 
swap suggest each swap depicted is a "par swap,'" i.e., the same notional prin-
cipal amounts at the same spot rates are exchanged and re-exchanged. As a 
result, one ofthe swap counterparties forgoes foreign exchange gain, while the 
other avoids a foreign exchange loss.473 Suppose in the first swap yen appreci-
ates relative to the dollar during the tenor of the swap from 100 yen per dollar 
to 95.yen per dollar. Also assume the notional principal amounts involved are 
100 million yen and $1 million. Consequently, Suinitomo's initial delivery to 
Hongkong Shanghai Bank is for 100 million yen, and Chase delivers $1 mil-
lion to the Bank. When the swap matures, the reverse deliveries will occur. 
In contrast, if the spot rate at the maturity date of 95 yen were used to cal-
culate the re-exchange requirements, then at maturity Chase re-delivers 100 
million yen, while Sumitomo re-delivers $1,052,631.58.474 The par swap im-
plies Sumitomo gives up a foreign exchange gain of $52,631.58, because Su-
mitomo initially receives delivery of $1 million and re-delivers $1,052,631.58 
at maturity. The source of the foregone gain is the fact Sumitomo parts with 
yen during the tenor of the swap, and yen appreciates relative to the dollar. 
Conversely, Chase avoids a loss of $52,631.58. Chase parts with dollars dur-
ing the tenor of the swap, dollars depreciate relative to yen· during the tenor, 
but Chase receives an additional $52,631.58 upon re-delivery. 
469. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 5. 
470. /d. 
471. /d. 
472. See MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 27, at 5, 93. 
473. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 27, at 7. 
474. This figure results from dividing I 00 million by 95 yen per dollar. 
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Repays its initial yen obligation with the yen notional principal it receives. 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Repays its initial dollar obligation with the dollar notional principal it receives. 
Figure 2C 
Re-Exchange of Notional Principals at Termination of Fixed/Floating 
Dollar-Yen Swaps and Repayment of Initial Borrowings 
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Why are the counterparties content with this arrangement? The par swap 
allows them to lock in the rate at which the re-exchange would occur-1 00 
yen per dollar-at the start of the swap. In effect, they trade certainty and pre-
dictability for a potential gain or loss arising from currency risk. · 
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CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGIME APPENDIX 
(1) The 1988 Basle Capital Accord 
The centerpiece ofthe Basle Supervisor's Committee's ("BSC's") capital 
adequacy regime is a plurilateral agreement among the G-1 0 central banks 
published in July 1988: the "Consultative Paper on International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," informally known as the 
1988 Basle Capital Accord.475 The Accord took effect on December 31, 1992 
and applies to internationally active banks from the G-1 0 countries. It ad-
475. See supra note 5. The 1988 Basle Capital Accord was preceded by a December 1987 
draft proposal entitled "Consultative Paper: Proposals for International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards," 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 527 (1988). In tum, this 
draft was preceded by the "February 1987 Agreed Proposal of the United States Federal Bank-
ing Supervisory Authorities and the Bank of England on Primary Capital and Capital Adequacy 
Assessment" and the "December 1987 BSC Consultative Paper: Proposals for International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards." With respect to the forerunners 
of the Accord, see MALLOY, supra note 210, at§ 5.3.3.4 at 5.103-5.106. 
For discussions of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord, see Duncan E. Alford, Baste Com-
mittee International Capital Adequacy Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking 
Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'LL. 189,209-19 (1992) (considering specific effects on banks ofthe 
1988 Basle Capital Accord such as encouraging asset securitization and portfolio adjustments); 
Gallatin, Nothing to Lose But Their Chains, EUROMONEY 58 (Sept. 1992) (addressing distor-
tions in bank lending and funding operations created by the 1988 Basle Capital Accord); Wil-
liam Taylor, Risk-Based Assessment of the Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks, in 1 
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 341-48 (Robert C. Effros ed. 1992) 
(discussing international cooperation on bank capital adequacy issues); Lichtenstein, supra note 
2 (explaining key features of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord); Peter C. Hayward, Prospects for 
International Cooperation by Bank Supervisors, 24 INT'L LAW. 787 (1990) (explaining the co-
operation among G-1 0 bank regulators necessary to reach the 1988 Basle Capital Accord); 
BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 4, at xxvi-xxviii, 12-15 (adopting a 
"building blocks" approach to the 1988 Basle Capital Accord, and exploring the substance-
form distinction in the context of credit risk rules for swaps); David T. Llewellyn, The Strategic 
Dilemma of World Banking, 4 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 504 (1989) 
(considering the effect of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord on competitive neutrality, the cost of 
business services, and other structural variables); Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Stan-
dards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 
OHIO ST. J. 1299 (1989) (assessing the appropriateness of regulatory concern about capital ade-
quacy); Joseph Jude Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Committee on Bank Capital 
Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on "International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards," 23 INT'L LAW. 245 (1989) (discussing the features of the 1988 Basle 
Capital Accord); William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital 
Requirements, 49 OHIO ST.J. 1365 (1989) (considering the relationship between the moral haz-
ard problem and a risk-based capital scheme); Michael P. Malloy, U.S. International Banking 
and the New Capital Adequacy Requirements: New, Old and Unexpected, 7 ANN. REv. 
BANKING L. 75 (1988) (treating key aspects of capital adequacy requirements). 
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dresses credit risks associated with on- and off-balance sheet transactions, in-
cluding foreign exchange transactions.476 Thus, with respect to foreign ex-
change transactions, the Accord addresses the possibility a bank's counterparty 
is unable or unwilling to deliver currency as required by a spot, forward, op-
tion, or swap contract. The Accord is designed to ensure the bank has suffi-
cient capital to absorb the loss associated with the default. 
The Accord is a dramatic effort to improve the safety and soundness of the 
international banking system and level the competitive playing field among 
banks.477 The BSC believes that absent such an agreement, the system remains 
vulnerable to thinly capitalized banks engaged in excessively risky activities. 
Further, banks from countries with less stringent capital requirements could 
gain a competitive advantage over rivals from countries with more stringent 
requirements. The potential exists for unscrupulous regulators to help their 
banks by reducing capital requirements, resulting in a "race to the bottom." 
Thus, the two objectives of the Accord relate to safety and soundness and 
competitive equality .478 
(A) Capital And Capital Ratios 
To meet these objectives, the Accord expressly links requisite capital to 
credit risk. The amount of capital a bank should maintain with respect to a 
particular transaction depends on the credit risk of that transaction.479 Thus, 
the Accord reflects an effort by regulators to "refine" their policies to account 
for relative degrees of risk and "define more precisely" the elements of capi-
ta1.4so 
Under the Accord, a bank must satisfy two risk-based capital ratio tests. 
The first test is the ratio of "Tier 1" (or "core") capital to total risk-weighted 
assets and off-balance sheet activities. This ratio must equal or exceed four 
percent.481 "Tier 1" capital is narrowly defined to mean stockholder's equity 
and disclosed returns from post-tax earnings.482 
476. Credit risk is simply the risk of counterparty failure. The term "international banks" is 
not defined in the Accord. The Accord applies on a consolidated basis, hence subsidiaries en-
gaged in the banking business are subject to the Accord. 
4 77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
478. First, "the new framework should serve to strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system." 1988 Bas1e Capital Accord, supra note 5, at ~ 3 (emphasis 
added). Second, it "should be fair and have a high degree of consistency in its application to 
banks in different countries with a view to diminishing an existing source of competitive ine-
quality among international banks." /d. (emphasis added). 
479. MALLOY, supra note 210, at§ 5.3.1 at 5.50. 
480. MALLOY, supra note 210, at§ 5.3.3.4.2 at 5.102-5.103. 
481. Additionally, Tier 1 capital must equal or exceed 50% of a bank's capital base. 
482. See 1988 Baste Capital Accord, supra note 5, at~~ 12-14. Shareholder's equity, or eq-
uity capital, refers to (1) common stock that is issued and fully paid and (2) non-cumulative per-
petual preferred stock. Disclosed reserves are created or increased by appropriations of retained 
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The second test is the ratio ofthe sum of Tier I and "Tier 2" capital to to-
tal risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet activities.483 This ratio must 
equal or exceed eight percent. "Tier 2" (or "supplementary") capital is de-
fined more broadly than Tier I capital. Tier 2 capital includes undisclosed re-
serves, revaluation reserves, general provisions and loan loss reserves, and 
subordinated term debt.484 
earnings or other surplus (such as share premiums, retained profit, general reserves, or legal re-
serves). An amount for goodwill is deducted from Tier I capital. 
483. The amount of a bank's investment in an unconsolidated subsidiary is deducted from 
the total capital base, the sum of Tier I and Tier 2 capital. Bank regulators have discretion to 
require a deduction from the capital base for the amount of capital held by one bank that is is-
sued by another bank- i.e., reciprocal cross-holdings of capital instruments. This deduction 
prevents the artificial inflation of capital by issuing shares to banks. If no deduction is required, 
then such holdings bear a I 00% credit risk weight. 
484. I988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 5, at~~ 15-23. The total amount of Tier 2 capi-
tal cannot exceed the amount of Tier I capital. 
Undisclosed reserves can be counted in Tier 2 only ifthey are authorized under the le-
gal and accounting rules applicable to a bank, have passed through a bank's profit and loss ac-
count, and are accepted by the bank's regulator. 
Revaluation reserves can be included in the Tier 2 capital base of a bank only if they 
are authorized under the legal and accounting rules applicable to the bank, and the bank's regu-
lator agrees the assets have been revalued (e.g., securities) in a prudent manner reflecting the 
possibility of price fluctuations and forced sale. To account for market volatility in asset values, 
and tax that must be paid on any capital gain upon sale of the asset, a revaluation reserve is 
subject to a 55% discount on the difference between the historical cost (or book value) of the 
asset and the current market value of the asset. 
General provisions and loan loss reserves do not include provisions or reserves that are 
targeted for a specifically identified asset. In addition, the amount of provisions and reserves 
that can be included in Tier 2 is limited to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. 
A hybrid debt capital instrument is one that combines characteristics of equity and debt. 
To be included in the Tier 2 capital base of a bank, the instrument must be unsecured, subordi-
nated, fully paid up, and not redeemable at the initiative of the holder without prior consent of 
the bank regulator. Unlike conventional subordinated debt, the instrument should be available 
to absorb losses without forcing the bank to cease trading. ~!so, it should be possible for the 
bank to defer servicing interest payments until its profitability is restored to a level that it can 
support such payments. A common example of a qualifying hybrid instrument is a mandatory 
convertible debt instrument. 
Finally, for inclusion in Tier 2, subordinated term debt must be unsecured with a mini-
mum original fixed term to maturity of more than five years and limited life redeemable prefer-
ence shares. However, such debt can be included in Tier 2 only up to an amount equal to 50% 
of the total amount of Tier I capital. This restriction reflects the fact that subordinated term 
debt cannot be used to absorb unanticipated losses except in liquidation, i.e., as long as the 
bank's shares continue to trade, subordinated term debt is unavailable to participate in losses. It 
is also subject to a discount of 20% per year during the last five years of its maturity. This 
limitation reflects the value of subordinated term debt in terms of its ability to absorb unantici-
pated losses declines as the debt nears maturity. 
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(B) Credit Risk Categories 
With respect to both ratio tests, there are five credit risk categories used to 
slot on- and off-balance sheet transactions. Each category has a specific risk-
weight: 0, 10, 20, 50, or 100 percent. Hence, the risk-weight assigned to a 
transaction depends on the credit risk associated with the activity which, of 
course, turns on the nature of the counterparty obligor.485 
485. The 1988 Basle Capital Accord gives bank regulators discretion on categorizing certain 
assets. For example, a bank regulator may assign a 0, 10, 20, or 50 percent weight to a claim on 
a domestic public sector entity other than the central government, or a loan guaranteed by such 
an entity. For a discussion of whether and how this discretion has affected the level of the field 
on which international banks compete, see Scott & lwahara, supra note 20; Bhala & Kapstein, 
supra note 20. 
The risk-weight categories create an air of elegance to the regime. However, by devis-
ing a simple categorization scheme in 1988, the BSC may have laid the foundation for subse-
quent pressure for future reforms to the scheme. In terms of the FICAS variables, if the BSC 
fails to adjust the scheme, then it neglects concerns about the cogency of the categories. If it 
makes adjustments, then it could increase the intricacy of the scheme. 
The threshold problem is that the five risk-weight categories result in the "grouping 
[of] different types of assets under the same risk weight, whereas in fact there may actually be 
differences in the actual risk involved among the various types of assets in a single risk-weight 
category." MALLOY, supra note 210, § 5.3.1 at 5.50-5.51. Is it appropriate to assign a 100% 
risk-weight to all claims on the private sector without distinguishing the creditworthiness of the 
obligor, and to claims on less-developed countries denominated in a foreign currency? Moreo-
ver, to what extent might a bank re-orient its activities toward lower risk-weighted assets? See 
generally John Gapper, The Very Model of a Modern Risk, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at 11 
(discussing efforts by British banks to ensure capital is allocated to activities with the best real 
returns). These rather obvious concerns create a challenge for the BSC: should it make adjust-
ments in the contents of the 0, 10, 20, 50, and 100 percent credit risk categories in an effort to 
achieve a more "scientific" risk-weighting scheme? Alternatively, should it expand the number 
of categories in order to make more precise distinctions among assets? 
Certainly, at least some banks might encourage the BSC to take on this challenge. Yet, 
herein lies a dilemma. By re-classifying assets within the existing five categories, or by creating 
new categories, the BSC tinkers with the capital adequacy regime. No doubt it acts with a pure 
heart. Its goal is to recalibrate the way- capital charge is measured so as to "fine tune" the Ac-
cord. But, in so doing it ends up making the Accord more intricate. How can it re-classify as-
sets without more precisely defining the assets at issue? Should, for example, loans to high-
technology companies like Microsoft be distinguished from loans to aerospace companies like 
Boeing? If so, how are "high-technology" and "aerospace" to be defined? They could ·also 
cause the regime to seem more arbitrary. If additional risk-weights should be added, then what 
should they be-30%? 75%? 
In sum, the elegance of the 1988 Accord credit-risk categories creates a tension in-
volving frequency of adjustment and intricacy. The categories may be overly simplistic. A 
complicated reality cannot be reduced to five-credit risk categories without controversy, and 
pressure soon develops to make the regime "more realistic." Attempting to alter the regime 
means getting bogged down in a myriad of details and somewhat artificial distinctions. Ulti-
mately, if the BSC tries to "fix" problems on an incremental basis, then the regime becomes 
unattractive because it loses any degree of elegance it might have had. 
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At one extreme, transactions with private counterparties (e.g., other banks) 
receive a 100 percent risk weight. For example, the full amount of a $1 mil-
lion loan to a private borrower is included in the denominator of both ratios. If 
this loan were a bank's only asset, then the corresponding capital charges 
would be $40,000 (the Tier 1 ratio) and $80,000 (the Tier 2 ratio). At the other 
extreme, claims on central governments that are members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") receive a zero per• 
cent risk weight.486 Accordingly, the full value of a U.S. Treasury security is 
excluded from the denominator of each ratio because of the zero risk weight 
ascribed to government obligations. 
(C) Off-Balance Sheet Transactions And The Current Exposure Method 
Off-balance sheet transactions-those activities not normally appearing on 
a bank's balance sheet-are handled somewhat differently from on-balance 
sheet transactions. Foreign exchange forward, option, and swap contracts are 
examples of off-balance sheet transactions. The Accord does not separately 
itemize these foreign exchange transactions. Rather, it defines the broad cate-
gory of "exchange rate contracts." This category excludes contracts with an 
original maturity of fourteen calendar days or less, hence it excludes spots and 
most forwards. 
The reason for the distinct treatment of off-balance sheet transactions is 
that a bank is not exposed to credit risk for the full face value of its contract. 
Rather, its exposure depends on the potential cost of replacing the cash flow 
(assuming it is positive) from a forward, option, or swap contract (or other off-
balance sheet transaction) in the event the bank's counterparty defaults on the 
contract. However, the cost of replacing the cash flow is difficult to calculate 
because it depends on a number of uncertain factors such as the maturity of a 
contract and the volatility of relevant underlying foreign exchange or interest 
rates.487 
The Accord lays out two methods to calculate the replacement cost of an 
exchange rate contract: the "current exposure" method, and the "original ex-
posure" method (discussed below). There are two steps in the current expo-
sure method (also called the "asset equivalent amount"). First, an exchange 
rate contract is converted into a credit equivalent amount. In general, the 
credit equivalent amount depends on the maturity of the contract and the vola-
486. The members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See OR-
GANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD. 
CODES OF LmERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND CURRENT INVISffiLE OPERATIONS 2 
(1995). 
487. MALLOY, supra note 210, at§ 5.3.3.4 at 5.111. 
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tility of the prices or rates of the relevant underlying instrument. Thus, for ex-
ample, the credit equivalent amount of a dollar-yen option contract depends on 
the maturity of the contract and the relevant dollar-yen exchange rates. Sec-
ond, an appropriate risk weight is applied to the credit equivalent amount. An 
exchange contract is not slotted into the I 00 percent risk weight category be-
cause banks entering into such a contract generally are "first class names."488 
Instead, the Accord presumes a 50 percent weight will be used. 
The first step in the current exposure method is the most complicated of 
the two steps. The credit equivalent amount is the value of an off-balance 
sheet transaction for purposes of risk-weighting. But, it is not the notional 
principal amount of that transaction. Rather, it is the sum of two terms: the 
current replacement cost of a contract and a term called the "add on."489 Ac-
cordingly, two calculations are necessary to obtain the credit equivalent 
amount. 
With respect to the first term, the current replacement cost, it is necessary 
to mark to market an exchange contract. ("Marking to market" refers to ape-
riodic, such as end-of-day, valuation of each asset position based on current 
market prices.) The current replacement cost is the cost a bank would incur if 
it entered into a new exchange rate contract on the same terms and conditions 
as an existing contract on which its counterparty defaulted. It focuses on mar-
ket values and is calculated "by marking [the] contract[] to market, thus cap-
turing the current exposure without any need for estimation .... " 490 On the 
day a contract is entered into, the replacement cost is zero because it reflects 
prevailing market exchange or interest rates. As time passes, those rates are 
sure to change, and it is likely to be costly to replace the contract because its 
terms and conditions reflect what have become off-market rates. 
The second term in calculating the credit equivalent amount is the add on 
factor. This factor captures potential future credit risk over the remaining life, 
or residual maturity, of the contract. In other words, it pertains to the possibil-
ity a counterparty might default on an exchange rate contract in the future. 
488. 1988 Baste Capital Accord, supra note 5, Annex 3 at 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 
I 007. Likewise, the 1988 Baste Capital Accord acknowledges that counterparties on swap con-
tracts generally are good credit risks. Accordingly, the risk-weight associated with swaps is not 
to exceed 50%. Interestingly, some bank regulators represented at the BSC reserve the right to 
apply a 100% risk weight. See BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 4, 
at 178. 
489. Accordingly, the formula for calculating the credit equivalent amount of an exchange 
rate contract under the current exposure method is the sum of: 
Current replacement cost based on mark-to-market value of contract + Add on for potential fu-
ture exposure based on notional principal amount and residual maturity. 
Thereafter, the appropriate risk-weight is applied to the credit equivalent amount. 
490. 1988 Baste Capital Accord, supra note 5, Annex 3, at 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 
1004. A replacement cost is calculated only for an exchange contract with a positive value. 
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The amount of the add on depends on two variables-the notional principal 
amount of the contract and its residual maturity. 
Originally, the 1988 Accord specified that for an exchange rate contract 
with a residual maturity of less than one year, an add on factor of one percent 
of the notional principal amount must be used. For an exchange rate contract 
with a residual maturity of one year or more, the Accord stated that an add on 
factor of five percent of the notional principal amount must be used.491 As a 
result of the 1995 Netting Amendment, the BSC adopted an expanded matrix 
of factors.492 Exchange rate contracts with a residual maturity of one year or 
less have a one percent factor. Those contracts with an original maturity of 
over one year to five years have a five percent factor. Those contracts with a 
residual maturity of over five years have a 7.5 percent factor. 
As an example of calculating the credit equivalent amount of a foreign ex-
change transaction, consider the capital required to support the following dol-
lar-yen call option. Suppose the Bank of Tokyo holds a $1 million call option 
written by Citibank. The exercise price is 100 yen per dollar, the original ma-
turity is 180 days, and the remaining maturity is 90 days. Suppose the dollar-
yen spot rate moves to 101 yen per dollar. The option is in the money because 
the Bank of Tokyo can obtain $1 million for ¥ 100 million. If it were to pur-
chase $1 million on the spot market, then it would have to pay ¥ 101 million. 
Ifthe Bank of Tokyo exercises the option, but Citibank defaults, then the Bank 
of Tokyo incurs a positive replacement cost.493 
This cost is estimated by marking the option to market. Assume the sec-
ondary market value of the option is $1,000-that is, it would cost the Bank of 
Tokyo $1,000 to enter into a new option with the same terms and conditions as 
the Citibank contract. Assume further that the secondary market value reflects 
the replacement cost.494 As for the add on, because the residual maturity is 
less than one year, it would be one percent of the notional principal amount of 
$1 million, or $10,000. Thus, the credit equivalent amount, or asset equiva-
lent, ofthe dollar-yen option is $11,000. 
To this credit equivalent amount an appropriate risk weight is applied. If 
the counterparty obligor is a private party (e.g., another bank) then the risk 
weight would be fifty percent. Accordingly, the Tier I capital required to sup-
491. 1988 Basle Capital Accord, supra note 5, Annex 3 at 30 INT'L LEGAL MA TERJALS 
1005. 
492. See 1995 Netting Amendment, supra note 14, Annex at 2. 
493. In contrast, suppose the dollar-yen spot foreign exchange rate moves to 99 yen per 
dollar. The option is not in the money because the Bank of Tokyo can obtain $1 million on the 
spot market for ¥ 99 million. In contrast, if it exercises the option, then it must pay ¥ I 00 mil-
lion for $1 million. Thus, ifCitibank were to default on the option contract, then there would be 
no replacement cost incurred by the Bank of Tokyo. 
494. In practice, the calculation of replacement cost is likely to be considerably more com-
plex than suggested above. 
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port this contract would be four percent of $6,500, or $260, and the Tier 1 plus 
Tier 2 capital required to support the contract would be 8 percent of $6,500, or 
$520. 
(D) The Original Exposure Method 
The current exposure method in the 1988 Accord for calculating the credit 
equivalent amount of an exchange (or interest) rate contract is intricate. In-
deed, a number of bank regulators represented at the BSC "apparently have 
found this two-step process of analysis too complex; they consider it inconsis-
tent with the general approach of the framework." 495 Quite possibly, these 
regulators were prodded by their banks. The BSC was compelled to allow 
bank regulators to use an alternative method for calculating credit equivalent 
amounts-the original exposure method. 
This method eliminates the first step of the current exposure method by 
deeming immaterial the market value of an exchange (or interest) rate contract 
at a particular date. Instead, the credit equivalent amount of a contract is cal-
culated by applying a conversion factor to the notional principal amount of the 
contract. The conversion factor used depends on the maturity of the contract. 
The original maturity is used for exchange rate contracts, but bank regulators 
have discretion to use either the original or residual maturity for interest rate 
contracts. The factors are:496 
Maturity Exchange Rate 
Less than 1 year 
One year but less 
than 2 years 
For each additional 
year 
Contracts 
(percent) 
2.0 
5.0 
(i.e., 2.0 + 3.0) 
3.0 
Interest Rate 
Contracts 
(percent) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.0 
Thus, in the case of the $1 million currency option discussed above with 
an original maturity of 180 days, a factor of two percent would be applied to 
the notional principal amount of one million, yielding a credit equivalent 
amount of $20,000. 
A risk weight appropriate to the counterparty obligor is then applied to this 
amount. As with the current exposure method, under the original exposure 
495. MALLOY, supra note 210, at§ 5.3.3.4 at 5.112 (emphasis added). 
496. 1988 Baste Capital Accord, supra note 5, Annex 3 at 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 
1006. 
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method an exchange contract is not slotted into the 100 percent risk weight 
category because banks that enter into such a contract generally are "first class 
names." 497 The Accord presumes a fifty percent weight will be used.498 Ac· 
cordingly, assuming a private obligor and, therefore, a fifty percent weight, the 
Tier 1 capital charge is $400. The Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital charge is $800. 
Unfortunately, in trying to simplify matters by allowing bank regulators to 
use the original exposure method, the BSC created the potential of an unlevel 
playing field for banks. As the option example illustrates, the current and 
original exposure methods may yield different capital requirements for the 
same exchange rate contract, depending on the nature of that contract.499 Un-
der the current exposure method applied above, the requisite capital charges 
for the hypothetical option were considerably smaller than the charges under 
the original exposure method. These differences stem in part from the fact that 
the original exposure method, unlike the current exposure method, does not 
focus on market values.soo 
(E) Netting By Novation 
The 1988 Accord recognized a risk reduction technique used by many 
497. I d. at Annex 3 at 30 lNT'L LEGAL MATERIALS I 007. 
498. The 1988 Basle Capital Accord acknowledges counterparties on swap contracts gener-
ally are good credit risks. Accordingly, the risk weight associated with swaps is not to exceed 
50%. See id. Interestingly, some bank regulators represented at the BSC reserve the right to 
apply a 100% risk-weight. See BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK-BASED CAPITAL, supra note 4, 
at 178. 
499. For an example of different capital charges under the two methods in the case of a sin-
gle-currency fixed/floating interest rate swap, see Scott & lwahara, supra note 20 at 50-54. 
500. See An Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, C-2-3. 
The different results raise the possibility that some bank regulators may behave strate-
gically to give their banks a competitive advantage. The Federal Reserve requires use of the 
current exposure method. Scott & Iwahara, supra note 20, at 49. In contrast, Japan allows its 
banks to use either method if they do not transact a large volume of exchange or interest rate 
contracts or are administratively unable to use the current exposure method. Id. at 50. 
(Administrative difficulties may arise in connection with mark-to-market accounting that is re-
quired to calculate replacement costs under the current exposure method. Japanese banks that 
select the original exposure method must use original maturities for interest rate contracts. If a 
Japanese bank selects the current exposure method, then the choice is irrevocable.) 
It would be economically rational for a bank with the freedom to choose to select the 
method that results in the lowest overall capital charge for its exchange (and interest) rate con-
tracts. Indeed, some Japanese banks have selected the current exposure method, while others 
have chosen the original exposure method. Scott & Iwahara, supra note 20, at 50. (Professors 
Scott and Iwahara raise the possibility that Japanese banks have chosen the original exposure 
method to secure a competitive advantage over their Japanese and U.S. counterparts. They ex-
press their personal disbelief regarding this possibility, but also indicate they would have to re-
consider the matter if Japanese banks continue to use the original exposure method. See Scott & 
lwahara, supra note 20, at 54.) Consequently, banks that lack this freedom may complain there 
is a gradient on the playing field for such contracts. 
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banks known as "netting by novation." This technique involves a bilateral 
contract between two counterparties under which any obligation to each other 
to deliver a given currency on a given date is automatically amalgamated with 
all other obligations for the same currency and value date, legally substituting 
one single net amount for the previous gross obligations.501 
Thus, for example, suppose the Bank of Tokyo has entered into dollar-yen 
and mark-dollar forward contracts for the same value date with Citibank. Un-
der the first contract, the Bank of Tokyo owes Citibank $1 million, while un-
der the second contract it is entitled to receive delivery of $400,000. Under a 
bilateral netting by novation arrangement, on the value date one payment 
transaction will settle both contracts: the Bank of Tokyo will pay Citibank 
$600,000. 
Because netting genuinely reduces counterparty risk, the Basle Accord al-
lows the Bank of Tokyo to use the netted amount of $400,000, rather than the 
sum of the notional principal amounts of each forward contract, as the basis for 
calculating the credit equivalent amount under the current or original exposure 
method.502 The capital charge under the current exposure method is reduced 
because the credit conversion factor of one or five is applied to the netted 
amount, which of course is smaller than the sum of the notional principal 
amounts. Similarly, the capital charge underthe original exposure method is 
reduced because the credit conversion factor of 2.0 percent or more is applied 
to the netted amount. 
(2) THE 1993 PROPOSALS 
(A) Market Risk 
While the 1988 Basle Capital Accord accounts for credit risk, it does not 
consider market risks associated with foreign exchange transactions.503 At 
best, the replacement cost calculation in the current exposure method indirectly 
501. 1988 Baste Capital Accord, supra note 5, Annex 3 n.6. See also An Integrated Bank 
Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at B-1. 
502. In general, netting by novation used in payments transactions can reduce the value and 
volume of such transactions by as much as 50%. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETILEMENTS, 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE 
GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 11 (Nov. 1990). A multilateral netting technique can reduce pay-
ments value and volume by up to 80%. ld. at 13. As a result of these reductions, systemic risk 
correspondingly declines. /d. See also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Policy Statement on Privately Operated Large-Dollar Multilateral Netting Systems, IV FED. 
RESERVE REG. SERVICE, 9-1021 at 9-360 (Oct. 1995). Ironically, however, until at least 1993 
most banks were unable to reduce capital charges through netting by novation because no for-
mula had been approved by the BSC or domestic regulators for calculating net exposures. An 
Integrated Bank Regulatory Approach, supra note 17, at B-1. 
503. The Prudential Supervision of Netting, supra note 7, at 4; A Simple Proposal, supra 
note 46, at 20. "Market risk" is defined supra note 8. 
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captures these other risks. But, volatile foreign exchange and interest rates can 
quickly and adversely affect the value of a bank's currency obligations or its 
asset-liability matches. Thus, the BSC realized an explicit cushion against 
losses arising from market risk is necessary. 
On April30, 1993 the BSC issued a "consultative proposal" entitled "The 
Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks"-i.e., the 1993 Market Risk Pro-
posal-that was supposed to become a formal amendment to the Accord.504 
The BSC intended to introduce specific minimum capital charges for the cur~ 
rent market value of open positions, including derivative positions, in a bank's 
trading book, and for a bank's total currency positions as regards foreign ex-
change risk. 505 
Specifically, the BSC divided financial instruments into two separate cate-
gories, debt and equity. The former category included debt derivatives like 
forwards, swaps, and possibly options.506 In addition, the BSC proposed an 
express capital charge against foreign exchange risk that would cover spots 
and options.507 The BSC's proposed methodologies are analyzed in Part II 
above in th~ context of the intricacy and cogency variables of the FICAS 
model. 
Conceptually, the BSC proposed that a bank's overall minimum capital re-
quirement for foreign exchange transactions would be the sum of the capital 
charges for the ( 1) credit risk associated with these transactions, (2) market 
risk associated with debt securities, and (3) market risk associated with foreign 
exchange rate movements.508 For debt securities, the BSC agreed the capital 
charge against market risk would substitute for the capital charge against credit 
risk, i.e., items (l) and (2) were substitutes.~09 Thus a bank with well-hedged 
positions might reduce its capital requirements. But, the BSC did not permit a 
compensating reduction in the capital charge for credit risk on account of the 
capital charge for foreign exchange risk, i.e., items (1) and (3) were additive.510 
(B) Interest Rate Risk 
The 1988 Basle' Capital Accord also failed to incorporate interest rate 
504. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 3. 
505. See Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15, at 4; see also 1993 Market Risk 
Proposal, supra note 7, at 1-5 .. The BSC expected banks to manage the market risk to which 
they are exposed through foreign exchange transactions on a continuous basis, i.e., at the close 
of each business day. /d. at 9. 
506. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 14-32. 
507. /d. at 1, 33-42. 
508. ld. at 8. 
509. ld. 
510. /d. See also, A Simple Proposal, supra note 46, at 20. The BSC proposed a de minimis 
exception to enable banks with negligible foreign currency business to escape any capital 
charge. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 8. 
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risk. 511 Again, the BSC relied on the replacement cost calculation mandated 
by the Accord to serve as an imperfect proxy to safeguard against this risk. 
While the 1993 Market Risk Proposal addresses trading activities valued at 
current market prices, it does not address the interest rate risk inherent in tradi-
tional bank activities like lending and deposit taking. This risk is the focus of 
a second consultative paper issued on April 30, 1993-"Measurement of 
Banks' Exposure to Interest Rate Risk," i.e., the 1993 Interest Rate Risk Pro-
posal. 
In the 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposal, the BSC reaffirms its view that 
"existing capital requirements [i.e., the credit risk guidelines devised in 1988] 
can be regarded as providing adequate protection against interest rate risk in 
most situations. " 512 The BSC accepts the fact that "a certain degree of interest 
rate mismatching is a normal feature of the business ofbanking."513 Therefore, 
in contrast to its Market Risk Proposal, the BSC does not call for new capital 
charges against interest rate risk. 514 
Instead, the BSC attempts to develop a system for measuring interest rate 
risk that would identify banks incurring "extraordinarily large amounts of in-
terest rate risk"-i.e., "outliers."515 The BSC leaves to the discretion of do-
mestic bank regulators the possibility of an explicit capital charge or some 
other regulatory remedy.516 In sum, the Proposal treats the first issue of how to 
measure interest rate risk, not the second issue of what action (if any) regula-
tors should take to discourage excessive risk-taking.517 
The BSC does not offer its methodology as the definitive way to measure 
interest rate risk. It acknowledges there is no consensus among the G-1 0 
regulators on a number of issues and invites comments from banks on such is-
sues.518 The goal of the proposed measurement methodology is "to estimate 
the sensitivity of the economic value [i.e., going concern value] of the bank to 
future changes in interest rates." 519 
The proposed methodology for measuring interest rate risk is intricate, in-
volving at least five steps. First, a bank "would categorize interest rate sensi-
511. A Simple Proposal, supra note 46, at 20. "Interest rate risk" is defined supra note 12. 
512. The Prudential Supervision of Netting, supra note 7, at 4. 
513. /d. 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposal, supra note 11, at 2. 
514. 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposal, supra note 11, at 2-4. 
515. The Prudential Supervision of Netting, supra note 7, at 4; 1993 Interest Rate Risk Pro-
posal, supra note 11, at 2 and 5. 
516. 1993/nterest Rate Risk Proposal, supra note 11, at 5. 
517. /d. 
518. /d. 1, 6, 10-12, and 25-29. In the absence of a consensus, and pursuant to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, the Federal Reserve and other U.S. 
bank regulators have issued a Joint Policy Statement on Interest Rate Risk. See Federal Reserve 
Press Release, Joint Agency Policy Statement: Interest Rate Risk, May 23, 1996. 
519. /d.at2,8. 
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tive assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet instruments according to their 
maturities or certain repricing characteristics." 520 That is, a bank slots these 
items into one of thirteen maturity bands. 521 Separate maturity ladders are 
used for each currency, hence the bank must go through the remaining steps on 
a currency-by-currency basis.522 Problems, of course, arise ~ith respect to in-
struments whose maturity was uncertain, for example, pre-payable mortgages 
and installment loans, or savings and demand deposits where a bank has some 
discretion as to the timing and changes in the interest rate it pays.523 .•.• 
Second, the bank "vertically" offsets .its positions (i.e., calculate a net po-
sition for each maturity band).524 However, full vertical offsetting might not 
be allowed. Rather, disallowance factors might limit the extent tp which in-
struments could offset one another.525 In addition, a bank might not be al-
lowed to offset opposing interest rate positions denominated in different cur-
rencies (though the BSC did not issue a specific proposal on this point).526. 
Third, the bank assigns a weight to the net position in each maturity band 
according to the price sensitivity of that item to changes in interest rates.527 
The BSC suggests the concept of "duration" as an appropriate way to measure 
this sensitivity. 528 
Fourth, the bank "horizontally" offsets its duration-weighted positions 
(i.e., calculates net weighted positions across all maturity bands). 
Fifth, the bank "compute[s] the difference between its duration weighted 
assets and liabilities, subject to certain adjustments. " 529 
The result of the five steps is a single numerical estimate of the change in 
the value of the bank as a result of a specified change in interest rates.53° For 
instance, the number might indicate the bank was vulnerable to a rise in inter-
est rates, i.e., if the rates rose, then value of the bank as a going concern would 
decline.531 ' 
The 1993 Interest Rate Risk Proposal treats foreign exchange transac-
tions---:in particular, debt derivatives like swaps, forwards, and possibly op-
tions-in the same way as the 1993 Market Risk Proposal.532 This treatment is 
520. Id. at 1. 
521. 1993Interest Rate Risk Proposal, supra note 11, at 8-9. 
522. /d. at 20. 
523. /d. at 6, 14-16. 
524. /d. at 8-9, 18. 
525. /993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 9, 18-19. 
526. 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 20. 
527. /d. at 8-9. 
528. /d.at16-17. 
529. /d. at l. 
530. /d. 
531. 1993/nterest Rate Risk Proposal, supra note 11, at 1; 
532. 1993 Interest Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 15-24. 
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discussed in Part II of the text. 
(C) . Netting 
The 1988 Basle Capital Accord deals with netting in a restrictive manner. 
A bank can reduce the capital charge associated with its currency trading ac-
tivities on the basis of net rather than gross payment obligations only if it nets 
these obligations by novation. In its 1993 Netting Proposal, the BSC offered 
to liberalize its policy toward netting and recognize certain netting arrange-
ments ·in addition· to netting by novation. That is, the BSC agreed a bank 
should be allowed to calculate its capital requirement on the basis of a broader 
range of bilateral netting techniques than simply netting by novation, including 
close-out netting. 
The BSC proposed to define "the precise conditions under which banks 
would be·permitted to net the credit risks arising from trading in certain finan-
cial instruments" based on a November 1990 report published by the Com-
mittee on Interbank Netting Systems of the BIS, commonly known as the 
Lamfalussy Report.533 Banks could reduce their overall capital charges "to the 
extent that they have legally valid netting arrangements governing their trading 
in certain financial instruments."534 The BSC presented specific requirements 
a bank must meet before its netting scheme would be recognized for capital 
adequacy purposes.535 The BSC confirmed these requirements in its 1994 
Netting Amendment, and they are discussed below in that context. 
(3) The 1994 Netting Amendment 
On July 15, 1994, the BSC confirmed its 1993 Netting Proposal as the 
1994 Netting Amendment to the 1988 Basle Capital Accord. The 1994 Net-
ting Amendment focuses on credit risks associated with off-balance sheet 
transactions. 536 The BSC purports "to broaden the recognition of bilateral 
netting ofcurrent credit exposure for capital adequacy purposes."537 The BSC 
does not specify a timetable. for implementing the new rules. Instead, it leaves 
the matter to domestic bank regulators.538 
The BSC articulates its concern that "a liquidator of a failed counterparty 
has (or may have) the right to unbundle netted contracts, demanding perform-
533. The Prudential Supervision of Netting, supra note 7, at 2. 
534. /d. 
535. 1993 Netting Proposal, supra note 9, Annex 2. 
536. See 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13. 
537. July 15, 1994 Press Statement, supra note 13. The Amendment applied only to contract 
netting, not payments netting. · Payments netting schemes may reduce the number and cost of 
settlements, but do not affect a counterparty's gross contractual obligations. See 1994 Netting 
Amendment, supra note 13, Annex 1 at 1 n.6. 
538. July 15, 1994 Press Statement, supra note 13; 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, 
at 1. 
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ance on those contracts favourable to the failed counterparty and defaulting on 
unfavourable contracts."539 In the event of such "cherry-picking," a netting 
scheme does not reduce counterparty credit risk.540 To address this problem, 
the BSC reiterates four requirements it had first set forth in its. 1993 Netting 
Proposal. A bank must meet these requirements before the BSC or the bank's 
domestic regulator recognizes for capital adequacy purposes any bilateral net-
ting arrangement (including netting by novation). First, 
the bank must satisfy its domestic regulator it has a netting contract- or agree-
ment with the counterparty which creates a single legal obligation, covering all 
included transactions, such that the bank would have either a claim to receive 
or obligation to pay only the net sum of the positive and negative mark-to- .. 
market values of included individual transactions in the event a counterparty 
fails to perform due to any of the following: default, bankruptcy, liquidation 
or other similar circumstances .... 541 
Second, the bank must obtain "written and reasoned legal opinions that, in 
the event of a legal challenge, the relevant courts and administrative authorities 
would find the bank's exposure to be such a net amount under" (1) the law of 
the jurisdiction in which the counterparty is chartered, (2) the law of the juris-
diction of a foreign branch of the counterparty, if a branch is involved in the 
netted transactions, and (3) the law that governs any contract necessary to ef-
fect the netting.542 Third, the bank must have "procedures in place to ensure 
that the legal characteristics of netting arrangements are kept under review in 
the light of possible changes in relevant law." 543 Fourth, a contract containing 
a "walkaway clause"-i.e., "a provision which permits a non-defaulting 
counterparty to make only limited payments, or no payment at all, to the estate 
of a defaulter, even if the defaulter is a net creditor"544-is not eligible for net-
ting for the purpose of calculating the credit risk capital charge. 
The 1994 Netting Amendment also confirms a transition rule first pro-
posed in the 1993 Netting Proposal pertaining to banks using the original ex-
posure method to calculate their credit risk exposures from off balance sheet 
transa~tions.545 The BSC opines that under the current exposure method, bi-
lateral netting could reduce the capital charges associated with exchange (and 
interest) rate contracts by 25-40 percent because of a reduction in the replace-
ment cost for such contracts.546 It recognizes this benefit would not accrue to 
banks using the original exposure method because that method does not entail 
539. I994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, Annex 1 at I. 
540. See BHALA, supra note 4, at 152-87. 
541. I994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, Annex 1 at 1-2. 
542. /d. Annex 1 at 2. 
543. /d. 
544. /d. 
545. /d. at 2, and Annex 1, at 3. 
546. 1993 Netting Proposal, supra note 9, at 4. 
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the calculation of replacement cost.547 Accordingly, the BSC states the credit 
conversion factors for the original exposure method would be reduced by 25 
percent until market risk capital adequacy rules were adopted. 548 After this 
transition period, the original exposure method could not be used. 549 Hence, 
eventually all banks would use the current exposure method to calculate the 
credit equivalent amounts of their off-balance sheet transactions. 550 
Finally, in the 1994 Amendment the BSC offers a formula to recognize the 
effect of netting when calculating the capital charge for potential future credit 
exposure associated with off-balance sheet transactions subject to legally en-
forceable netting arrangements.551 The BSC acknowledges these arrangements 
can reduce future as well as current credit exposure.552 However, because it is 
concerned about cherry picking in both contexts, the BSC proposes to apply in 
the potential future credit exposure context the same four requirements estab-
lished for the current credit exposure context. 553 In addition, the amount by 
which add-ons for potential future credit exposure could be reduced as a result 
of a netting arrangement would be constrained by a formula incorporating net 
and gross current replacement costs for the transactions subject to netting. In 
particular, the add-on for netted transactions (ANET) would equal the average 
of the add-on as calculated under the 1988 Accord (AGROSS),554 adjusted by 
547. /d. at 5. 
548. /d. Annex 2 at 3. The 25% reduction could be linked to the BSC's conservative esti-
mate of the capital reduction associated with the current exposure method. However, this link-
age is not clear from the 1993 Netting Proposal or 1994 Netting Amendment. In other words, 
the origin and rationale for the 25% reduction is not transparent. Consequently, it could be ar-
gued the transition rule is a well-intentioned but arbitrary way of trying to ensure a bank using 
the original exposure method is not unfairly disadvantaged by the BSC's new approach to net-
ting. 
549. 1993 Netting Proposal, supra note 9, Annex 2 at 3; 1994 Netting Amendment, supra 
note 13, Annex l at 3. Domestic bank regulators have the discretion to add an additional twelve 
month transition period. 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, Annex l at 3 n.l 0. 
550. The BSC noted that for bilaterally netted forward transactions, a bank's credit exposure 
would be the sum of its net mark-to-market replacement costs (if positive), plus an add-on based 
on the notional underlying principal. It did not, however, provide any details about this calcula-
tion for spots, options, or swaps. 
551. The BSC also suggested an enlargement of the matrix of add-ons for potential future 
exposure, first set forth in the 1988 Basle Capital Accord, in order to cover a broader range of 
transactions not covered expressly in the Accord. See 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, 
at 4-5 and Annex 3. 
552. 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 3. 
553. !d. at 3. In this paragraph, the BSC states its proposed formula for reducing the add ons 
would apply to "transactions subject to legally enforceable netting agreements consistent with 
the requiremen_ts set out in the attached amendment to the [1988 Bas/e) Capital Accord on bi-
lateral netting" (emphasis added). 
554. That is, A GROSS is calculated by multiplying notional principal amounts of transac-
tions by the appropriate add-on factors specified in Annex 3 of the 1994 Netting Amendment. 
See 1994 Netting Agreement, supra note 13, Annex 3. 
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the product of the (I) ratio ofthe net current replacement cost to the gross cur-
rent replacement cost (NGR) and (2) AGROSS.555 The BSC proposes the 
following formula: 
ANET = (0.5)(AGROSS) + (0.5)(NGR)(AGROSS), 
where NGR = level of net replacement cost divided by level or gross re-
placement cost, with respect to transactions subject to legally enforceable net-
ting arrangements.556 
(4) The 1995 Netting Amendment 
The BSC did not take long to confirm its proposal, first published in the 
1994 Netting Amendment, for recognizing the effects of netting on reducing 
potential future credit risk exposure. This confirmation took the form of a pa-
per issued on April 13, 1995 entitled "Baste Capital Accord: Treatment of 
Potential Exposure for Off-Balance Sheet Items"-the 1995 Netting Amend-
ment. The only material change the BSC made to its initial ANET formula, 
presented above, was to scrap the 0.5 coefficients. In the 1995 Amendment, 
the BSC adopts a new coefficient for AGROSS, 0.4, and a new coefficient for 
the product of NGR and AGROSS, 0.6. Accordingly, the formula the BSC 
now mandates is: 
ANET = (0.4)(AGROSS) + (0.6)(NGR)(AGROSS). 
The BSC states the 0.4 and 0.6 weights represent "an appropriate com-
promise between recognizing the effects of netting in the add-ons and provid-
ing a cushion against potential fluctuations in the net current exposure. " 557 
(5) The 1995 Market Risk Proposal 
The BSC's 1993 Market Risk Proposal was superseded in just two years 
by a new proposal. On April 12, 1995, it began a revolution in capital ade-
quacy with its 1995 Market Risk Proposal.558 This Proposal offers banks a 
choice. They can determine the capital adequacy charge to cover market risk 
using the methodology outlined in the 1993 Proposal, re-named the 
"standardized measurement" (or simply "standardized") methodology. Al-
ternatively, banks can determine the charge by using an internal VaR model 
that satisfied broad qualitative and quantitative standards. 559 
The second option, which may be called constrained self-regulation, is dis-
cussed in detail in Part III above. As for the standardized methodology, in its 
SSS. 1994 Netting Amendment, supra note 13, at 3. 
556. /d. at 3. 
557. 1995 Netting Amendment, supra note 14, at I. 
558. See supra note 15. 
559. The BSC did not suggest a capital charge for interest rate risk in its 199S Market Risk 
Proposal. Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note IS, at 7; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, su-
pra note IS, at 6 n.7. See also 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 6 n.7. 
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1995 Proposal the BSC makes only two material changes to the 1993 Market 
Risk Proposal relevant to foreign exchange transactions.560 The first change 
pertains to the treatment of options.561 In contrast to its stance in the 1993 
Proposal, the BSC agrees in its 1995 Proposal to allow a bank to use sophisti-
cated means to measure the market risks associated with options. A bank that 
uses only purchased options can use the "simplified" approach, which resem-
bles the approach set forth in the 1993 Proposal and discussed in the text. 562 
However, a bank that also writes options must use an intermediate approach, 
or a comprehensive risk management model.563 The more significant its trad-
ing, the greater the expectation a bank use a sophisticated approach.564 Such 
an approach can be devised by the bank and should take account not only of 
delta (which measures the expected change in the price of an option as a result 
of a change in the price of the option's underlying instrument), but also gamma 
(which measures the rate of change of delta) and vega (which measures the 
sensitivity of the value of an option with respect to a change in volatility).565 
Curiously, the BSC offers no rationale for its proposed formulas to measure 
gamma and vega risk, 566 and it admits it has no proposal to deal with certain 
risks-:-most notably, rho (the rate of change ofthe value ofthe option with re-
spect to interest rates) and theta (the rate of change of the value of the option 
with respect to time).567 
The second change in the standardized methodology concerns the avail-
ability of tier III capital to cover foreign exchange risk. The BSC appears to 
relax the view it articulated in the 1993 Market Risk Proposal. It allows a 
bank to use tier III capital, subject to the similar criteria as those set forth in 
1993, to absorb losses from foreign exchange risk. 568 
560. Compare 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pts. A.1 at 9-18, A.3 at 22-25 and 
A.S at 31-37 with 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 14-26 and 33-42. See also Over-
view, supra note 16, at 7; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pts. A. I at 9-18 and A.S 
at 32-37. A number of minor changes made by the 1995 Proposal are summarized in Proposal 
to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15, at 5. 
561. April 1995 Press Release, supra note 15, at 3; Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra 
note 15, at 2-5; 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. A.S at 31-37. See also 1996 
Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, pt. A.S at 32-37. 
562. Compare 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. A.S at 31 with 1993 Market 
Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 35. 
563. 1995 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 15, pt. A.S. at 31-37. 
564. /d. at pt. A.S at 31. 
565. /d. at pt. A.S at 32. 
566. /d. at pt. A.S at 34-35. 
567. /d. at pt. A.S at 35-36. 
568. Compare 1993 Market Risk Proposal, supra note 7, at 9-12 with April 1995 Press Re-
lease, supra note 15, at 3-4, Proposal to Issue a Supplement, supra note 15, at 5-6 & 1995 Mar-
ket Risk Proposal, supra note 15, at 7-8. See also Overview, supra note 16, at 7-8; 1996 Market 
Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 7-8. 
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(6) The 1996 Market Risk Amendment 
Finally, in January 1996 the BSC confinned its 1995 Market Risk Pro-
posal. The 1996 Market Risk Amendment resembles the 1995 Proposal in all 
material respects.569 With respect to the standardized methodology, the most 
significant change concerns simplified treatment of options.570 With respect to 
the internal model methodology, as discussed above in Part III there are two 
noteworthy changes: a framework for using backtests to check the accuracy of 
a VaR model, and limited recognition of empirical correlations across market 
risk factor categories. · 
569. See Overview, supra note 16, at 3. 
570. See id. at 7; 1996 Market Risk Amendment, supra note 16, at 4. 
